Egyptian President-for-life Hosni Mubarak
It
seems like Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has been around forever.
His 25-year reign as the Egyptian leader is far from over. Last year,
he announced he would step aside, only to change his mind shortly
after. He realized the job market would be limited for a 78-year-old
former president of Egypt.
Mubarak
has been the number one asset in the Middle East for various U.S.
administrations. Let’s to back 25 years. When Mubarak was inaugurated,
not one Arab leader would openly court the U.S. or side with America
against Israel. Mubarak was a willing candidate to break that
tradition. Today, most Arab leaders are in the pockets of the U.S., all
because of the groundbreaking of Mubarak. One independent Arab leader
is in jail in Iraq, and another, Bashir al-Assad of Syria, is on the
brink of being an ex-president. Other than them, Arab leaders have
succumbed. This will be Mubarak’s legacy to the Arab world.
Over the years, Mubarak has won every election in which he participated. According to the U.S., he is a great
leader of a democratic nation. The truth is slightly different, however.
Egypt is far from a democracy. During his tenure, Mubarak has jailed many a political opponent. His methods
are simple: just declare any opposition party illegal. It works every time.
In
1995, Iraq held a referendum in which the presidency of Saddam Hussein
was the ballot issue. The question was whether Saddam should stay on
for a seven-year term. He won 99.96% of the vote. We all know that this
was a stroke of propaganda. The U.S. criticized the results and
demonized Saddam even more.
A
few months after the Iraqi plebiscite, Mubarak ran in Egypt. He won
99.81% of the vote. Same farce as the Iraqi elections, but no one
called foul. In fact, some U.S. pundits called Mubarak’s re-election
proof of his popularity. At least the Iraqi elections displayed a
party-like atmosphere and many officials held tongue slightly in cheek.
Saddam the dictator and Mubarak the democrat gained about the same
number of supporters in the polls, but one was viewed as a travesty and
the other as democracy in action by the U.S.
How
about Saddam’s palaces? Rarely does a conversation about Iraq that
includes warmongers arise without this subject. Mubarak has many
palaces also, but I have yet to hear one use this as an argument
against him. Hypocrisy, as usual, is the order of the day. His advanced
years have not stopped Mubarak from making ridiculous statements. On
April 8, 2006, Al-Jazeera News ran an article titled, "Mubarak: U.S.
Must Not Leave Iraq Yet." His red-white-and-blue tinged remarks
included:
Asked
what effect an immediate U.S. troop withdrawal would have, he said,
"Now? It would be a disaster. It would become an arena for a brutal
civil war and then terrorist operations would flare up, not just in
Iraq, but in very many places."
Maybe Mubarak has not read any recent newspapers. He uses the future tense for current everyday occurrences
in Iraq.
Most
Arab leaders, even though in the pockets of the U.S., would not make a
public statement calling for U.S. troops to stay in Iraq. Eighty-five
percent of the Iraqi population is calling for an immediate withdrawal,
even those who once supported the illegal invasion.
Mubarak
states that he does not know of a solution to Iraq’s problems. However,
he does know how the problems started. He, like successive U.S.
administrations, blamed Saddam Hussein: "If Saddam was more just, none
of this would have happened." This statement is illogical at best.
"None of this" did not happen when Saddam was in power, but he blames
the violence after Saddam’s removal on Saddam. The victim of the U.S.
invasion becomes the offender.
If
we go back a little less than 15 years in time, it could be argued that
Mubarak was a major contributor to the Gulf War of 1991: the event that
began the downward slide of Iraq to its current-day state of chaos.
Without his actions, there would have been a strong chance that Iraqi
troops would have left Kuwait on August 5, 1990 and certain injustices
against Iraq by Kuwait would have been addressed in a much different
manner.
Below, I have posted a portion from my soon-to-be-released book, The Mother of all Battles,
that addresses the diplomatic issues of early August 1990: issues in
which Hosni Mubarak played a crucial role in enhancing the U.S. pro-war
stance.
The Closed Door
Negotiation
as a tool to settle the crisis that emerged when Iraq crossed the
border into Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was disallowed by the U.S. From
August 3, 1990, the diplomatic door was slammed shut and nobody could
pry it open, despite the efforts of many to negotiate a settlement. You
might recall that there was a term being spread between August 3, 1990
and the start of Desert Storm: "The Nightmare Scenario." This term was
used to describe George Bush’s worst vision; Iraqi troops pulling out
of Kuwait.
Most
Americans view August 2, 1990 as the date that the Iraq-Kuwait crisis
began, but previous sections of this book have shown that Iraq knew
long before that Kuwait was up to something that would undermine the
economy and structure of Iraq. Saddam Hussein asked on February 23,
1990 in Amman, Jordan, "Aren’t American ships still patrolling the Gulf
even though the war between Iran and Iraq is over?" He made reference
to the presence of the U.S. Navy that had been in the Persian Gulf
during the Iran-Iraq War, supposedly to protect merchant shipping. When
the war was finished, there was no further purpose for the U.S. Navy to
maintain its occupation of the Gulf, but the fleet remained.
The
U.S. military presence in the Gulf, combined with the information that
Iraq had acquired concerning Kuwait’s techniques in trying to undermine
the Iraqi economy, led Iraq to believe it was being targeted, but Iraq
thought a diplomatic conclusion could be reached. On March 3, 1990,
Saddam Hussein met with King Hussein of Jordan in Baghdad. When the
conversation turned to the problems between Kuwait and Iraq, Saddam
Hussein told his Jordanian counterpart, "In time, reason and goodwill
would finally prevail in this matter." Shortly after, Saddam Hussein
met with Senator Robert Dole and explained his country’s plight to the
American lawmaker. When Dole returned to the U.S. and met with George
Bush I, he told the president that Saddam Hussein is "the kind of
leader the United States can easily be in a position to influence."
There was no talk about the Iraq-Kuwait problems; only the concern
about being able to "influence" a country.
Before
the Iraqi intervention in Kuwait, most Arab countries were concerned
about problems that may arise from an invasion. However, the American
public was unaware of the months of negotiation that Iraq had conducted
in attempting to defuse the situation. At that time, the American press
rarely covered events in the Middle East unless they involved Israel.
When it was announced that Iraq had crossed the border of Kuwait, most
Americans considered this an unprovoked act of aggression. The
ignorance of the American public about the Middle East allowed Bush to
turn U.S. public opinion against Iraq.
Another
bit of misinformation fed to the American public concerned the linking
of the Palestinian’s plight to Iraq’s pulling out of Kuwait. In August
1990, Saddam Hussein stated that he would withdraw troops from Kuwait
if discussion of the Palestinian question could begin. He was looking
to the future and wanted to address major problems in the Arab world
that had been put out of sight by much of the Western world.
Immediately, we heard the term "no linkage." The Bush administration
told the American public that Saddam Hussein was using this as a ploy
and that he had never championed the Palestinian cause before. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
Throughout early 1990, Yasser Arafat was a frequent visitor to Baghdad and he and Saddam Hussein worked on
the two biggest issues of contention in the Middle East — the Palestinian problem and the Iraq-Kuwait dilemma.
On
May 24, 1990, King Hussein of Jordan told Saddam Hussein, "At the next
(Arab) summit in Baghdad, I intend to demand financial aid not only for
Jordan, but also for the PLO." Saddam answered, "Leave it to me — I’ll
force them to pay." What he meant by the word "force" was to shame the
rich countries into helping the poorer states.
On
the agenda at the May 28, 1990 summit in Baghdad was the disparity
among rich and poor Arabs.. Saddam Hussein strongly inferred that the
rich countries of the Gulf were not pulling their weight in helping the
less fortunate, such as Jordan, Iraq and the Palestinians. When the
subject of money arose, he said:
Brothers,
let me tell you an old legend that perhaps some of you know. One day,
disaster struck a little village, and all the villagers were asked to
contribute something toward repairing the damage. In the village there
lived a very poor man who had no possessions, and the other inhabitants
decided not to ask him for anything. But the poor man approached them
and said that he would feel ashamed not to contribute. He gave the
other villagers the only thing he possessed — a copper pot. Well, at
this summit, that poor man is Iraq, but we shan’t fail in our duty. We
shall give $50 million to Jordan and $25 million to the PLO. That
should help to exert moral pressure on those who might be tempted not
to contribute. You all know the sacrifices we have accepted over the
years while others fail to respect their agreements.
Saddam Hussein was criticizing all the rich Arab states in general, and Kuwait in particular. He mentioned
the sacrifices Iraq had made in defending Kuwait against Iran, but he included the plight of the PLO as well.
Saddam
Hussein had always worked closely with Yasser Arafat. In fact, he
helped convince the Palestinian leader to adopt a more moderate stance
in dealing with the U.S. When the public was told that Saddam was only
using the Palestinian issue as a ploy, they were told another lie.
History shows that the Ba’athist government worked right up until the
March 2003 invasion of Iraq in helping the Palestinians. Even the more
recent assistance received negative press in the U.S. The
administration mentioned that the Iraqi government paid a stipend to
the families of suicide bombers, therefore, Iraq supported terrorism.
In reality, the Iraqi government paid benefits to the families of all
those Palestinians who died at the hands of the Israelis during the
Palestinian intafada. Saudi Arabia also contributed to those families,
yet the Saudis were not depicted as terrorists, especially since the
U.S. still had troops stationed in Saudi Arabia.
Despite
Iraq’s efforts to reach an agreement with Kuwait, the Emirate continued
to demand money from Iraq. Leaders of other Arab countries were
becoming concerned that the situation could become more volatile and
most were surprised at Kuwait’s insistence on immediate payments.
On
July 28, 1990, King Hussein of Jordan spoke with Sheikh Sabah, the
Kuwaiti foreign minister. The king was perplexed at Kuwait’s attitude
and he told the foreign minister about his concern that Iraq may take
military action. The Kuwaiti response was curious because Iraq had not
yet invaded the Emirate and, in theory, the U.S. had no defense
agreement with Kuwait. Sheikh Sabah told King Hussein, "We cannot
bargain over an inch of territory. It is against our constitution. If
Saddam comes across the border, let him come. The Americans will get
him out."
Iraq
had maintained that the U.S. as working with Kuwait to undermine the
Iraqi economy and Sheikh Sabah’s statement inferred knowledge of future
U.S. military intervention. When Iraq crossed the border of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the whole world focused its attention on the Middle
East. Unfortunately, Iraq’s military intervention was the first
information to which most Americans were exposed in the Iraq-Kuwait
dispute, making it possible for the U.S. administration to create its
own version of the incident. Hardly anybody knew about the fruitless
discussions that led to the invasion.
Saddam
Hussein’s strategy was to garner world attention to his plight and then
withdraw from Kuwait and start earnest negotiations. He had no idea of
the magnitude of the U.S. plan to turn the world against Iraq.
Shortly
after Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti border, King Hussein talked with
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi president mentioned that most problems
could be resolved at a scheduled mini-summit to be held in Cairo, Egypt
on August 4. He then said he did not want any condemnation by an Arab
country of the invasion prior to the meeting. King Hussein took the
role of mediator and said he would talk to the other Arab nations. He
foresaw few problems.
One of the first calls King Hussein made was to the Egyptian leader, Hosni Mubarak. After the king explained
the situation, Mubarak replied, "I’ll support you."
On
the same day, August 2, 1990, King Hussein called President Bush to
explain the latest developments in negotiations. He wanted to obtain
Bush’s commitment that he not pressure Arab countries to issue
communiqués criticizing Iraq’s actions for at least 48 hours. At the
time of the call, Bush was on an airplane from Washington D.C. to
Colorado. The Jordanian leader told Bush, "We (Arabs) can settle this
crisis, George … we can deal with it. We just need a little time."
Bush’s reply was, You’ve got it. I’ll leave it to you."
King
Hussein thought he was dealing with an honorable person, and, when the
conversation ended, he took Bush’s word that he would do nothing for 48
hours. Bush did not wait 48 seconds to start to break down the efforts
of a negotiated settlement.
While
the Arab world was awaiting the mini-summit in Cairo, scheduled for
August 4, George Bush was already lining up allies to condemn Iraq,
despite his promise to King Hussein to remain quiet for 48 hours. On
August 3, 1990, Saddam Hussein issued a communiqué announcing he would
begin to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait on August 5. He was
confident that the mini-summit scheduled for August 4 would reap
benefits for everyone. Saddam, as well as the entire Arab world, was
unaware of the American duplicity that was occurring.
On
August 3, 1990, Bush met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Colin Powell. The topic was the option of military force against
Iraq. Powell told Bush, "If you finally decide to commit to military
forces, Mr. President, it must be done as massively and decisively as
possible."
Meanwhile,
on August 3, in Amman, Jordan, matters worsened. King Hussein met with
his foreign minister, Marwan Al Qasim, and stated, "I have very good
news. Saddam Hussein has told me he’s going to pull out of Kuwait." The
foreign minister was a little more up-to-date on the situation and he
wasted no time telling the king, "You haven’t heard, but the Egyptian
Foreign Ministry has just put out a statement condemning the Iraqis for
invading Kuwait."
King
Hussein realized he had been duped by Bush. Egypt was an Arab country
that held much influence and its condemnation could destroy all
possible negotiations. The kind did not know at the time that Bush has
already called Mubarak and cancelled a $7 billion Egyptian debt in
return for Mubarak’s condemnation — a debt George Bush had no right to
forgive under U.S. law.
Immediately,
an irate King Hussein called Mubarak and asked, "Why did you release
that communiqué? We had an agreement not to do something like that
until the mini-summit took place." Mubarak answered, "I was under
tremendous pressure from the media and my own people. My mind is not
functioning." King Hussein angrily told Mubarak, "Well, when it starts
functioning again, let me know."
Egypt’s
condemnation virtually shut the door on diplomacy. The August 4
mini-summit was cancelled and King Hussein told his brother, Prince
Hassan, "The Arabs ought to have proved that they could settle the
conflict themselves. We shouldn’t have failed. Anything can happen now.
We must expect the worst."
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