September 17, 2005
Pablo Picasso. Guernica, 1937.
Securitizing the Global Norm of Identity: Biometric Technologies in Domestic and Foreign Policy
For presentation at Global Norms Under Siege: Non-Intervention,
Human Rights, and Abstention from Torture, 20 May 2005, Queen's
University Belfast, N. Ireland.
Author's contact details:
John Measor
Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies
Stocker Road
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4ND
UK
Email: jmeasor@shaw.ca
Benjamin J. Muller
Department of Political Science
University of Victoria
PO Box 3050
Victoria, BC V8W 3P5
Canada
Email: bmuller@uvic.ca
Securitizing the Global Norm of Identity: Biometric Technologies in Domestic and Foreign Policy
In the 1930s the Spanish city of Guernica became a symbol of
wanton murder and destruction. In the 1990s Grozny was cruelly
flattened by the Russians; it still lies in ruins. This decade's
unforgettable moment of brutality and overkill is Falluja...
Jonathan Steele and Dahr Jamail, 'This is our Guernica'
The Guardian, 27 April 2005i
They'll be fingerprinted, given a retina scan and then an ID
card, which will allow them to travel around their homes or to nearby
aid centers, which are now being built. The Marines will be authorized
to use deadly force against those breaking the rules.
Richard Engel, NBC reporter, 8 December 2004ii
21st Century Guernica: (Dis)Ordering Places
In November 2004 the world watched - periodically, depending on the
focus of the media gaze - as the US Marine Corps engaged so-called
'insurgents' in a brutal battle in Fallujah, Iraq. For all their
high-tech weaponry, precision munitions, and exceptional training, in
their search-and-destroy mission occupation forces all but obliterated
Fallujah. During the month-long siege of Fallujah by American forces
more than 200,000 residents fled the city. Out of these ruins,
occupation forces argued they were erecting a 'model city', replete
with a high-tech security infrastructure centered on biometric
identification strategies to manage returning citizens. Returnees are
fingerprinted, retina scanned, and issued a mandatory identity badge
displaying the individual's home address and collected biometric data.
In this context, the gratuitous destruction of Fallujah appeared, as
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld often retorts when pushed on current
events in Iraq, to be precisely 'according to plan'. It is trite
to say that we live in interesting times; not so trite, however, are
the meditations of many contemporary thinkers and writers surrounding
the way modern liberal politics embody what is increasingly known as
'the state of exception'. In the context of contemporary international
norms, and even constitutionalism, one might consider the extent to
which 'exceptionalism' is itself becoming a norm of/in world politics.
In some sense, the gratuitous destruction of ones enemy is a thinly
veiled norm of modernity, not to mention the subsequent reordering and
repopulation of these ruined spaces/places. Jonathan Steele and Dahr
Jamail's invocation of the wanton destruction of Guernica and Grozny,
brings to mind Pablo Picasso's poignant painting 'Guernica'. Unlike any
other, this painting commissioned for the 1937 World's Fair in Paris
depicts the horrors of area bombing; wrenched buildings, contorted
animals, and maimed people, brutally and hopelessly intertwined in a
shambles that betrays the order of the cubist form. Out of such
bewilderment how does (re)introduce order?
The violence and cruelty of bombing civilians and annihilating a
city/place through such violence is palpable in Picasso's painting;
thus, one is left with a feeling of hopelessness in the face of the
overwhelming destructive capacity of modernity. Practically cliché,
however, is the extent to which this destructive capacity is in marked
contrast with the simultaneous productive potential of modernity.
Imbued with a certain measure of American triumphalism it speaks to the
remnants of a post-Cold War hubris. Lingering in the American political
imaginary, one finds a unique (re)productive arrogance that dominates;
destruction is no longer the problem, but rather the rapidity of
reconstruction.iii
In fact, as is noted by advocates of biometric technologies in Iraq
(and elsewhere), problems with spelling local names and the alleged
overdependence on interpreters is resolved, as personal data is
collected with relative ease through technological means.ivMoreover,
it becomes apparent that modernity's potential precludes the need to
come 'face-to-face with the Other',v the ramifications of which are
multiple and widespread. Notably, the state of exception acts as
a condition of possibility for both wanton destruction and the
particularities of the reconstruction. It is only in a state of
exception that the shooting of protestors is an acceptable measure, and
where the overt management of the population as a condition of
reconstruction is feasible. In this paper, we consider the introduction
of biometric technologies in Fallujah, or more precisely, the ruins of
Fallujah. Variations on the strategies of management and control
exercised in Fallujah are proliferating across Iraq (and Afghanistan),
raising similar concerns regarding the management of local populations
- and indeed the definition of their membership (citizenship) in the
community - by occupying military forces. In fact, the so-called
'biometric automated toolkit' or BAT has become an integral part of the
US authorities arsenal. How different, then, is the use and rationale
behind the application of biometric technologies as a constituent part
of homeland security compared with its employment in pursuing foreign
policy objectives? We argue, that the use of biometrics for the
management of the population is constitutive of contemporary
securitized (exceptional) politics, and while more apparent, the case
of Fallujah is not dissimilar to 'domestic' homeland security
initiatives and the securitization of citizenship. Moreover, it speaks
to an evolving global norm of securitized identity, emphasizing the
mutually constitutive relationship between domestic and foreign policy,
or at the very least destabilizing conventional notions about the
separation between these spheres, which are reified in the discourses
and disciplinary regimes/knowledge of International Relations and
Comparative Politics.vi
Moreover, it speaks to an attempt to exercise bioplitical technologies
of power as forms of subjugation and control/management, which in turn
constitutes the subject under such 'exceptional' circumstances as
Agamben's homo sacer. The paper begins by briefly introducing the
state of exception, and the extent to which the introduction of
biometric technologies are representative of the politics of
exceptionalism. As the title of the paper indicates, we consider these
securitizing moves, namely the introduction of biometric technologies,
as underscoring constitutionalizing trends, or at the very least, the
untenable differentiation between domestic and foreign policy. In this
specific case, in much the same way that modern technology has rendered
conventional articulations of space and time obsolete, the simultaneous
use of biometric technologies as a part of both domestic homeland
security strategies and foreign policy objectives, biometrics begin to
challenge articulated limits of identity and place. We then examine the
case of Fallujah, which is arguably an exemplar in the wider case of
Iraq, wherein the struggle to gain the biopolitical ascendancy of
sovereign power is asserted by occupation forces in an effort to take
control of biopolitics - the management of life. As a result of the
destructive violence executed by occupation forces, identity is
rearticulated on the principles of biometrics and to draw on Giorgio
Agamben's work, some Iraqis are articulated as homo sacer; namely, the
15-45 year old males who were not given the option of leaving Fallujah
prior to the siege in November 2004. In this sense, while cognizant of
the disturbing story of destruction represented in Picasso's
'Guernica', the story here is much more about the destructiveness of
reconstruction, and the struggle over sovereign power in its
biopolitical form. We conclude with some reflections on the arguments
presented, and their wider application in the Iraqi context.
Homo Sacer and the State of Exception
Drawing on the work of Nazi constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt, but
also a Hobbesian and Weberian heritage, the revival of deliberations
over the state of exception is found in contemporary work by Italian
philosopher Giorgio Agamben. Although many of those not beholden to the
triumphalism found in post-1989 commentaries turned to Schmitt, some
specific resonances were absent. In particular, one of the critical
points for Agamben regarding the state of exception is becoming the
norm sent many writers and thinkers scrambling. In the wake of the
events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent introduction of
anti-terrorist legislation and homeland security strategies, however,
this contention is much less radical. Specific pieces of anti-terrorist
legislation such as Bill C-36 in Canada, the USA PATRIOT Act, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), or
even the American Homeland Security Act of 2002, involve at a bare
minimum some 'sunset clauses', if not in fact subjecting the entire
piece of legislation to such a clause. Of particular importance, is the
way in which sunset clauses give a certain impermanence to exceptional
or emergency powers. While the sovereign might indeed, to borrow from
Schmitt's dictum, 'the sovereign is he who decides the exception', it
is not intended to be carte blanche power. If it were, exceptional
powers would no longer be 'exceptional', but the norm, or what is
termed the permanent state of exception. The question then is, what
gives the state of exception its permanence, and what are the
implications to the members of the political community in this state of
exception?
On the one hand, to follow Agamben's lead, the state of exception
arises at an intersection between the legal and political; a civil war,
an insurrection, an armed resistance.vii
Moreover, the state of exception is the result of a 'political crisis',
indicating that they should be understood in political terms and not
juridical-constitutional grounds.viii For Agamben,
what is particularly challenging about the state of exception is the
way in which it functions in a 'zone of undecidability', or what he and
others have referred to as a 'zone of indistinction'.ix
As the sovereign is both the law and outside the law, and subsequently
has the power to suspend the law, there is a sort of legal sanction to
the state of exception which is extra-juridical. Therefore, as Agamben
contends, the state of exception is awarded a certain legal status,
such as the notion of the 'legal civil war' he explores.x
Furthermore, and perhaps most important to the transformation of the
state of exception becoming the norm, is the way in which exceptional
powers, or permanent states of emergency, become important technologies
of governmental control. Here Agamben accurately notes, the state of
emergency is not always openly declared in a technical sense, yet
statutory amendments and changes that occur in the background speak
directly to the permanence of the state of exception.xi
Moreover, the suspension of conventional legislative and judicial
powers and the concentration and centralisation of power in the hands
of the core executive, constitute the state of exception. The ways in
which this creeps into hidden statutes that lie in wait, ready to
spring forward when required, and the general way in which this state
of exception seems to have become an effective technology of rule for
contemporary governments emphasises the permanence of the state of
exception. Much of this speaks directly to Michele Foucault's point
that modern politics is biopolitics, in so far as sovereign power is
preoccupied to a much greater extent with the management of life as a
particularly important technology of power.xii As Foucault notes:
Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as a
political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and
political, as a biological problem as as power's problem.xiii
For Giorgio Agamben, what is particularly important about Foucault's
thesis is the way in which one understands the sense of this
transformation towards biopolitics and the 'management of life'. Hence,
Agamben's dialogue about 'form-of-life' and the power(s) that
constitutes multiple forms of life as the 'form-of-life'. In other
words, it seems impossible to isolate 'naked life' from the
'form-of-life' that is political life.xiv
Inasmuch as its inhabitants [of the camp] have been stripped of every
political status and reduced completely to naked life, the camp is also
the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realized - a
space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life
without any mediation.xv
In this 'zone of indistinction' that is the political space of the
exception, homo sacer or sacred man becomes indistinguishable from the
citizen. Hence, in the same way as the 'zone of indistinction' is
exceptional - extra-juridical - the subjectivity of the inhabitants is
also extra-juridical, as they are deprived of rights and prerogatives
to the point that committing any act toward them no longer appears as a
crime.xvi
In our analysis, if Fallujah is indeed a space/place of exception - as
in broader terms we might argue that Iraq on the whole is subject to a
state of exception, as is the domestic space of the US under conditions
of the war on terror, which further emphasizes the mutually
constitutive relationship between domestic and foreign policy - then to
what extent are the inhabitants homo sacer? In considering the
specifics of the Fallujah case, while not all inhabitants are clearly
articulated as homo sacer, certainly those perceived as most
threatening by occupying forces are constructed as such. Furthermore,
our analysis emphasizes the extent to which the application of
biometric technologies by US led forces is at the very least a
contributing factor to this (re)articulation of Iraqis or in this case
Fallujahns as homo sacer, or indeed might be a necessary although not
sufficient condition for this particular (re)articulation. Before
discussing the specific case of Fallujah, however, some brief words on
biometric technologies and the specifics of contemporary applications
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Biometrics and the BAT
Biometric technologies involve the measurement of physiological characteristics, generally in digital form.xvii
The breadth of allegedly measurable physical characteristics appears
limitless, at least according to the industry literature. The most
popular biometric applications are face recognition vis-à-vis digitised
facial scanning, iris scans, retinal scans, and digitised
fingerprinting. These conventional biometric applications reinforce
notions of the body as a solid, stable entity of which definable and
quantifiable parts can be subject to measurement. However, so called
'esoteric biometrics' take not only the unique aspects of the body, but
the actual physiology, which, for lack of a more suitable phrase
measures the bodies 'output'. Esoteric biometrics include: facial
thermography (the pattern of facial heat caused by the distinctive
blood flow under the skin); DNA; body odour (measuring 'rolatiles': the
chemical substances that cause odour; gait (measuring the distinctive
manner of walking); foot dynamics (considers not only the size of the
foot, but dynamics, such as pressure analysis relating to the shape of
the foot, the 'foot geometric' regarding timing of steps, and
'dermatoglyphics', which uses the measurement of footprint ridges to
measure friction).xviii The reason to offer some
examples of esoteric biometrics is not simply for its shock value, but
to emphasize the vision and belief in 'the body as password' that
permeates the biometrics industry and the literature. It also exposes
the industry and its advocate's long term vision, indicating both a
belief in the sustained need for biometric technologies, and their
suitably futuristic (re)solutions of/for these needs. The possible
applications for biometrics, it would seem, are only limited by one's
imagination. Biometric technologies have generally been employed in the
private sector, such as in high-security sites like financial
institutions, secure nuclear or chemical facilities, or for the
security of particular products, such as the narcotics necessary for
anaesthesiologists. Biometric technologies are also not strangers to
the panoptic sphere of surveillance, consistently used to track the
comings and goings of employees in large institutions. Contemporary
debates over the applications of biometrics are subject to some very
particular phenomena of both the contemporary information age and the
post-9/11 security context.
The events of 11 September 2001 definitely had an impact on the
biometrics industry, if only to open a policy window for already
supportive legislators. Doing much more than preach to the converted,
however, biometric technologies were strategically presented as the
panacea to the security problems of the post-9/11 world. Caught in the
paradox between securing borders and bodies and the imperatives of the
neoliberal global economy, states were attune to the representation of
the 'security problem' that the biometrics industry was so quick to
articulate.xix
The proposed applications of biometrics for the purpose of securing
borders and bodies are generally for biometric or biometric ready
passports, visas, permanent resident cards, and national identity
cards. The general emphasis is for Machine Readable Travel Documents
(MRTD), allegedly contributing to increased efficiency and heightened
security, thus satisfying the dual requirements of the imperative free
movement of the global economy and the post-9/11 supposed security
imperatives. Throughout these debates, however, the (im)possibility of
securing bodies and borders generally appears to fall outside of the
space of biometrics politics. As Simon A. Cole maintains, based on its
assumptions about the security of the body itself, this entire project
may in fact be misguided:
Indeed, the body itself may become a rather antiquated way of defining
the individual. A wide variety of new technologies - sex reassignment,
cyberspace, artificial intelligence, cosmetic surgery, organ
transplantation, and so on - all point toward the demise of the
nineteenth century notion of the body as solid, stable entity and the
advent of some new conception of bodies as mutable and flexible... We
may cease to think of ourselves, or to identify ourselves, strictly as
physically unique bodies and begin to think of ourselves as somewhat
more ethereal entities for whom bodies and body parts are merely
resources.xx
While there are ways in which Cole's contentions might challenge the
introduction and claims of biometrics, the introduction of biometrics
might also be interpreted as contributing factors to this rather
fetishised account of the body. In other words, if the body becomes
password, does it cease to be the body?xxi On such questions and others, the literature, government commissioned reports, and public forums generally fall silent.
Following on form arguments made by Robert Putnam and others, Yale
Ferguson and Richard Mansbach assert that the separation between
domestic and foreign policy is increasingly untenable; domestic
policies influence international affairs, and vice versa.xxii
To this end, biometric strategies towards the (re)articulation of the
body as password and the general securitization/criminalization of what
Agamben refers to as 'bare life' or even homo sacer itself appear
mutually reinforcing in the spaces of both domestic and foreign policy.
In the domestic space, the new 'normal' biopolitical relationship
between the citizen and the state affords sovereign power the ability
to appropriate and register the biological life of bodies.xxiii
In the 'international' space, biometrics is becoming an ever powerful
tool on war on terror's battlefield du jour. Rather than simply
'managing the battlefield' in the classical strategic sense of the
word, biometric technologies serve to narrow the field of politics,
wherein the citizen is increasingly rendered a suspect, or as Agamben
might say, homo sacer, which can be legitimately subjected to such
disciplinary technologies.xxiv In the case of Iraq
and Afghanistan, the Biometrics Automated Toolset, otherwise known as
BAT, is employed throughout the theatre of operations in order to keep
a database of terrorists, insurgents, local workers, and detainees.xxv
Like Simon A. Cole's notion of 'suspect identities', or more apt
Agamben's homo sacer, the subject is deprived of rights and
prerogatives, and can be legitimately tamed, controlled, disciplined,
and even destroyed. As the listed categories indicate, terrorists are
on equal footing with local workers, as an overall management of
identity is pursued, where the subjectivities of those in question are
(re)articulated as homo sacer; they can be detained, shot, tortured, as
they are stripped bodies in the exceptional zone of indistinction.
Equally relevant here, is the proliferation of the use of these
measures, not to mention the rapidity with which they can be deployed.
According to reports from the US Marine Corps, the BAT system is effective, mobile, and user friendly:
In a matter of seconds, a Marine working at a gate or check point can
collect biometric data from an individual, search the database in the
computer, and look for a match with the many other records already in
the database... 'Success with BAT comes from the relative ease of
collecting good quality biometric data and then searching for a person
using that data', Jon E. Davis said.xxvi
The system uses iris scans, taking a digital image of the eye and
storing it in the database with other personal information and relevant
personal history. In addition to the claimed dependability of collected
biometric data, the ability to circumvent even a superficial nod at
cultural sensitivity is noted when extolling the virtues of BAT:
Biometrics also solves the current problem of matching spelling of
local names, which is often encountered even when an interpreter is
available. The majority of Marines working the gates are able to learn
how to operate the system in a matter of days.xxvii
Instead of coming face to face with the Other, one can avoid this in
any substantive way through such measures, as the Other is simply
rearticulated through biometric applications into the suspect identity.
Moreover, the productive possibilities of such face-to-face encounters
are eradicated; they take too long, require too much cultural
investment, and respect local knowledge in the face of the imposed 'new
normal' biopolitical measures of the state. Remember, the majority of
Marines can learn to operate BAT in a matter of days; understanding the
complexity of local identities takes much longer. To return to
Picasso's 'Guernica', this would appear to be the real horror of
contemporary war's destructiveness: not the annihilation of structures
and the bombardment of infrastructure, but the rationalization of
knowledge vis-à-vis the rearticulation of identity.
Fallujah: 'Exceptional' Place and the creation of Homo Sacer
The US invasion and near-total destruction of Fallujah in November 2004
attempted to create an extraordinarily powerful space of exception
within the Iraq being shaped by US policies. US Marines assaulted the
city using aerial bombardment and ground forces in an effort to pacify
Fallujah and its inhabitants, to undermine support for the insurgency,
and establish central control for the national election scheduled for
30 January 2005. It has proven particularly difficult to investigate
the nature of the new geopolitical ordering - and its associated
biopolitical strategies - as US authorities, acting as the de facto
sovereign with their occupation of Iraq, prevented independent
observation of the attack and subsequent actions and the general
security situation in the country continued to deteriorate preventing
even independent Iraqi or international humanitarian investigation.
However, reports indicated the widespread use of white phosphorus, the
attack and closure of hospitals within the city in an effort to
suppress witness reports of the type and severity of injuries and
deaths, and to implement a strict biometric control on the citizens of
the city.
Situating Fallujah in the context of Iraqi politics and its experience
with the occupation forces is critical in identifying its place within
policy planners' designs for Iraq. Prior experience had led US
decision-makers to see Fallujah as a space necessitating the
'suspension of the norm'. It emerged as a space of in-distinction
between order and disorder within which sovereign power decides the
confine between life and death and where, from that confine, it
attempts to put in order that which lies 'outside'. Fallujah, with its
long history of resisting central control only magnified by its
experience with the American occupation, had doubtlessly rebuked
American attempts to control the city. These attempts saw US military
forces increasingly identify it as unique and exceptional in its role
in the insurgency.
However, Fallujah's opposition to US actions, and its inhabitant's role
within the insurgency were more tied to geographical location and the
historical composition of the city's population. Sitting at a
crossroads of the Euphrates River, the Amman-Baghdad highway, and the
north-south corridor connecting the Western Arabian Peninsula and Mosul
and Aleppo in the north - an ancient trading route - Fallujah had long
been an important node in the development of trade and culture flows
between multiple societies. Centuries of marriage, tribal and
commercial flows had cemented a local culture that found great
prosperity in the heady days of Iraqi development with the influx of
petro-dollars. Its early acceptance of salafi and even Wahabbi strands
of Islamic thought from the Nejd to the south and its embrace of trade
and cultural ties to Mosul and Alleppo created a worldview divergent
from that of Baghdad. Under an avowedly secular Ba'thist dictatorship
Fallujah found itself resisting central control and modernist trends
emanating from ministries in Baghdad. Like all of Iraq it suffered
under the aerial bombardments of the 1991 war,xxviii and the deprivations and humanitarian devastation brought on by economic sanctions from 1990-2003.
However, with the US-led invasion of March 2003 Fallujah found itself
bypassed by both major fighting and the incursion of US occupation
forces within the city itself. With the fall of Saddam local tribal
leaders ousted local Ba'th Party officials, asserted local control of
the city, prevented looting, and selected the pro-American Taha Bidaywi
as the new mayor of the city. US forces would not enter until April
2003, an action that erased some goodwill, especially when many in the
city had been hoping the U.S. Army would stay outside. Facing the
emergent insurgency across Anbar province US forces worked with Bidaywi
and established the 'Fallujah Protection Force', composed of men from
Fallujah, to police the city and help fight the resistance. On 28 April
2003, a crowd of 200 youth gathered outside a local school where US
forces had established their base of operations in the city, to protest
the presence of US forces in the city generally and in particular to
see the school vacated so that classes could begin. This developed into
an altercation in which 15 Iraqi civilians were killed and dozens
injured by US gunfire. Continued protest, brought on by the rising
anger at US forces deployment within the city, forced redeployment
outside the city, but also reoriented Falloujah's traditional
opposition to outside control to opposition of US dictates.
The city's strategic location within Anbar province, home of the
increasing insurgent opposition to US occupation of the country, saw
increased US military action in the surrounding villages and cities.
This brought the interwoven community apparatus - tied together through
marriage, clan and tribal linkages - intimately into contact with the
conflict. Fallujah and its environs provided insurgents with access to
the transportation arteries critical to both the US military occupation
and its political incarnations - the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and then the US-sponsored Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).
Moreover, the emergence of Islamist jihadi elements amongst the
increasingly diverse insurgency - painted as 'foreign fighters' by the
US military - merged with the city's historic Islamist character to
establish it as a permissive locale for such fighters - real or
imagined. The increasing voice of the Association of Muslim Scholars
(Hayat Al-Ulama Al-Muslimin) - a group based out of Fallujah
representing some 3000 mosques across Iraq - only furthered the
perception.
On 31 March 2004 insurgents in Fallujah killed four private security
contractors working for Blackwater Security USA. With the insurgents
quickly melting away following the attack on the Blackwater SUVs a
crowd of local youths began to beat and stone the vehicles and bodies -
eventually hanging the dismembered remains from a bridge over the
highway. The images of the corpses and their treatment received immense
media exposure worldwide, and US military forces quickly responded by
surrounding and quarantining the city.
With the city council unable or unwilling to identify and hand over
'those responsible' for the act US forces launched an assault on the
city on 4 April 2004. The assault on the city met fierce localized
resistance and after several days much of the city was not under US
military control. Attacks on mosques by US forces, who identified them
as legitimate military targets due to their use by insurgents, and the
assault upon a major urban population, saw the expansion of the
insurgency both in geographical scope - from south of Baghdad to Mosul
- and in the lethality of attacks on US forces and their chosen Iraqi
administrators. With increasing Iraqi and international approbation of
the assault the US military declared a ceasefire on 9 April, and the
ensuing negotiations between city leaders and Baghdad saw a formal
agreement declared on 19 April 2004. The attempt by coalition forces to
regain control of Fallujah, dubbed 'Operation Vigilant Resolve' by
military planners, led to more than 40 US military deaths and estimates
of the number of Iraqi deaths in the attack ranged from 271 (according
to the Iraqi Ministry of Health) to 731 (according to Rafie al-Issawi,
the head of the city hospital). The US military's failure to pacify the
city saw it rise as both a symbol of a specific strain of Iraqist
identity and as a concrete locale of resistance to US occupation. US
military and political statements left the distinct impression that the
assault was in retaliation for the attack on the Blackwater personnel,
rather than as part of a larger strategy to combat the insurgency or to
pursue the rule of law across Iraq.xxix
The appearance of US actions as reactionary increasingly dominated
media coverage of events in Iraq. The failure to procure evidence of
Iraqi WMD possession undermined the justification - and legal basis -
for invasion, the torture and detainment of innocent Iraqis in the
thousands made US authorities appear vindictive in the face of the
insurgency, and the thrust of the attack on Fallujah - destroying an
urban landscape and its inhabitants to mete out reprisal against a
handful of insurgents purported to be in their midst - vengeful and
wanton in its destruction. US authorities did not abandon efforts
against Fallujah however. The growing insurgency and its Islamist
variants only heightened Fallujah's position in the eyes of occupation
authorities. What was needed was a justification, and alternative
project to promote US military control over Fallujah. Seven months
later, following increased insurgent activities across Anbar, and with
the nominal cover of the 'sovereign' Interim Iraqi government of Iyad
Allawi, US forces again surrounded and invaded the city. Dubbed
'Operation Phantom Fury' by US forces and al-Fajr (the Dawn) by the
Iraqis involved, the assault on the city began 7 November 2004.
For the week preceding the assault civilians and non-combatants were
urged to evacuate the city and some 200000 of the city's 250000
residents fled into exile as internally displaced persons (IDPs) with
no government or occupation assistance. In this action - promoted as a
humanitarian gesture by the US forces - lay the basis of a new Iraq as
carried out by the occupation. For, as international and regional
pressures staid the hand of military action against the city in April
2004 on humanitarian grounds, what was preventing the military defeat
of the insurgency was the failure of US authorities to decipher and
disrupt the articulation of Fallujans identity; the network of
connections between local affinity groups and familial bonds,
linguistic and other identity markers that allowed the population to
maintain a sense of their own place and solidarity. Breaking this
solidarity would be necessary to break the tacit consent for the
insurgency in Anbar.
In so doing however, it required the creation of new identities,
crafted by the needs of foreign logics implemented through the use of
force. Fallujans were systematically divided into four distinct
categories. Women, children, and the elderly were to be displaced to an
unknown locale - no humanitarian provisions were forthcoming from
either the US military forces or the "Iraqi" authorities in Baghdad.
Nominally identified as 'Iraqis' they were to step aside while the
cleansing of the 'non-Iraqi' elements in Fallujah took place and then
return to 'vote' in the elections to select representatives and confirm
their status as 'new Iraqis'. Those noncombatants unable or unwilling
to leave were encouraged to avoid contact with anyone outside their
homes, to survive without drinking water and electricity (which was
shut off prior to the invasion) and on the meager foodstuffs they could
procure. Lost to the vagaries of chance their survival was abandoned as
'rules of engagement' stipulated by the invasion forces expanded scope
of lethality. These noncombatants, whether now displaced outside the
city or left under the rubble of their home's remains, were nominated
to be 'new-Iraqis' and to be the embodiment of what US forces were
fighting for - for their Iraqiness, their soon-to-be democratic
identity. Return to the city - to Fallujahns homes and lives - was
predicated on the removal of the 'old' and the acceptance of the new
biometrically catalogued and determined identity.
Combatants, insurgents, foreign fighters, jihadis, and regime 'dead
enders' were to be expunged from Fallujah - the 'old Iraq' removed - no
longer would language, history, architecture (in a city known as the
'city of mosques') or familial, clan or tribal bonds inform identity -
rather the use of biometric information gleaned in antiseptic
technological precision would determine who was Iraqi, all others were
to be killed. No longer would the individual and collective determine
identity markers by choice, but rather the authority of the occupation
would implant it on them. The new sovereign would color its subjects;
expunge the alternative, the past, the indecipherable - the 'other'.
Nowhere did this stand out as much as with a final group not identified
by US authorities, were those 15-45 year old males who were
noncombatants by choice. They were by dint of their gender and age
remade as homo sacer and unable to vacate the city. Guilty of the crime
of existing as 'old Iraqis' capable of defying the new order - even if
they chose not to - they were banned from society with all of their
rights as citizens (indeed as human beings) revoked by the de facto
sovereign. Identified by Giorgio Agamben as holy men homo sacer were
individuals to whom Roman law no longer applied. The mirror image of
the sovereign homo sacer was excluded from the law allowing him to be
killed by anybody - the exact fate of the 15-45 year old Iraqi males of
Fallujah. Agamben notes that from its origins law has maintained the
power to define what "bare life" was while at the same time gaining
power over it by making it the subject of political control. The power
of law ascribed to the sovereign the ability to actively separate
citizens (political beings) from human beings ("bare life"). In the
Fallujah of 2004 - the zone of exception created by US sovereign
military force - the application of law itself was/is being held
suspended.
After several weeks of intense fighting US and Iraqi authorities
invited Iraqi civilians to return. Some came to recover belongings left
behind in the haste of departure, some to reconnoiter an assessment of
the feasibility of returning to their homes, but most stayed away.
Unwilling to return to the newly created reality of their previous
reality, unwilling to accept the strictures of a biometrically
determined identity, and unable to live in the devastation of the 'new
Guernica' the people of Fallujah are now dispersed across the Iraqi
tableau. While the military assault on the city reduced it to rubble
and scattered its inhabitants the effort to reorient or reconstruct the
localized political identity failed. Connections of the ancien society
- tribe, clan, family, language, architecture, faith and ideology -
trumped attempts by the occupation authority to create a 'new Iraqi'.
In much the same way the Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari articulate
the state as a 'scripting machine' that 'over-codes' alternative ways
of coding the bodies and territories,xxx
US forces as agents of the state have attempted to 'captured' the Iraqi
people. The local knowledges and taxonomies that make the identity,
whose roots are in the ancien society possible, cannot be accessed by
these forces; hence, they are subjected to the state's methods of
capture. Moreover, the subjectivity or subjectification vis-à-vis the
state is often rather seductive, as the contestation of existence
within a statist political organization can itself be the manner
through which one is constituted as a 'subject'. As in the case of
'indigenous subjects' in North America, it is only when their own
existence within the state is contested that they are constituted as
indigenous subjects, and the state's capacity as a 'machine of capture'
is revealed. The long term ramifications of such attempts remains open
in the case examined here, but the struggle between existing localized
'codes' of identity, space, bodies and territories and the over-coding
capacities of the state is critical aspect of the material impact of US
led occupation forces in Iraq.
Conclusion
In some sense, the issues raised in this paper are situated at the
intersection of various issues, dilemmas and literatures. The somewhat
straightforward material case of the application of biometric
technologies by US led forces in Iraq masks the complexity that lies
behind this strategic decision/application. Because of its historical,
religious, and strategic importance, the particularities of Fallujah as
a case study complicate matters. The extent to which the discourse
surrounding the application of biometric technologies is overwrought
with preoccupations of efficiency, cost effectiveness, and specific
articulations of 'security', conceals its role in the biopolitical
obsessions of late modern state authority, and the state's role as a
'machine of capture'. Finally, as the question of sovereign power in
the Weberian sense is ambiguous at best in the Iraq situation, and
becoming murkier as the days pass, the conditions of the state of
exception that amplify sovereignty and reconstitute subjects as homo
sacer is both compelling and disquieting.
In our paper, we move to explore the extent to which the application of
biometric technologies by US led forces are an important part of the
assemblage that both constitutes the exceptional sovereign state as a
machine of capture, but also how in so doing, attempts are made to
rearticulate/over-code Iraqis, or in this specific case, Fallujahns as
homo sacer. In terms of the biopolitical mechanisms of discipline and
management, reconstituting citizens as homo sacer fortifies sovereign
power in the state of exception, and permits extra-juridical acts which
are no longer seen as a crime. Therefore, not only are attempts made to
over-code local knowledges and taxonomies of identity associated with
the ancien society, but in doing so, bodies and territory is
(re)articulated within the extra-juridical setting of the state of
exception; the efficient application of biometric technologies simply
acts as the material condition of possibility for this move. The
important question in human terms, is how (un)successful such moves
have been and currently are. As Picasso's Guernica reveals, while there
is much to be said of the (ir)rationality of war, its destructiveness
and the consequent human suffering is paramount.
i Quoted in Milan Rai 'Turning Point Fallujah: How US Atrocities Sparked Iraqi Resistance' Electronic Iraq 4 May 2005 http://electroniciraq.net/news/1947.shtml (accessed 9 May 2005)
ii John Lettice, 'Marine Corps deploys Fallujah biometric ID scheme' The Register http://www.theregister.com/2004/12/09/fallujah_biometric_id/print.html (accessed 10 December 2004)
iii Joxie - Rumsfeld Doctrine; creation of chaos...
iv Cpl. Chris Prickett, II Marine
Expeditionary Force, 'Coming to your town soon? Tracking locals with
the BAT of an eye' Marine Corps News 28 March 2005 http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/image1.nsf/lookup/2005327113726?opendocument (accessed 11 May 2005)
v See Emmanuel Levinas...
vi On the role of the distinction between
foreign and domestic policy to the disciplinary knowledge of IR and CP,
from a critical perspective see: David Campbell, Writing Security:
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1992); Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W.
Mansbach, 'Political Space and Westphalian States in a World of
'Polities': Beyond Inside/Outside', Global Governance Vol. 2, No. 1
(1996), pp. 261-287; Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A
Critical (Re)Introduction of International Relations (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Michael J. Shapiro, Methods and
Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject (New York:
Routledge, 2004); R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International
Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993).
vii Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception trans by Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 1.
viii Ibid.
ix Ibid., p. 2. Also see Giorgio Agamben, Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans by Daniel Heller-Raozan
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Jenny Edkins, 'Sovereign
Power, Zones of Indistinction and the Camp', Alternatives Vol. 25, No.
1, pp. 3-26.
x Agamben, State of Exception, pp. 2-3.
xi There are various examples one could point
to here, which speak to the way in which statutes lie in waiting to
exercise their power during the state of exception. Perhaps more
interesting and more relevant to discussions of the state of exception
becoming the norm, particular statutory amendments are worth
considering. These statutes are not subject to 'sunset clauses' that
certain pieces of anti-terrorist and homeland security legislation
have, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, which demand legislative and/or
judicial review after a set number of years. For example, consider the
amended article 38.13 of the Canada Evidence Act which is a statutory
change, and as such is not subject to these 'sunset clauses' typical of
'emergency powers', yet nonetheless effectively contributes to
executive power and suspends the power of judicial review,
concentrating power in the hands of the Attorney General:
38.13 (1) The Attorney General of Canada may personally issue a
certificate that prohibits the disclosure of information in connection
with a proceeding for the purpose of protecting information obtained in
confidence from, or in relation to, a foreign entity as defined in
subsection 2(1) of the Security of Information Act or for the purpose
of protecting national defence or national security. The certificate
may only be issued after an order or decision that would result in the
disclosure of the information to be subject to the certificate has been
made under this or any other Act of Parliament.
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-5/text.html
(accessed 30 March 2005). Our understanding of these issues owes much
to discussions with Benjamin Berger, Faculty of Law, University of
Victoria.
xii See Michel Foucault, Society Must Be
Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976 trans. by David
Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), passim, pp. 239-264.
xiii Ibid., p. 245.
xiv Giorgio Agamben, 'Form-of-Life' Means
Without Ends: Notes on Politics trans. by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare
Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 3-14;
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.
xv Agamben, Means Without Ends, p. 41.
xvi Ibid.
xvii This section basis its description of
biometric technologies found in the following sources: John Chirillo
and Scott Blaul Implementing Biometric Security (Indianapolis, IN:
Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2003); John D. Woodward, (Jr.) Biometrics:
Facing Up to Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2001);
John D. Woodward (Jr.) Super Bowl Surveillance: Facing Up to Biometrics
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2001); John D. Woodward (Jr.),
Katharine W. Webb, Elaine M. Newton, Melissa Bradley, and David
Rubenson Army Biometric Applications: Identifying and Addressing
Sociocultural Concerns (Arroyo Center, RAND, 2001); John D. Woodward
(Jr.), Nicholas M. Orlans, and Peter T. Higgins Biometrics: Identity
Assurance in the Information Age (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003).
xviii John D. Woodward (Jr.), Nicholas
M. Orlans, and Peter T. Higgins Biometrics: Identity Assurance in the
Information Age (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), pp. 115-136.
xix The Canada-US Smart Border Declaration,
12 December 2001 is a good case in point, as are other pieces of
legislation passed in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001.
xx Simon A. Cole, Suspect Identities: A
History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2001).
xxi For critical accounts of the body in the
context of technology and the digital age, see the work of Arthur and
Marilouise Kroker, of which much can be found on http://www.ctheory.net
xxii Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W.
Mansbach, 'Political Space and Westphalian States in a World of
'Polities': Beyond Inside/Outside', Global Governance Vol. 2, No. 1
(1996), p. 261.
xxiii Giorgio Agamben, 'Bodies without Words: Against the Biopolitical Tatoo' German Law Journal Vol. 50, No. 2, (2004), pp. 168-169
xxiv See Ibid.
xxv Cpl. Chris Prickett, II Marine
Expeditionary Force, 'Coming to your town soon? Tracking locals with
the BAT of an eye' Marine Corps News 28 March 2005 http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/image1.nsf/lookup/2005327113726?opendocument (accessed 11 May 2005)
xxvi Ibid.
xxvii Ibid.
xxviii Including multiple incidents of
mass casualties in local markets as coalition bombs strayed from their
intended targets - the bridge across the Euphrates.
xxix The international exposure of the
torture ongoing at Abu Ghraib prison by US officials broke on 25 April
2004 following more than a year of denial and cover-up of ICRC,
humanitarian and Iraqi queries over the treatment of prisoners within
the US-run prison system in Iraq and the efficacy of US military
dragnets against the Iraqi population in its efforts to confront the
insurgency.
xxx See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schozophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley,
Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 139-153.
Also see Michael J. Shapiro, Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance
and the Indigenous Subject (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 33-67. Also
see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism
and Schizophrenia trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2001), pp. 424-473.
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