January 2, 2006
President
George W. Bush began the new year by telling the American people that
his NSA domestic surveillance program was only used to monitor
communications between members of al-Qaeda and people in the United
States. He did not address the issue of why he deemed it necessary to
bypass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that had, for
24 years, been reviewing and approving such surveillance programs.
When the story first broke, President Bush and his staff claimed to
have done so because it took too long to obtain a warrant. This lame
excuse fell apart within hours when it was revealed that the law
already gave them the right to engage in surveillance for 72 hours
without a warrant. So the question remains: what is the real reason
George Bush and his team chose to bypass the FISC?
We know that between 1978 and 1992, presidents Carter, Reagan and
Bush presented 7,030 applications for warrants and the court approved
all of them as submitted. During his eight years in office, President
Bill Clinton and his Justice Department presented 6,057 warrant
applications. The FISC approved 6,055 of them, modified one and
rejected one. This is not to say that there was no controversy
involving the program. According to the Federation of American
Scientists’ archive of documents relating to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/,
problems developed in 2000. In one case, the FBI assured the court that
they had developed software that allowed them to pick up a surveillance
target’s emails without accessing anyone else’s emails. But when the
software was activated, it did access the email accounts of people not
covered by the warrant. In another case, the FISC had approved
surveillance of a target’s phone calls and email. When it came time to
renew the warrant, the FBI asked to continue wiretapping the target,
but said they no longer needed to check his email. So the FISC approved
a new version of the warrant that excluded email coverage.
Nevertheless, the FBI continued to cover the target’s email anyway.
Other cases included FBI videotaping of a meeting even though
videotaping had not been authorized, unauthorized searches and
continuing surveillance after warrants ran out. In one case, the FBI
failed to notice that a target had given up his cell phone and that the
cell phone number had been reassigned to a new person. The FBI
continued this electronic surveillance "for a substantial period of
time" even though the new owner of the cell phone number spoke a
different language than the target. Despite these problems, the
relationship between the executive branch and the FISC appears to have
remained harmonious, as indicated by the fact that the court approved
without modification 99.97% of the Clinton Administration requests.
All this changed after George W. Bush became president. The court
rejected six requests outright and modified 179. Some Bush supporters
have tried to characterize the FISC justices as liberal
obstructionists. In fact, all eleven members of the Bush-era FISC were
selected by conservative Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) that
created the FISC also provided for a three-member Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review to review applications denied by the FISC.
All three current members of this court were appointed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist during George W. Bush’s presidency.
After 24 years of idleness, in September 2002 the Court of Review
heard its first case because the Bush Administration tried to expand
the coverage of FISA jurisdiction to allow prosecutors and local law
enforcement agencies to be involved in the surveillance program and to
have access to information obtained through the surveillance. FISC
modified their requests before accepting them and the Bush
Administration appealed. At the September 9, 2002, hearing before the
Court of Review, the Bush Administration was represented by ten members
of the Department of Justice, led by Solicitor General Theodore B.
Olson, who had become famous when he presented the Bush-Cheney case to
the Supreme Court during the 2000 presidential election dispute. Other
notables included James A. Baker, in his role as counsel for the Office
of Intelligence Policy and Review, and John C. Yoo, the administration
go-to guy to legally justify anything the Bush Administration wants to
do. The Justice Department team was joined by Spike Bowman, a lawyer
for the FBI, and David S. Addington, a lawyer representing
Vice-President Cheney’s office. Lawyers supporting the FISC decision
were not allowed to be present, so the ACLU and others later submitted
a written brief to the three justices. The convening of the Court of
Review was so novel that the justices had to ask the Justice Department
lawyers who submitted the surveillance applications (the Attorney
General’s staff) and how often the FISC met to consider the
applications (once a week).
Olson argued that a FISC-approved surveillance could uncover
information about a suspect that, although totally unrelated to
terrorism, might indicate illegal or illicit activities that could then
be used to blackmail or intimidate a terrorism-related suspect into
cooperating with the authorities. Such a prosecution or threat of
prosecution would be approved by the Attorney General who, at the time,
was John Ashcroft. It is worth noting that FISA warrants are issued
based on a lower than usual standard that does not require probable
cause, and that if a FISA-approved surveillance leads to a prosecution,
the targets may not be allowed to obtain copies of their intercepted
communications.
The Administration also wanted to change the phrase "the purpose of
the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information" to "a significant
purpose of the surveillance…." This qualifying word could open the door
to all manner of other "purposes" for surveillance. When the Court of
Review judges tried to get the Justice Department officials to clarify
what other purposes there might be besides suspicion of terrorism or
espionage, Olson and Baker were evasive. Exasperated, Judge Lawrence
Silberman said, "I’ll try one more time and then I’ll give up." Olson
complained that the judges were asking "very, very difficult questions"
and, in the end, Silberman never got his answer.
At one point in the proceedings, Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr. found "a
touch of irony" in the fact that after the Patriot Act had expanded the
government’s power of surveillance and after the FISC had gone 24 years
without an appeal, suddenly, for the first time, the government was
complaining about being restrained by the court. Nonetheless, on
November 18, 2002, the Court of Review sided with the Bush
Administration.
Yet despite this victory, and despite having the expanded powers of
the Patriot Act, President Bush and Vice-President Cheney were not
satisfied with the extent of their power and they began clashing with
the FISC. In 2003 and 2004, the court denied four of the Bush
Administration’s applications, forced them to withdraw three and
modified 173. In the 24 years prior to 2003, the court had voiced
objections to a grand total of six applications.
Of course it would be illuminating to know the exact nature of the
surveillance requests that led the FISC to issue this myriad of
rejections and modifications and whether George Bush went ahead with
these surveillances anyway. It would also be interesting to know if the
Bush team, once it declared itself free of any judicial or
Congressional oversight whatsoever, decided to take advantage of the
NSA surveillance network to go beyond fighting terrorism to spy on
people and organizations for other reasons. For example, did they use
government resources to spy on members of Congress, journalists, the
Kerry campaign, opponents of the Bush agenda, foreign corporations or
members of the United Nations? It would also be useful to know why Bush
and Cheney transferred the responsibility for these surveillances from
the FBI to the NSA, an agency which, in its 50 years of existence, had
not previously been involved in domestic surveillance.
Whatever the answers to these questions, possible grounds for
impeachment will probably center instead on whether Bush and Cheney are
lying about what they have done and whether they usurped powers that
the Constitution grants to the legislative and judicial branches of the
United States government. President Bush claims that after 9/11
Congress gave him the power to do whatever he wants in fighting
terrorism, including detaining suspects indefinitely without charge and
without access to legal counsel and including engaging in surveillance
of Americans without warrants. This must surely come as a surprise to
most members of Congress, who were unaware that they had done this.
Bush claims that as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he is free
to use whatever tactics he wants. This is a creative interpretation of
Article II of the Constitution if ever there was one. As far as the
FISC rules go, if President Bush has decided that he is not obligated
to apply for warrants through the court, one wonders why he bothered to
do so 5,645 times during the first term of his presidency.
In the coming months it will be fascinating to watch as each
Republican member of Congress (and Joe Lieberman) decides whether he or
she owes a greater loyalty to President Bush or to the Constitution. It
is possible that the members of the Supreme Court, some of whom pride
themselves on being strict constructionists, will face the same dilemma.