By John Robb

Can the US win in Iraq? One of the most important factors is the size of the Iraqi insurgency. However, the numbers presented by the US military on its size are less than compelling. They have ranged from 12,000 to 20,000. These numbers do not mesh with the reality of the situation:

• The frequency, dispersion, and depth of attacks indicates a large force.
• The resiliency of the insurgency despite substantial casualties and arrests (estimated at 1-2,000 a month) suggests a larger force.
• The number of men who have become effectively "stateless" and "jobless" is very large.

A good place to start with an analysis of the correct size of the insurgency was accomplished in a report by an associate (likely DIA) of Pat Lang (Download iraqs_insurgency.pdf). This report completes its analysis with an estimate of the size of the insurgency based on likely participants. This list of participants falls into the following groups:

• Saddam Fedayeen.
• Senior and mid-level Republican Guard and Army officers.
• Secret police and other agencies.
• Foreign Jihadis.
• Senior Baathists.

Given the size of these groups before the war, and the relatively light casualties they suffered during the short campaign, these groups represent a large pool of unscathed participants. Additionally, the ongoing actions of the current government of Iraq to exclude these men from civil life has left them effectively "stateless" and therefore likely very resentful due to falling standards of living and power. I have taken the numbers in the analysis and did some light corrections and additional analysis. The table above shows a weighted average of the likely participation of these men in ongoing guerrilla activities. Also, I’ve added a estimate of the number of Sunni men outside these groups (in tribes and gangs) that are also likely participants. The net result is that we are likely facing an insurgency of 184,800 men.