Editor's Note: Noah Cohen (New England Committee to Defend Palestine) challenged Noam Chomsky in his 8/23/04 critical analysis: Noam Chomsky and 'Left’ Apologetics for Injustice in Palestine (originally published on Axis of Logic). Cohen's challenge goes to the heart of the horrific conditions faced by the Palestinian people every day. Until Cohen opened this debate, the "Left" - so-called, has dominated the discussion in the Corporate Media and in large sectors of the Alternative Media, presenting a "two-state solution" as the only realistic alternative for Palestine. Chomsky took Cohen's critique seriously enough to respond in an article titled: Advocacy and Realism: A reply to Noah Cohen (published on ZNet and posted on Axis of Logic)

Noah Cohen's reply to Chomsky's defense is published below. Readers are encouraged to submit comments ( rmcmail@speakeasy.net ) on this debate to Axis of Logic. - Les Blough, Editor

Noam Chomsky and 'Left’ Apologetics for Injustice in Palestine
By Noah Cohen
Aug 23, 2004, 16:15


It’s particularly interesting in the case of Palestine to see where US intellectuals and progressives decide that it’s necessary to be "realistic" and where "principled;" where they choose to accept more or less the general media consensus about "the boundaries of acceptable discourse" and where they reject it. In the case of Palestine, people who are generally on record as calling for forthrightness and honesty in the demand for justice in political discourse, who criticize a false "pragmatism" oriented toward the corporate media and academic political consultants and who question generalizing statements about popular consensus, suddenly become believers in pragmatism and the limits of what the discourse will allow. An interview with Noam Chomsky published on Znet under the title "Justice for Palestine?" (Znet, March 30, 2004 : http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=5240) is an exemplary contribution to this genre of left apologetics. Since it contains so many of the arguments generally advanced to legitimize some form of continued existence for an Israeli system of colonialism and Apartheid—and to shore up rear-guard support for it among US progressives—it is worth examining in full. In general, the argument rests on two pillars:

(1) Israel’s history of colonial occupation and expansion must be separated from all other colonial histories as a special case and special consideration must be given to Zionist colonial settlers as a historically vulnerable group;

2) Since this "historically vulnerable group" also has massive military power, nuclear weapons, and U.S. military and economic support, calling for an end to the colonial regime is unrealistic; it only hurts the colonized, and should be redirected to more useful activities.

The first is a tortured attempt to meet arguments about justice; the second is an attempt to make them moot by arguments about realism.

These essentially are the two arguments that Chomsky advances against calls for democracy and equal rights for all the people of historic Palestine. In this case, their particular form runs as follows: a democratic Palestine, in all of historic Palesine, with equal rights for everyone would only end up making Jews an oppressed minority (moral argument); such calls are unrealistic in any case, and will only be used by Zionist extremists to further justify their program of ethnic cleansing against Palestinians (pragmatic argument). Palestine is thus not like South Africa morally, where in the discourse against Apartheid the fact that whites were a minority was not supposed to give them the right to maintain special privileges by military force—they were a colonial-settler regime, and special privileges were exactly what the anti-Apartheid movement was opposing. Somehow in the case of the "Jewish state" a colonial-settler minority is supposed to be able to maintain a privileged status by force on land seized through military aggression. Palestine is not like South Africa pragmatically, since calls for an end to the colonial-settler regime are doomed to failure because they will never get sufficient international support to be effective.

As in the famous case of Freud’s "leaky-pot logic" of dreams, one should ask oneself whether these two arguments don’t rather cancel each other out—the first providing the unspoken assumptions and motivations of the second.

2.

Here is how the discussion works in Chomsky’s hands. Asked by interviewers Stephen S. Shalom and Justin Podur how he views the possibility of a "single-state solution, in the form of a democratic, secular state," he responds as follows:

"There has never been a legitimate proposal for a democratic secular state from any significant Palestinian (or of course Israeli) group. One can debate, abstractly, whether it is 'desirable.’ But it is completely unrealistic. There is no meaningful international support for it, and within Israel, opposition to it is close to universal. It is understood that this would soon become a Palestinian state with a Jewish minority, and with no guarantee for either democracy or secularism (even if the minority status would be accepted, which it would not). Those who are now calling for a democratic secular state are, in my opinion, in effect providing weapons to the most extreme and violent elements in Israel and the US."

Reading these comments, one wonders how Chomsky understands the words "legitimate" and "significant." Do Palestinians ever qualify? Both the PDFLP and the PFLP explicitly proposed a "democratic secular state" in all of historic Palestine as early as 1969, and the foremost official representatives of the larger PLO umbrella organization expressed this goal within the same year. This continued to be the vision of the core left within the PLO for years to come. More importantly, the Palestinian idea of liberation expressed in the PLO charter of 1968 rejected the colonial construction of ethnic and religious division: all the historic people of Palestine, regardless of religion, were considered Palestinians; all were entitled to freedom of worship. The PLO rejected not Jewish people, but colonial settlers and the state created for their exclusive interests. The "democratic, secular state" espoused by a significant portion of the Palestinian movement throughout the 1970s was an implicit concession to the settler community—a generous attempt to include settlers and their descendants in a liberated Palestine, provided that they were willing to renounce special privileges. This generosity was never answered by any significant movement within Israel. Does this Israeli rejection condition then the limits of justice for which Palestinians and their supporters should struggle?

What’s clear is that Israelis will necessarily determine the limits of the discourse for Chomsky; anything that they do not accept is "unrealistic." Pressed again on the subject, Chomsky becomes even more emphatic:

"The call for a 'democratic secular state,’ which is not taken seriously by the Israeli public or internationally, is an explicit demand for the destruction of Israel, offering nothing to Israelis beyond the hope of a degree of freedom in an eventual Palestinian state. The propaganda systems in Israel and the US will joyously welcome the proposal if it gains more than even marginal attention, and will labor to give it great publicity, interpreting it as just another demonstration that there is 'no partner for peace,’ so that the US-Israel have no choice but to establish 'security’ by caging barbaric Palestinians into a West Bank dungeon while taking over the valuable lands and resources. The most extreme and violent elements in Israel and the US could hope for no greater gift than this proposal."

This last threat is rather curious. When I visited Palestine in the summer of 2003, the Israelis were in the process of caging Palestinians into a system of open-air prisons in the name of "security," and were busily annexing their land to settlements, even as representatives of the Palestinian Authority were meeting with Sharon and Bush to discuss the "Road Map to Peace." None of this required anyone proposing a "democratic, secular state"—since that, according to Chomsky, wasn’t even on the table.

3.

It’s especially disturbing to see Chomsky so consistently placing the limits of activism at the limits of the prevailing discourse—what is "taken seriously" by "the Israeli public" or "the US public" or "internationally"

In his article "The Bounds of Thinkable Thought" (The Progressive, 1986), Chomsky argued that a genuine criticism of U.S. imperial policies in Vietnam had been kept out of the mainstream political debate largely through a process of self-censorship oriented toward the boundaries of acceptable discourse. According to Chomsky, anyone not wishing to be considered "beyond the pale" knew that it was necessary to funnel all opposition to U.S. policy through the discourse of "winability"—not to challenge U.S. goals in Vietnam, but rather to challenge tactics and strategy. The prevailing discourse allowed for two positions:

1) the U.S. was successfully defending democracy in Vietnam, and could win the war by intensifying its military operations;

2) the U.S. was attempting to defend democracy in Vietnam, but its possibilities for success were increasingly poor, and casualties both to U.S. soldiers and to the Vietnamese made the war unsupportable from the perspective of a cost-benefit analysis. According to this model, even those within the mainstream debate who may not have supported the basic assumptions of the discourse—e.g. those who recognized that the U.S. was in Vietnam in order to pursue U.S. regional hegemony, against the interests of the people who lived there—learned to couch their opposition within the acceptable terms. This was done to preserve "credibility" and to serve the pragmatic goal of ending the war.

As Chomsky observed, this means that the basic assumptions at work in U.S. propaganda for its various wars of expansion and domination are never significantly challenged within mainstream debate. This makes it difficult to build a movement that opposes basic policies. Even a limited "pragmatic" victory for the opposition—e.g. success in shifting U.S. policy away from troop deployment in Vietnam—can be effectively absorbed within the overall system of empire. The subsequent writing of history created what was called the "Vietnam syndrome"—narrowly understood as a tactical problem in winning ground wars against guerilla resistance in foreign lands—and George Bush the First was thus able to declare the "syndrome" broken after the intensive aerial bombardment of Iraq and the deliberate massacre of tens of thousands of retreating troops and fleeing civilians on the Basra highway in 1991. By then the "Vietnam syndrome" did not include the deliberate massacre of civilians and other war-crimes, but only significant losses to U.S. forces.

From someone with this analysis regarding Vietnam, it’s all the more distressing to see Chomsky’s repeated insistence on what the discourse will allow in the case of Palestine. To say that one should not speak on behalf of a democratic Palestine with equal rights for everyone because there is no broad support for that position and it will only play into the hands of Israel’s right wing supporters is rather like the equivalent argument continually advanced within certain sectors of the anti-war movement in the case of Vietnam (and still continually advanced today): Talking about U.S. goals in Vietnam as "imperialism"—or worse, speaking of "the right of the Vietnamese people to defend themselves against U.S. invasion"—will only make us all look like a bunch of left-wing fanatics out of touch with the rest of America; that’s exactly what the pro-war crowd wants us to do; we had better confine ourselves to criticizing the "winability" of the war and decrying U.S. casualties.

Now listen to Chomsky on the right of return:

"there is no detectable international support for it, and under the (virtually unimaginable) circumstances that such support would develop, Israel would very likely resort to its ultimate weapon, defying even the boss-man, to prevent it. … In my opinion, it is improper to dangle hopes that will not be realized before the eyes of people suffering in misery and oppression. Rather, constructive efforts should be pursued to mitigate their suffering and deal with their problems in the real world."

The right of return—a fundamental human right that Palestinian refugees posses both collectively and individually, and that cannot be bargained away on their behalf by anyone—is thus dispensed with in a few sentences referring to prevailing "international support." Notice the kindly paternalism with which Chomsky refuses to "dangle hopes that will not be realized before the eyes" of the Palestinian people—as if the right of return were something that he, or "we," could offer or withdraw to an oppressed community that is entirely passive and dependent on his benevolence, and not a right for which the Palestinian refugee community has organized itself in an international struggle. The right of return is not a "hope" which Chomsky can "dangle before the eyes" of Palestinians; it is a right which they possess and which they are actively fighting to realize. He can either support their struggle or fail to support it.

It is a striking fact about the entire interview that Palestinians nowhere occur as a people with historical agency. When Chomsky tells us that a majority of Israelis and US citizens now support a two-state solution, he fails to mention that the very recognition of the existence of the Palestinian people—in the face of half a century of genocidal Israeli attempts to negate their society, their history and their culture—is a direct product of Palestinian resistance against overwhelming military, economic and political odds. It also seems that Chomsky’s assessments of "international support" are very much out of touch with the global opinion on the streets. Wherever one finds masses of people showing serious opposition to U.S. and European systems of empire—whether against imperial wars, or against the instruments of economic conquest—the Palestinian resistance has captured the imagination and sympathy of the global community. "Globalize the Intifada!" is now a rallying cry from Europe to South America.

4.

Against the call for justice and equal rights for everyone—a call that we are being told is at once unjust and too idealistic—Chomsky offers his realistic compromise of justice: a two-state solution based on the Geneva Accords. (That is to say, if only the US would back it—which it just might do if we deluded pro-Palestine activists would devote our energies to that realistic solution.) Here is Chomsky’s calculus of compromise:

"Which compromises should be accepted and which not? There is, and can be, no general formula. Every treaty and other agreement I can think of has been a 'compromise’ and is unjust. Some are worth accepting, some not. Take Apartheid South Africa. We were all in favor of the end of Apartheid, though it was radically unjust, leaving highly concentrated economic power virtually unchanged, though with some black faces among the dominant white minority. On the other hand, we were all strenuously opposed to the 'homelands’ ('Bantustan’) policies of 40 years ago, a different compromise. The closest we can come to a formula—and it is pretty meaningless—is that compromises should be accepted if they are the best possible and can lead the way to something better. That is the criterion we should all try to follow. Sharon’s two-state settlement, leaving Palestinians caged in the Gaza Strip and about half of the West Bank, should not be accepted, because it radically fails the criterion. The Geneva Accords approximates the criterion, and therefore should be accepted, in my opinion."

It’s notable that Chomsky recognizes, in the case of South Africa, that the compromise ultimately reached falls short of justice: even the official end of Apartheid does not undo the immense inequality in the concentration of wealth and power among white South Africans. In the case of Palestine, "realism" demands that Palestinians strive not even for this much, since Chomsky’s solution is to impose some version of what the anti-Apartheid movement rejected in South Africa 40 years ago: a militarized state "for Jews only" next to a system of demilitarized Bantustans. Make no mistake—in spite of all of Chomsky’s claims, this really is the solution offered by the Geneva Accords.

5.

It’s good that, at least in this case, we know what the "realistic" demand for a two-state solution looks like. In the usual variants of this argument from pragmatism, there is the added wrinkle that the spokesman only believes in a highly idealized, utopian two-state solution, which he can’t quantify exactly with details. It’s usually a two-state solution that isn’t like any of the proposals advanced so far; one that "really gives both sides equal rights" and has them living happily ever after "along side one another" and "in peace." Here Chomsky at least does give us something specific and historical—a solution based on the Geneva Accords.

What the Geneva Accords are in reality—what they actually are meant to accomplish for Israel—is best expressed by one of their foremost negotiators and spokesmen, Amram Mitzna (the Israeli Labor candidate famous in the US as a candidate for "peace," and infamous among Palestinians as the man who instituted the bone-crushing policy against Palestinian children during the first Intifada). The following passages are culled from Mitzna’s article on the Geneva Accords published in Haarezt ("They are Afraid of Peace," October 16, 2003). I quote them here at some length because they demonstrate, better than any discussion I might give, that "negotiation" is here merely a continuation of colonial war by other means:

"If the prime minister decided to implement the Geneva initiative, he would go down in history for confirming the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, by agreement. That would be even more important than the declaration of the state in 1948, since that was unilateral and recognized by only a few other countries at the time." …

"For three years the prime minister brainwashed the public on the grounds that only force will bring victory.

"He and his colleagues made the public believe that there truly is 'nobody to talk to,' that 'the IDF can win' and that if we use more force, the Palestinians will break.

"They told the citizens that if we are strong, the terror will end. But the situation only worsened. The assassinations became the government’s only policy and instead of eradicating terror threaten to wipe out all that remains of the country.

"The terror is intensifying, the economy continues to collapse, and society to break down, and the demographic reality threatens the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. But none of that has made the government change course and try a different tack." …

"…We conducted battles for Jerusalem, the Temple Mount and Gush Etzion. We fought for the permanent borders of the state of Israel, for the very existence of the state and its character, and we reached many achievements.

"For the first time in history, the Palestinians explicitly and officially recognized the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people forever. They gave up the right of return to the state of Israel and a solid, stable Jewish majority was guaranteed. The Western Wall, the Jewish Quarter and David’s Tower will all remain in our hands.

"The suffocating ring was lifted from over Jerusalem and the entire ring of settlements around it—Givat Ze’ev, old and new Givon, Ma’ale Adumim, Gush Etzion, Neve Yaacov, Pisgat Ze’ev, French Hill, Ramot, Gilo and Armon Hanatziv will be part of the expanded city, forever. None of the settlers in those areas will have to leave their homes."

Two things are clear from Mitzna’s discussion: 1) the second Intifada has been far more successful than anyone would imagine from the press here in the US, or from Chomsky’s discussion, in threatening the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish state; 2) the Geneva Accords were meant to accomplish by means of negotiation what the Sharon regime has failed to accomplish by means of force—to break the Palestinian resistance, to give full and permanent international legitimacy to '48 occupied land, and to increase by one huge bound the amount of '67 occupied territory that would belong to this now fully legitimate "Israel." As Mitzna puts it, it is a matter of trying "a different tack."

At the same time, the Geneva Accords would be an international treaty giving legal legitimacy to a set of conditions on the ground that set the stage for Israel’s then inevitable ongoing colonial expansion. The agreement would ensure that the "Palestinian state" has no means of defending itself against Israeli aggression and that Israel would maintain the de facto power to invade at any time. The dense settlements around Jerusalem, which contain the highest concentration of settlers in the West Bank, and which effectively cut the West Bank in half, would be conceded as part of "Israel" forever. The only guarantee that Israel would not continue to expand these settlements, build more of them, and re-invade militarily whenever Palestinians attempt to defend themselves from these encroachments is a vague promise that the majority of Israelis "really want to live in peace." Once again, neither the history of Israel nor the general history of colonial projects is supposed to guide us in assessing the realism of this "realistic" scenario.

A far more realistic assessment of all such treaty negotiations was written during the Oslo process by Norman Finkelstein. Entitled "History’s Verdict: the Cherokee Case," the article is a sustained comparison between the Zionist project in Palestine and the US colonial-settler project of dispossessing the Cherokee people of all of their native land through a combination of settler encroachment, military assault and treaty negotiations. Within this process, settlers steal land; natives defend themselves; self-defense is widely published as "savagery" or "terrorism"; this propaganda is then used to justify military attacks as acts of "self-defense;" and finally treaty negotiations are employed to enlist a certain number of the indigenous people—either those who are simply exhausted by the sustained military assault, or those who can be bribed into collaborating—to cede more of their land to the settlers with the guarantee that the remaining land will be theirs "in perpetuity." Perpetuity lasts for about 10 to 20 years, and then the cycle begins again (if it doesn’t simply continue unabated). The treaty negotiations are particularly useful in dividing the colonized within themselves over their possible hopes; stopping resistance struggles under the guise of a negotiated peace; and finally giving a spurious appearance of legitimacy to the entire process.

6.

There is unmistakable racism in the way in which Chomsky evaluates the realism of different scenarios: he tells us that it’s entirely unrealistic to imagine that Jewish people could live safely as a minority in a Palestinian state based on principles of democracy and equal rights. More disturbingly, this concern over the possible fate of Jews as a minority in a Palestinian state is so significant in his mind as to justify opposition to ending an actual situation in which Jewish people live as privileged colonizers on Palestinian land. Here we are supposed to apply the author’s concept of realism. On the other hand, it’s supposed to be realistic, in spite of all proven history to the contrary, for Palestinians to expect that a neighboring Israel, under a two-state solution, will respect their territory even though they have no arms to defend themselves. Or, even more amazing, that the US, under pressure from US citizens, could be expected to protect them. His hope for this rests apparently on the good will of Israelis and US citizens. (Even in the aftermath of decades of genocidal US policies in other countries, and protest movements that have never reached a level capable of stopping a US invasion.) Here idealism is supposed to apply.

In deciding what is realistic, we are supposed to ignore the most obvious historical facts: that Palestine had centuries of religious co-existence before Zionism—a co-existence to which all parties in the history of the Palestinian struggle for liberation have officially committed themselves; that the US, Europe and now Israel have an unbroken history of violating treaties and international agreements (including the highest conventions of international law) respecting territorial integrity—especially the territorial integrity of native peoples—and that this process has generally ended in near total genocide wherever such peoples have put down their arms and ceased to defend themselves.

7.

Chomsky’s concept of "realism" has a striking resemblance to the colonial discourse of "manifest destiny": Good or bad, right or wrong—so the argument goes—these are the facts on the ground; this is the way of history. In the name of this "realism," activists and intellectuals in the international community have simultaneously asserted themselves as pro-Palestinian, and yet taken it upon themselves to concede every fundamental right to which the Palestinian people lay claim. In pointing to the Geneva Accords as a legitimate compromise, Chomsky concedes all of the following rights on their behalf:

* the right to reclaim sovereignty over the land stolen from them in 1948;
* the right of refugees even to return to this land;
* the right to reclaim the most densely settled land in the West Bank;
* the right to freedom of movement within the new Palestinian "state" (since the West Bank settlements—to be declared permanently a part of "Israel"—cut that territory into isolated cantons, and these cantons are in turn separated from Gaza);
* the right to full sovereignty over borders and airspace;
* the right to maintain an independent military capable of self-defense;
* the right to full control of resources.

In general, this means that the "best possible compromise," that promises to "lead to something better," requires first that Palestinians officially concede all of the material conditions on which the right to self-determination depends. It’s hard to see how these concessions could possibly lead to "something better."

More importantly for our purposes—however one evaluates the realistic possibilities available to the Palestinian people in their struggle for liberation—it’s impossible to see how anyone in the international community can help their struggle by conceding ground on matters of fundamental principle. Honesty in these matters is our minimum responsibility; if we believe that colonialism, racism and Apartheid are unjust, we should oppose them systematically on principle and fight them with every means at our disposal.

Faced with the apologetics of pragmatism, a friend long active in the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa, and now equally active in the struggle for justice in Palestine, put the matter succinctly: Since when is it the role of solidarity activists from the society of the oppressor to make concessions on behalf of the oppressed?

© Copyright 2004 by AxisofLogic.com


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Noah Cohen is a friend of Axis of Logic and works as an activist with the New England Committee to Defend Palestine in Boston, MA ( http://www.onepalestine.org/ ). He has traveled extensively in the Middle East, Palestine included, and has been fighting for the rights of the people of Palestine through the Palestinian struggle for the right-of-return and a single-state solution.

http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_11169.shtm
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Noam Chomsky replies to Noah Cohen's article published last week on Axis of Logic












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Advocacy and Realism: A reply to Noah Cohen

By Noam Chomsky

August 26, 2004

[This is a reply to an article by Noah Cohen, which in turn is a response to an interview Chomsky gave with Shalom and Podur several months ago.]

Noah Cohen’s charges raise some interesting questions about advocacy, principle, and realism, which have much broader applications. Let’s focus on his particular case – defense of Palestinian rights -- bringing up the broader issues in this context. The core question, then, has to do with the stands that can be taken by people with serious concerns for the fate of the Palestinians, who have suffered severely and face an even more miserable future unless we find ways to reverse the processes now underway, for which we bear considerable responsibility and accordingly, can influence if we choose.

Among the options under discussion are one-state and binational approaches. These are crucially different. There are many forms of multinationalism in the world: Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, etc. The concept is a cover term for arrangements that allow forms of autonomy for groups within complex societies, not necessarily only those that choose to regard themselves as "nations." Quite different are one-state systems, with no form of autonomy for various communities. In the US, for example, Latinos do not have autonomy or control over language or education in the areas stolen by violence from Mexico (or elsewhere); nothing approaching, say, the partial autonomy in Catalonia, to mention one of many cases of some form of multinationalism.

Let’s turn to some of the relevant background. Pre-1948, binationalism was a minority position within the Zionist movement. From 1967-73 Israel had a real opportunity to institute a binational settlement in cis-Jordan in the context of a full peace treaty with Egypt and Jordan, hence the relevant part of the Arab world. There was no interest. The PLO had no interest. US articulate opinion was bitterly opposed. My own writings on the topic were harshly attacked from all sides.

After the 1973 war, that option was effectively closed. Palestinian national rights were, for the first time, clearly and forcefully articulated in the international arena. A two-state settlement was brought to the UN Security Council in January 1976, vetoed by the US, an act condemned by Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the PLO. Since then there has been a broad international consensus in favor of a two-state settlement, blocked by the US and Israel alone. It should be unnecessary to review this history once again.

In contrast, there has been no support for a one-state solution from any significant actor throughout this period. It has never been considered an option in the international arena. The PLO spoke about "democratic secularism," but in a form that called for liquidation of all Jewish political, social, and cultural institutions within an "Arab nation." For this reason alone – there were many others – the stance had no impact, except as a weapon for advocates of US-Israeli rejectionism. These matters were discussed in print in the 1970s; there is a brief review in my book Toward a New Cold War (1982, 430n). To say that the idea has had no support in Israel is an understatement. It is rejected with virtual unanimity and considerable fervor, and would be even if there some basis for taking seriously the rhetoric about democratic secularism. Under the (virtually unimaginable) circumstance that some meaningful international support would develop for such a plan, Israel would oppose it by any possible means: that includes the ultimate weapons, which Israel has available and can use.

Since the late '90s, a "one-state settlement" has become a welcome topic of discussion in elite circles, so much so that the New York Times Magazine and the New York Review of Books have run major articles proposing this approach – I won’t say "advocating" it, for reasons to which I will return. Same in similar circles elsewhere. It is worth bearing in mind that when the solution was realistic and would have saved a lot of blood and agony, it was utter anathema. Why the change? The only explanation I have seen is what appears in the interview with Shalom-Podur, which I won’t repeat. But let us put that aside, and turn to the current situation.

Right now, there are several possible stands that might be taken by those concerned with the people of the region, justice for Palestinians in particular. Evidently, such stands are of only academic interest unless they are accompanied by programs of action that take into account the real world. If not, they are not advocacy in any serious sense of the term.

Perhaps another word of clarification is in order. Attention to feasible programs of action is sometimes dismissed as "realism" or "pragmatism," and is placed in opposition to "acting on principle." That is a serious delusion. There is nothing "principled" about refusal to pay attention to the real world and the options that exist within it – including, of course, the option of making changes, if a feasible course of action can be developed, as was clearly and explicitly the case with regard to Vietnam, discussed in the comments that Cohen brings up and completely misunderstands. Those who ignore or deride such "realism" and "pragmatism," however well-intentioned they may be, are simply choosing to ignore the consequences of their actions. The delusion is not only a serious intellectual error, but also a harmful one, with severe human consequences. That should be clear without further elaboration.

I will keep here to advocacy in the serious sense: accompanied by some kind of feasible program of action, free from delusions about "acting on principle" without regard to "realism" -- that is, without regard for the fate of suffering people.

One stand is support for a two-state settlement in terms of the overwhelming and long-standing and very broad international consensus (including the Palestinian Authority), barred by the US and Israel though supported by the majority of the US population and acceptable to majorities, possibly large majorities, within Israel (depending on how questions are asked in polls). There are various concrete forms. One version is the Geneva Accords, which, as noted in the interview, "gives a detailed program for a 1-1 land swap and other aspects of a settlement, and is about as good as is likely to be achieved." The terms and maps are readily available. Since Cohen does not address these matters, apart from citation of an irrelevant source, and does not suggest anything that is more "likely to be achieved," there is no need to go beyond the interview. These proposals constitute a basis for negotiations that is vastly improved over the Clinton-Barak Camp David proposals as well as the (much less unacceptable) Taba proposals that followed. For the first time, they open the doors to a 1-1 land swap that could be meaningful, and they break from the cantonization programs of earlier proposals. They still have objectionable features, but the operative question is whether they can be taken as a serious basis for negotiations, and whether there is an alternative that is likely to offer more to the Palestinians than proceeding on this basis.

If there is such an alternative, let’s by all means hear it. Those who do not want to undertake that responsibility are choosing, in effect, to take part in an academic seminar among disengaged intellectuals on Mars.

Support for the international consensus is true advocacy, not posturing or academic debate. The reason is straightforward, as discussed in the interview: there are obvious and realistic programs of action associated with this stand. The main task is to bring the opinions and attitudes of the large majority of the US population into the arena of policy. As compared with other tasks facing activists, this is, and has long been, a relatively simple one. Relatively; no such tasks are easy. What has been lacking is commitment, not opportunities. Those who are unwilling to undertake the commitment have only themselves to blame for the likely outcome, which is taking shape before our eyes, in directions that are all too clear. To the extent that US policy can be shifted towards the international consensus and domestic opinion, support will increase in Israel, almost automatically, as a result of the dependency relation that Israel consciously adopted over 30 years ago. There will undoubtedly be settler resistance, but at least in the judgment of the most senior Israeli security officials, the problem should not be too difficult to deal with, as quoted in the interview.

A second possible stand is support for a binational settlement, perhaps a federal arrangement of the kind that has long been discussed and exists successfully elsewhere, or in some other form. This stand moves from rhetoric and posturing to true advocacy when it is accompanied by a feasible program of action. There is such a program, with two essential steps. The first is to implement a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus, and reversing the escalating cycle of hostility, hatred, violence, repression, and dispossession. The second step is to proceed from there. For reasons that are clear to anyone familiar with the region, two states in cis-Jordan make little sense, and both communities have good reasons to seek further integration. That is a feasible program, but only in steps. Those who think otherwise have the responsibility of formulating their program to implement directly the alternative they propose; as noted, that was possible before the mid-1970s, but not since. Until we see that program, there is nothing to discuss, and there is no advocacy in the serious sense of the term.

A third possible stand is support for a no-state settlement, generalizing multinationalism (in the broad sense indicated) beyond the borders of a state. That approach would be based on the recognition that the nation-state system has been one of the must brutal and destructive creations of Europe and its offshoots, imposed by force on much of the rest of the world, with horrendous consequences for centuries in Europe, and elsewhere until the present. For the region, it would mean reinstating some of the more sensible elements of the Ottoman system (though, obviously, without its intolerable features), including local and regional autonomy, elimination of borders and free transit, sharply diminishing or eliminating military forces, etc. Applied elsewhere, say to North America, it would entail, to mention just one example, reversing Clinton’s post-NAFTA militarization of the (previously quite porous) Mexico-US border, with a severe human cost, and dealing in some humane way with the fact that the US is sitting on half of Mexico, acquired by brutal conquest. Similar issues arise throughout the world.

For what it’s worth, I’ve also advocated that in public, and in fact have been (maybe still am) under investigation for the crime of "separatism" by the Turkish security system for remarks on this matter in a talk in the semi-official Kurdish capital of Diyarbakir, later published, maybe posted on Znet. There’s also an (implicit) advocacy of something like that in Charles Glass’s excellent book Tribes with Flags.

Is there a feasible program for this, so that it reaches the level of true advocacy? Yes, along the path of advocacy of the more limited binational proposal. The no-state stand is more reasonable and probably more feasible in the longer term than the one-state position. At least this approach recognizes the realities of the region, and the importance of some form of self-determination and autonomy for the complex array of intermingled groups and interests.

How should we rank these objectives in order of preference? My own judgment, since childhood and still today, is that among these alternatives, the no-state solution is by far the best (not just in this region), a binational state second, and a two-state solution worst. Note that I have omitted the one-state version. One reason I have already indicated: a binational system is much better suited to the needs and concerns of the two communities, and I suspect would be preferable to them if it can be approached in steps. But we need not speculate about that. Until the immediate one-state proposal accepts the discipline of "realism," and is accompanied by some indication of a feasible program of action, we are back to the Martian seminar.

As already mentioned, I presume this is why the proposal has become acceptable in elite intellectual circles, as distinct from the years when a binational version was feasible and was anathema. Now the ideas are welcome, demonstrating our humanity, but without concern that they might lead anywhere. There are, however, those who greatly welcome this proposal as an immediate demand, rejecting the intermediate stages, and hope that it will be widely adopted. To quote the interview:

"The propaganda systems in Israel and the US will joyously welcome the proposal if it gains more than even marginal attention, and will labor to give it great publicity, interpreting it as just another demonstration that there is "no partner for peace," so that the US-Israel have no choice but to establish "security" by caging barbaric Palestinians into a West Bank dungeon while taking over the valuable lands and resources. The most extreme and violent elements in Israel and the US could hope for no greater gift than this proposal."

If the only alternative open is a "one-state settlement" without preliminary stages, we can have little doubt that Israeli and US hawks would rejoice, and would proceed, with overwhelming public support to impose their own brutal arrangements on the occupied territories. Since Cohen ignores these matters entirely, I’ll leave it at that, simply noting that we do not reach the level of advocacy, in a serious sense, unless these topics are addressed with care.

Much the same holds with regard to the "right of return." As stated explicitly in the interview, "Palestinian refugees should certainly not be willing to renounce the right of return." That is not in question (Cohen’s misrepresentation omits this crucial sentence). A different question is whether the right will be implemented. In this case too, under the (virtually unimaginable) circumstances that any meaningful support might develop for it, Israel would resort to its ultimate weapons to prevent it. Those who have any concern for the fate of the refugees will not dangle before their eyes hopes that will not be realized. And they can hardly claim that to do so is a moral stance.

The same is true generally, including the other examples mentioned here. The Cherokees have the right of return to the lands from which they were driven, and "should certainly not be willing to renounce" that right. The 10-15 million Kurds of Turkey have the right to self-government in a much broader Kurdistan, and "should certainly not be willing to renounce" that right. Suppose that someone were to dangle in front of the eyes of Cherokees or Turkish Kurds the hope that those rights will be realized if only they reject any arrangements that to some extent mitigate their grim circumstances. Such a person might believe him/herself to be a "defender of the Cherokees" or of the Kurds, and to be acting "on principle," but would be seriously misled.

I have been assuming so far that the discussion is among people who care about the people involved and their fate, in particular the Palestinians, the most miserable victims. There is, of course, another possibility. We might shift to the academic seminar among disengaged intellectuals on Mars. We can then join them in deriding "realism" and feasibility – that is, attention to the real world and consideration of the consequences of our actions for the victims. And we can engage in abstract discussion of what might be "right" and "just" in some non-existent universe. But if partipicants in these exercises decide to come down to earth, and to have some concern and compassion for the victims, they have the duty of explaining to us how we proceed from here to there. If they have a suggestion, let’s hear it so we can evaluate it, and if it is reasonable, act on it. Those who are convinced by the proposals if they are ever presented should by all means pursue them, but for the moment the matters is entirely academic, since there are no meaningful proposals for action other than the step-by-step ones already outlined; at least none that I have ever seen. For the reasons I explained, I think that those who take these stands without reaching the level of serious advocacy are serving the cause of the extreme hawks in Israel and the US, and bringing even more harm to suffering Palestinians. Since the comments have not been addressed, I have to leave it at that.

I don’t see anything substantive in Cohen’s charges that has not already been answered. To illustrate the pointlessness of response, I will simply take the first charge, skipping the rhetorical flow that precedes:

"In general, the argument rests on two pillars:

1) Israel's history of colonial occupation and expansion must be separated from all other colonial histories as a special case and special consideration must be given to Zionist colonial settlers as a historically vulnerable group; 2) Since this "historically vulnerable group" also has massive military power, nuclear weapons, and U.S. military and economic support, calling for an end to the colonial regime is unrealistic; it only hurts the colonized, and should be redirected to more useful activities.

The first is a tortured attempt to meet arguments about justice; the second is an attempt to make them moot by arguments about realism."

Pillar 1) is an invention, unless Cohen means that this is a "special case" in the exact sense in which every other case is a "special case," with its own properties that should be taken into consideration by anyone who has the slightest concern for the people involved, in particular the Palestinians. The rest of 1) we can ignore.

In pillar 2), Cohen is quoting himself, not me. The reference to "U.S. military and economic support" is also his invention: the interview to which he refers, and everything I’ve written and said about that topic for many decades, make it unmistakeably clear that ending that support should precisely be our objective – not reinforcing that support by adopting a stand that is extremely welcome to the ultra-hawks, as just explained. To the extent that the charge of "realism" is accurate, I certainly accept it, and would recommend it to anyone who hopes to do something useful in this world, and therefore takes into account real world circumstances and the consequences of our actions for suffering people.

The rest continues along the same lines. If any reader thinks there is some point that should be addressed, I’ll be glad to consider it.

http://www.zmag.org/ZNET.htm

http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_11349.shtm
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Chomsky's "Realism" and "Advocacy" : Advocacy for what and for whom?

By Noah Cohen

August 30, 2004 - I'm glad to see that Chomsky took the trouble to publish his response to my article, if for no other reason than that his response has provoked ZNet to print the critique. (I sent it to ZNet when I wrote it; up to now it has circulated on e-mail and on other websites.) Perhaps ZNet will also print this further reply.

In fact, Chomsky largely ignores the substance of the critique. He comments directly only on one passage from the beginning, which he also misconstrues. In discussing Chomsky's apologetics for injustice, I gave first the general form of an argument for Israel continually advanced by its 'left' apologists; I then gave its specific form in Chomsky's hands. I trust that readers will look back at the original and see whether they think that the quotations I cited from Chomsky contain the basic assumptions of the general argument. Their specific form, for Chomsky, is as follows:

1) that Israelis, though a colonial-settler community, have a legitimate concern about losing their special privileges in a Palestinian democracy;

2) that their military superiority (a superiority supplied largely by the US) makes all proposals to end the Apartheid regime moot. The assumptions that underlie the first of these positions are also everywhere evident in Chomsky's reply. It's only by reference to those assumptions that we can understand Chomsky's preference for a "bi-national state" (advanced in this case in the pure abstraction of his "seminar on Mars")--which would codify a special status for Jewish people (largely settlers) over against all indigenous groups within the Palestinian community together--over a single, Palestinian state in which all have equal rights. But I won't recapitulate my article; I'll confine myself to answering Chomsky's central contentions about "advocacy" and "realism."

The limits of advocacy, as Chomsky proposes it, require that we lend our support to the "settlement" which--according to Chomsky--has the greatest support in the international community, the broadest support in the US, and the possibility of support within Israel if the US would pressure the Israelis to accept it. US activists should play their limited role of compelling the US government to "implement" this proposal. The proposal is some version of the two-state solution (and most immediately, the Geneva Accords); it requires that Palestinians officially give up virtually all of their rights in return for an agreement on paper that gives full legitimacy to Israel, and disarms Palestinians of any practical power to defend their territory.

Can this truly be called "advocacy" on behalf of Palestinian rights? It sounds rather like much of the current peace movement both in Israel and in the US (though not in the rest of the world), which isn't even concerned about Palestinian rights. This movement looks instead for a "resolution" to the "conflict" that would allow a colonial settler community to retain its privileges without suffering the consequences of Palestinian resistance. This involves a refusal to see Israel within the broader context of legitimate struggles of indigenous people against racist, colonial regimes.

Unlike Chomsky, I don't believe that a "settlement" in any way favorable to Palestinians will be "instituted" by Israel (as Chomsky suggests that a "Bi-national state" might have been in the land Israel had occupied in the 1967 war) or by the US, or produced by negotiations under circumstances in which US and Israeli power determine the limits of choice. Under those circumstances, it hardly matters what name such a "settlement" would take ("one-state," "two-state," "bi-national," or anything else.) The only one-state proposals I've seen that depend on such conditions are equally objectionable.

The Geneva Accords are consistent with the primary goals of US/Israeli negotiations: these are generally aimed at stopping Palestinian resistance under a sham "peace-process" and continuing to move forward with a colonial program. This is clearly the goal on the Israeli side for the Geneva Accords. They are the initiative of the so-called "opposition," which disagrees with the current government in Israel about the best methods for achieving what are essentially the same goals. Mitzna's discussion of the process as a war for territory--and also as a "different tack" aimed at stopping the Second Intifada--supports this assessment. (Since Mitzna was a central player in the negotiations and an architect of the proposal, that's hardly an "irrelevant citation.")

I gave a summary at the end of my article of all the Palestinian concessions required by the Accords; readers can refer to the document to see whether or not this assessment is valid. See the full text on Haarezt: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=351461
). The single most important one is Article 5 (Security), Section 3 (Defense characteristics of the Palestinian state), which stipulates that "Palestine shall be a non-militarized state;" in the face of this concession, any language about Palestinian gains (e.g. Chomsky's mention of the 1 to 1 land swap) is purely academic.

It should be obvious to anyone who actually read the article, that I did not make an objection to being "realistic"; I offered rather a critique of Chomsky's competing applications of the notion of "realism." As I have reiterated here, Chomsky finds it "realistic" to think that a negotiated settlement in which Palestinians have no military power to defend themselves, no true sovereignty over borders, no control of resources--and in which they have signed on to these conditions as a binding agreement of international law--is a way forward for them that "could lead to something better." On the other hand, he tells us that it's unrealistic to think that there would be any guarantee of freedom of worship and other rights for Jewish people in a Palestinian state in which Jewish people are a minority. I suggested that there is either an inconsistency in Chomsky's application of his principle of "realism," or an inconsistency in his evaluation of the "realism" of different scenarios, and that this inconsistency serves an ideological agenda favorable to Zionism.

Chomsky's demand that we work out a step-by-step series of stages toward a one-state solution is not a call for "realism," but precisely a call for us to engage in an academic exercise (e.g. his own proposal for the "two-state solution" as a stage toward a "bi-national state"). I think that our problem is much more immediate and practical: how do we build a movement to support the Palestinian struggle, without binding our support to concessions that limit the ability of the struggle to move forward? To do this, we have to build a movement that opposes the fundamental principles on which Israel is founded - and that continually asserts the full rights of the Palestinian people.

There is hope in a growing regional resistance that shifts the balance of power away from Israeli and US dominance. We can contribute by working to end all aid to Israel; by participating in an international movement to isolate Israel; and by giving whatever practical support we can to the people who are resisting on the ground.

Chomsky cites his statement in the interview that Palestinians "shouldn't give up the right of return." This is perhaps the best place to view Chomsky's idea of effective advocacy on behalf of Palestinian rights: Palestinians go on fighting for the right of return, while Chomsky calls their struggle unrealistic, tells activists who read Znet that they will only be doing harm to Palestinians by supporting this struggle, and he calls the treaty in which Palestinians are required to give up the right of return "the best possible compromise" for Palestinians. Again, is this really advocacy on behalf of Palestinian rights? I recommend instead that your readers take a look at the web-site of Al-Awda (the Palestinian Right to Return Coalition) www.al-awda.org to see what initiatives the international refugee community has been taking on this issue, and that they find ways to support those initiatives.

Finally, it's interesting to note Chomsky's evasion on a historical point. In the original interview, he had said that there "had never been a legitimate proposal for a secular, democratic state from any significant Palestinian (or of course Israeli) group." I don't contend that the Israelis have ever proposed it; I do contend that the DFLP, PFLP and much of the PLO leadership proposed it several times, and even fought to keep the hope for it alive in the face of massive Israeli rejection.

He now says,

"The PLO spoke about "democratic secularism," but in a form that called for liquidation of all Jewish political, social, and cultural institutions within an 'Arab nation.' For this reason alone – there were many others – the stance had no impact, except as a weapon for advocates of US-Israeli rejectionism."

Notice, once again, how Chomsky blames Palestinians for Israeli rejection when Palestinians fight for their legitimate rights. I'll let readers judge for themselves whether Chomsky's characterization is accurate; here is a typical statement of the "one-state" position from the PLO emissary to the UN, Saadat Hasan, in 1969:

"The Palestinian revolution is humanitarian in its goals. It seeks the establishment of a just and democratic society that guarantees to all its citizens, irrespective of their faith, the same rights and responsibilities and the same duties. It seeks the establishment of a society free from racism and bigotry, free from repugnant concepts of supremacy and racial purity, free from economic exploitation and social ills. It seeks the establishment of a State and not a beachhead for perpetual waves of invasion by followers of one faith or another. It seeks the establishment of a democratic secular State -- a pluralistic State -- for all its people."

This is not just an isolated statement, but the main current of much of the Palestinian thought of its time and through the 1970s. More importantly, this is not just a documentary or historical question. I personally can say that I have found the spirit of commitment to pluralism, and against racism and religious intolerance, very much alive everywhere I have traveled in Palestine.

© Copyright 2004 by AxisofLogic.com

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Noah Cohen is a friend of Axis of Logic and works as an activist with the New England Committee to Defend Palestine ( http://www.onepalestine.org/ ) in Boston, MA. He has traveled extensively in the Middle East, Palestine included, and has been fighting for the rights of the people of Palestine through the Palestinian struggle for the right-of-return and a single-state solution.


http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_11365.shtm
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Steve Kowit joins the Cohen-Chomsky Debate
By Steve Kowit
Sep 1, 2004, 12:13


Editor's Note: We thank Steve Kowit* for this enjoinder to the continuing Axis of Logic Cohen-Chomsky Debate. The debate began with Noah Cohen's challenge to Noam Chomsky's position on Palestine and solutions to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. We invite other readers to comment on this debate which goes to the heart of the history and dynamics of the occupation. - LMB


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Noam Chomsky's critique of Noah Cohen's one-state argument seems somewhat odd, since its premise is that the two-state solution is the only "realistic" solution, largely because it's the only one that the major players are seriously considering. But that itself seems a weak argument -- and simply untrue. It would be surprising if Hamas --surely one of the major players -- wouldn't quickly embrace this solution -- as would, more than likely, the majority of the Palestinian people, once the realization dawns, as no doubt it already has on many, that the two-state solution is a fantasy and the one-state solution means having their stolen coutnry back. It is likely that, if promoted, it will be embraced throughout the world, since it's a genuine solution, a just and meaningful solution, to the horrible Palestinian predicament. Much of the world would be delighted to see the racist state of Israel dissolve without a single individual facing harm of any sort from that collapse. And surely the nations of the Middle East would be overjoyed to see real justice in Palestine.

The Israeli government, continuing to build settlements in the West Bank even now, has never seriously contemplated the establishment of a Palestinian state, Sharon's duplicitous "acceptance" of that "two-state" proposition notwithstanding. His Likud Party, in its rejection, is more honest. The two-state solution is an Israeli-U.S. con game and always has been.

Arik Sharon has found it all but impossible to get Israeli settlers in Gaza to agree to so much as the mere possibility of withdrawal sometime in the future. But a two-state solution means removing hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers from Gaza and the West Bank. To say that it is unlikely that either the Israeli government or the international community can effect such an exodus is to understate the case. It is, for all intents and purposes, impossible to remove the bulk of the West Bank settlers from the West Bank and surely no one is about to try it. But if that is the case, then the two-state solution is nothing but a chimera. It would be hard for anyone with a realistic perspective to imagine it as a plausible option. The two-state solution is nice for Israel and the United States to talk about, to discuss, to pretend to embrace. Practically every Zionist in America today can feel righteous and compassionate by "embracing" the two-state solution -- especially knowing full well that it will never come to pass. Of course, the PLO, in desperation, signed on to the idea in 1988. It was, its leadership thought, the best they could hope for in a grim situation. But the concept of that Palestinian state is now one of a "demilitarized" state, and a demilitarized state is, of course, not a state at all. It is simply a name for another kind of colonial entity of impotent and impoverished refugee camps. Not the right of return but the right to be a vastly overcrowded, impoverished, completely unarmed sea of subject people living under the state of Israel's watchful and hostile eye, is what a two-state solution comes to. Nor is that pseudo-state for the palestinians likely to encompass even 22% of that people's stolen homeland.

The "two-state" solution is neither a state nor a solution. It is a con game. Nor does that "solution" solve the root problem of Israel's continuing to be a racist state with a master race in control of the land, water and government. Nor does it solve the problem of Israel being an aggressive, militaristic nuclear state with a relentless colonialist mind-set and long-held expansionist ambitions.

And --please forgive me for injecting a note of ethics into this discussion-- the two-state solution does not begin to serve the interests of social justice. The entirety of the Palestinian homeland was stolen and Noam Chomsky seems perfectly content with the Palestinian people being given back 22% (or less) for a non-state.

There is a solution, as Noah Cohen rightly insists -- one that doesn't require the impossible task of removing hundreds of thousands of Israelis from land they consider to be theirs and which under no circumstances would they be willing to abandon. It is to force Israel, through a total, unremitting international boycott --(one that might, in the end, have to include the United States as well as Israel)-- to end its racist state system and declare itself a nation in which people of all religions and ethnicities have absolutely equal rights. The