July 22, 2005
It's
official now. The leaked Downing Street memos have confirmed that Lt.
General Michael Moseley, who commanded allied air forces during the Iraq
war, admitted in a briefing in 2003 that starting nine months before the
invasion, British and American aircraft waged a secret air war against
Iraq.
Britain's Liberal
Democrats party has obtained Ministry of Defense figures showing that
Britain and the United States dropped twice as many bombs in the second
half of 2002 as in the whole of 2001, according to the Times of London.
The escalated attacks began in May 2002, six months before the United
Nations resolution that Prime Minister Tony Blair cited as the legal basis
for war. (1)
Why anyone would
eagerly claim paternity of a war that has so miscarried is of course a
whole other question, but Moseley believes that it was those nine months
of allied raids, of 21,736 sorties dropping 600 bombs, that "laid the
foundation" for the Coalition victory. The raids took place under cover of
patrolling the no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq and had the
ostensible aim of protecting ethnic minorities in the region, but the rest
of the leaked memos show pretty clearly that this is hogwash meant only
for public consumption. The principals -- Bush, Blair, then Defense
Secretary Hoon, Generals Boyce and Moseley -- knew all along that
provocation not protection was the name of the game.
Still, reporters who
have fallen all over this story in shrill angst should ask themselves
where they were three years ago, or even two, when not only was this
war-before-the-war wiped off our screens, but so was the air-campaign
DURING the war.
A while back, an
insightful article in Tom Dispatch, "Icarus (Armed with Vipers)
Over Iraq," pungently noted the blank-out. (2) It quoted
the BBC's Stuart Richie only a week into the air campaign during the war:
"[S]leep was
virtually impossible -- troops moving in and out all night by helicopter
and Hercules planes. Fighter planes also seemed to be on the go all
through the night, this time on sorties to Mosul, I believe."
Tom Dispatch then asks why it is that, with the exception of an early NY Times piece
about the difficulties faced by US airmen, not one newspaper or magazine
article has had anything to say about those "all through the night"
bombing campaigns. Nor have there been cumulative figures on daily,
weekly, or monthly air strikes in Iraq, maps of the reach of the air war,
photos of the aftermath of bombing raids, analysis of the strategy
involved or estimates of its significance, its effects on the insurgency,
and its limitations.
This was a secret
war. But presumably, even embedded reporters are free to look up, unless
they were specifically instructed not to. Did someone tell our Ernest
Hemingways to ignore the hostile heavens and fixate on the earthly war?
Sad to say, in a war as vetted, scripted, and rehearsed as this one, the
possibility can’t be ruled out, which means that the so-called freedom of
our press is no more than the freedom of eunuchs in a Turkish seraglio.
Even so, inquiring minds might wonder why the air war, rather than ground
combat, would be the target of such selective and thorough censorship.
After all, if one were looking to create a telegenic, video game war, it
would make sense to focus on the fireworks in the sky; spectacular,
technologically masterful and most importantly, detached from any visible
consequences. So why the blank-out?
Thomas F. Searle, a
military defense analyst at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama who argues
that air power's "counter-guerilla capabilities" need to be "aggressively
developed," gives the game away:
"Airpower remains
the single greatest asymmetrical advantage the United States has over its
foes." (3)
Exactly. To a
government intent on creating the collective illusion of the Iraq war as a
defensive campaign against a belligerent dictator, what would be likely to
undermine that illusion than the image of a bullyboy in the skies pounding
a rag tag, almost-disarmed enemy?
That explains the
official white out of the air war and the silence of the official media,
but not the stunning indifference of the public.
Bush lied us into
war? It's a nice slogan but rather self-deceiving. It seems more honest to
say that most people didn't resist too much when they were being tutored
in official mythology and that some even turned out to be rather apt
pupils. The media might have kept the story of the pre-war war off the
screen but anyone with his wits about him could have put together the
story from those telltale tidbits that popped up from time to time from an
otherwise comatose press.
Here's one
far-from-complete list starting from as far back as over a decade:
1) Two NY Times
editorials after the 1991 Gulf War, one of them titled "Don't Shoot Down
Iraqi Aircraft," which cautioned that "shooting [Iraqi aircraft] down
would put the United States in the position of breaking an accord it is
pledged to uphold."
2) An August 29,
1999 report in a left-wing newspaper, Revolutionary Worker, which
observed that: "Almost every day since last December, the United States
and its close ally Britain have been relentlessly bombing Iraq and its
people," have fired "more than 1,100 missiles at over 360 targets," and
have already flown "about two-thirds as many missions in Iraq this year as
NATO flew over Yugoslavia in around-the-clock bombings from March to
June."
3) An April 9, 2000
Agence France Presse report that Iraq newspapers considered the air
strikes "criminal" ("Iraq Slams Gulf Silence Over Civilian Deaths in US
Raids").
4) A June 16, 2000
piece in The Washington Post by Edward Cody, "Under Iraqi Skies, a
Canvas of Death," which vividly described the bombing of farmers and
shepherds on May 17 as almost routine: "Without warning, according to
several youths standing nearby, the device (the missile) came crashing
down in an open field 200 yards from the dozen houses of Toq al-Ghazalat.
A deafening explosion cracked across the silent land. Shrapnel flew in
every direction. Four shepherds were wounded. And Omran, the others
recalled, lay dead in the dirt, most of his head torn off, the white of
his robe stained red. 'He was only 13 years old, but he was a good boy,’
sobbed Omran's father, Harbi Jawair, 61."
5) A February 17,
2001 AP report on the first air strikes outside the NFZs since
1999. The report claimed that the strikes did not indicate a change in
policy. These attacks, which targeted Baghdad, were Bush's first air
attack orders.
6) A June 9, 2002
AP report on Russian criticism of the air strikes ("Russia Strongly
Criticizes US-British Patrol of Iraq Zones," by Nicole Winfield).
7) A November 11,
2002 AP report describing warplanes roaring off US Navy aircraft
carriers "day and night" as "previews of a potential American invasion."
The targets are no longer the usual targets of the decade long patrols --
anti-aircraft and missile batteries -- but command bunkers, communications
stations and radar directing the attacks, hard-to-repair facilities
essential to Iraq's air defense.
8) A November 19,
2002 Reuters report that describes even the timorous Kofi Annan
digging in his heels and contradicting the US interpretation of Resolution
1441 on Iraq ("Annan Says Iraqi No-Fly Zone Firing No Violation").
9) Another
Reuters piece on December 2, 2002 detailing a letter to Annan by Iraqi
foreign minister Naji Sabri that describes a coalition raid on Sunday as
part of a "barbaric terrorist aggression" against Iraq ("Iraq Complains to
UN Over Raid").
10) An AFP
article on the same day voicing Moscow's condemnation of the same Sunday
raid as unjustifiable and a hindrance of the UN inspector's work ("Moscow
Condemns US-British Air Raid on Iraq").
11) A long piece by
Richard Norton-Taylor in The Guardian on December 4, 2002, "Britain
and US Step Up Bombing in Iraq," noting a 300% increase in bombs dropped
in Southern Iraq since March and a 60% increase over the previous year.
The article's diagnosis is that the escalation of hostility foreshadows
open war.
12) A piece by
Stephen Zunes in Foreign Policy in Focus on December 6, 2002, "The
Abuse of the No-Fly Zones as an Excuse for War," calling the air raids a
pretext for war. It points out that the United Nations never actually
authorized the no-fly zones.
13) A piece by John
Pilger in The Mirror on December 20, 2002 that counts 62 attacks by
American F-16 aircraft and RAF Tornadoes between August and December 2002,
all said to have been aimed at Iraqi air defenses, but falling mostly on
populated areas ("The Secret War"). Pilger notes that under international
law the attacks amount to acts of piracy, legally equivalent to the
Luftwaffe bombing of Spain in the 1930s, and calls the unrelenting "secret
war" since 1991 the longest Anglo-American campaign of aerial bombardment
since World War Two.
14) An article by
Robert Dreyfuss in the American Prospect, "Persian Gulf—or Tonkin
Gulf?", which bluntly dubs the Anglo-British sky patrol "a case of might
makes right" and calls Iraq's feeble attempts to protect her airspace
perfectly justified under international law.) "The unilateral U.S.
interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441," writes Dreyfuss,
"is a pretext for launching the war that President George W. Bush wants."
These are all
reports dating from 2001 and 2002, that is, more than half a year BEFORE
the invasion of Iraq. And for the most part they are all accounts from
well-known media outlets. Clearly, "we didn't know" simply doesn't work as
an excuse. The
Downing Street memos tell us nothing we haven't suspected in our
marrow and our blood for a long time now.
Then what gives? Why
the practiced chagrin, the howls of violated rectitude?
As far as our elites
go, there is a two-word answer: cognitive dissonance. The Downing Street
memos catch the ruling classes of Anglo-America in flagrante delicto
and it doesn't square with the pillars-of-international-society look that
they affect at other times. Hence the feigned double take, the curled lip,
the sneaky scramble for cover.
But we the people
have surely always known that our Dear Leaders are up to what all other
Dear Leaders in all places and at all times are always up to. So what's in
it for us that we've been willing to play along? Or, as Mike Davis, the
author of City of Quartz, asks succinctly, "What is the
contribution of strategic bombing to the American war of life?"
(4)
Davis describes a
work of public art in Reading, Pennsylvania, in which Mexican artist
Marcos Ramirez lists without comment the following names and figures:
Ciudad de Mexico
3202 km 1847
Veracruz 3040km 1914
Hiroshima 11194 km 1945
Dresden 4837 km 1945
Hanoi 13206 km 1972
Ciudad de Panama 3497 km 1989
Kabul 10979 km 2001
Baghdad 9897 km 2003
The cities are all
one-time targets of US bombing raids, the numbers express their distance
from Reading, and their juxtaposition betrays the range of American
domination of the globe and the centrality of bombing to the maintenance
of American empire.
And how did the
public react to this non-committal record of history? With righteous
outrage: "Other countries do it too," or in the case of one group of
patriots outraged by Ramirez's billboard, with brazenness, "We're Glad!"
There was collective rage at "anti-Americans", "communists", and
"feminazis".
The uncomfortable
truth is that our silence over American air power is not simply the
silence of ignorance, but the silence of complicity.
For, think about
what it is that that silence glosses over. In the 20th century,
air campaigns have dropped literally billions of bombs, killing -- besides
enemy combatants -- at the very least more than two million foreign
civilians, mostly Asian, including half a million Japanese in nuclear and
non-nuclear incineration (during WWII); 100,000 or more Koreans (the
Korean war); a million Indo-Chinese by carpet-bombing (the Vietnam War);
numberless thousands of Germans and Europeans, some intentionally, some by
accident (WWII); around 50,000 and probably many more Iraqis (the two Gulf
wars); several thousand Afghans (post 9/11); several hundreds of Serbs
(Yugoslavia); good numbers of Nicaraguans, Dominicans, Haitians,
Guatemalans, Cubans, Panamanians, and Colombians (various police
operations and coups), with some miscellaneous Libyans and Sudanese thrown
in for good measure. (5) And these are simply the
immediate victims of American bombing. There is also the aftermath of
disease and violence to be reckoned with, the economic and environmental
devastation, the incineration of forests and fields, the poisoning of
livestock, of water and soil, the mutilation of the gene pool. That is
what our ownership of the sky has meant for the world.
And what has it
meant for us?
Do we somehow
believe -- against the facts staring in our face -- that a war for oil
means cheaper gas prices? That preventive bombing wins friends and
influences people?
What is it that
makes us still willing to buy into the myth of smart bombs and surgical
strikes when with every war, civilian casualty rates keep rising? By one
estimate, the number of civilians killed per bomb dropped may have been
four times as high in Afghanistan as in Yugoslavia, even though 70% of the
bombs used in Afghanistan were precision-guided versus only 30% in
Yugoslavia. (6) During the 1991 Gulf War two American
"smart" bombs, working perfectly, burrowed through 10 feet of hardened
concrete into what the Pentagon swore was an Iraqi command and control
center. But it was the Amiriyah bomb shelter, and 408 Iraqi civilians were
incinerated in what many regard as the single most lethal instance of
civilian casualties in conventional air war. But we still see what
happened in the no-fly zones as "police" operations and ourselves as Wyatt
Earp keeping law and order on the frontier. Why?
One answer lies in
history. Airplanes, "like a host of other weapons invented or imagined in
the nineteenth century" were celebrated because they were so destructive
that writers like Jack London and Victor Hugo believed they would make war
and armies vanish. (7)
In Europe in 1921,
General Giulio Douhet asserted the basic principle of strategic bombing as
an intensive and systematic offensive against a country’s infrastructure
and, by corollary, its civilian population. His apocalyptic book, The
Command of the Air (1921), and his prophecy of the future devastation
of cities was also echoed in fiction like H.G. Wells' The Shape of
Things to Come (1929). If war was inevitable, then a short war was
best, and the best way to have a short war was to use the deadliest
weapons and finish off the matter as fast as possible.
The sheer
carnage of air war was cloaked not only by such pious reasoning, but by
the increasing sophistication of the technology and organization involved.
God-like power seemed to grant god-like impunity and therefore god-like
prerogatives. "Those who could take life could also give it and thereby
triumph over their own mortality," writes one chronicler of air power as
he traces how the "good guys" of World War II ended up taking the lead in
establishing the norm that is now taken for granted -- that all civilians
are fair game in war from the air. (8)
And how does the
public conscience square with all this? Simple. The civilians who are fair
game are not American civilians. The skies that are threatened are not
American skies. It may take a village to raise a child, but given enough
air power, we now know also that it only takes a child to raze a village.
Our children, their villages. And in return for our invulnerability, we
make cultural icons out of bomber pilots, turning a blind eye to their
ravages abroad. While the grunt that kills and is killed on the scorched
ground bears the burden of public backlash against any horrors of war
making that might elude censorship, his mates in the clouds are
untouchable. Atrocities are always only committed on earth. So a
Lieutenant Calley is court-martialed over My Lai and a Charles Graner is
imprisoned for Abu Ghraib, but the bombers who wreak havoc on a magnitude
far grander not only walk free, but are feted by a society in which for
many reasons the air force is substantially white and the officer corps
even whiter.
But there’s more.
Strategic bombing directed broadly against a country’s will or morale
rather than military targets has nearly always been associated with
civilian not military control. Pen pushers in think tanks and journals,
couch-crusaders on Wall Street and Main Street are the most hysterical
groupies for total war from the skies. (9) Remote from
actual bloodletting, they're still the quickest to tote up grand
calculations of its necessity in bringing about their favorite utopia. It
was Lyndon Johnson, not the generals, who first ratcheted up the air war
against North Vietnam to genocidal proportions.
And because the
civilian leadership unlike the military is always indebted to public
opinion for its existence, it’s ultimately public approval rather than
military need that drives air war against civilians, which is why the
corporate media obligingly does its bit to keep that approval going.
Media and government
duplicity, widespread intoxication with technological wizardry, a deadly
sense of impunity combined with a deadlier sense of omnipotence, cultural
myth making, and socio-economic class are the causes of America’s
fundamentally diseased relationship with air power and thus with the raw
foundation of imperial might. It is the cognitive disease which
periodically manifests itself in redundant "smoking-guns" and "exposes"
about memos whose sole purpose apparently is to maintain our illusion of
ourselves as eternal naifs duped by an endless procession of charlatans
in government.
Clearly, it's not
merely war propaganda so much as the public’s receptivity to war
propaganda that's the problem. The addiction to war-as-Grand Theft Auto
reveals an insatiable craving in the bowels of the military-industrial
leviathan for physical violence. Air war feeds that craving while
disarming us with its technical virtuosity and its remote-controlled,
surreal impersonality.
Air war works
because it displays naked aggression masked as defense, hard core
furtively masquerading as family viewing in the American living room. It's
the secret fix that lets us look like good guys but act like bad guys;
it's the other face of the double-eagle, the predator behind the mask of
the protector.
Air war is the white
noise of a consumer society so narcotized that only violence makes us feel
alive. If we no longer see it, hear it, or talk about it in the heart of
empire, it's ultimately only because for more than fifty years now, we've
never really done without it.
Lila Rajiva
is a freelance journalist based in Baltimore, Maryland, and author of
The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and the US Media
(Monthly Review Press, September
2005). While her manuscript was completed in February, publication has
been delayed for a variety of reasons not under her control until this
Fall. She apologizes to the many readers who have ordered copies. She is
working on a second book on propaganda and empire.
She can be reached at:
lrajiva@hotmail.com.
Copyright (c) 2005 by Lila Rajiva
REFERENCES