The International Balances between Two Instants


Philosophical thought naturally tends to be absolute.

The conduct and thinking of those who have or adopt philosophical theories about life, society and mankind must together represent a complete unity. We shall therefore see that the harmony between Saddam Hussein's thought and its application within Iraqi society equally applies to Iraqi foreign policy. With its inner coherence, and in concord with its practical applications, his ideology acquires its unity, integrity, comprehensiveness and own independence.

The general theoretical features of this ideology in its internal applications are, as we have attempted to confirm, several. The first is its national and Pan-Arab character, which interacts with others without losing its essential nature. It also has a balance. This is not based on fixed mechanical calculations but on the outcome of a living dialectic between the present and future. Also involved is a constant search for new formulae, not for the sake of novelty itself as such, but in order to overcome objective impediments and difficulties, which cannot be done using conventional methods and formulae. These general traits are also embodied in their external applications.

What is the analytical picture it presents of the conflicts between the forces of today's world? From which angle does the analysis begin? On which calculations is Iraq's movement based in its complicated relations with the world movement? What are the practical applications of these analyses and calculations in the different stands towards the countries of the world?

Before endeavoring to reply to this question, it must first be said that the historic moment of Saddam Hussein's appearance on the international stage was all but completely different from the preceding moment, whilst simultaneously full of potential to change. More precisely perhaps, Saddam Hussein's moment was that of a new moment of labour in a new form for the world. Like all moments of labour, it did not only experience inner turmoil and instability, but also the natural pains of birth.

When Gamal Abdul-Nasser emerged in international politics in 1952, for example, with the Egyptian revolution, the world had recovered from the effects of World War II, and its international contours had been defined with considerable clarity. This was apparent not only by the division into two defined camps, but also by the cold war between them. This fact alone sheds important light on the nature of the conduct adopted by Gamal Abdul-Nasser in the international field during the first phase of his revolution at least, namely the phase where the various options found practical application. In view of this, we are able to explain the skill he displayed in striking up discord between the two giant powers, and understand why, at that time, he succeeded in reaping the fruits of this discord, which gave him a great opportunity to maneuver and gain the maximum possible. Thus, when America refused to supply him with arms he was able to obtain them from one of the countries in the socialist camp. Likewise, when Dulles withdrew the offer of financing the High Dam, he was able to replace America with the Soviet Union. Then when the West was showing reluctance to meet his ambitions for industrialization and development, the East, whether through goodwill or far-sightedness, rushed forward to offer loans and technical and material assistance.

Europe was then still economically and politically weak. Nevertheless, it persisted in adhering to its former colonialist principles, and this limited its ability to deal firmly with the newly independent countries. America was blatantly influencing their foreign policy, as it hoped to inherit the legacy of the downfallen imperialists, Great Britain and France. This was based on theoretical and material premises, which governed its external movement since, and even during, World War II. When the world was drowning in bloodbaths, the American strategist, Nicholas Speakman, published his famous book, American Strategy in International Politics, which later became a sort of inspired bible for the American leaders and foreign policy theorists. In the book, he said: "In international society, every type of force and coercion, including wars of destruction, is permitted. This means that power conflicts are in themselves conflicts for become the major objective of American domestic and foreign policy. All else is secondary to that, because in the final moment power alone can accomplish the aims of foreign policy. Power means survival, and the ability to impose its will on others, dictate to those who have no power, and withdraw concessions from those who have less power than US (l)."

At that time, the socialist camp was also a united whole. It had been joined by 800 million in 1949, when Mao's peasant revolution triumphed over the imperialists and reactionaries. The only renegade was Tito. The Soviet nuclear umbrella gave protection to this large camp, which extended from the ends of Asia to the borders of Central Europe. The relations between the different parties to this camp were usually described as "granite", like the stone, which cannot be crushed or destroyed, even by bomb.

The third world was also beginning to appear at that time in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It sought to be rid of the colonialism and backwardness it had lived with for many years, and wanted to be far-removed from the new and underhand subordination of world imperialism.

Bandung had not yet brought positive neutrality and nonalignment, and the third world, which had had a difficult birth, was consequently faced at every turn with alignment to one of the two sides. Few leaders were then able to skillfully walk the tight rope between the two.

This, however, did not last long, and the 'sixties had hardly begun than new changes and new situations appeared. The socialist camp was divided amongst itself, split by conflict within its ranks. More than one Tito emerged, and the effects of the tragic facts broadcast by Khrushchev in the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 began to be strongly felt, turning the dreams of many in more than one place into a tragic nightmare. Armed Soviet troops invaded the streets of the capital cities of certain socialist countries.

The aim was to guarantee the people's loyalty to the Soviet system, and that of their leaders to Soviet ideology and politics. In fact, the leaders' remaining in office was made conditional upon this loyalty.

Europe, on the other hand, had recaptured its breath, and had begun demonstrating rebellion against the absolute American influence, reaching the point of independence along Gaullist lines. There was widespread recognition of the changes of the age, and after the fall of the old empires in 1956 under pressure from the two superpowers, it was realized that the time had passed when armies could occupy the land of others. Algeria gained its independence after much bloodshed, as did many other countries in black Africa.

America also realized that the dream of destroying the socialist states which had always appealed to the fanatic military leaders and hegemonists amongst those who held the true power, had become impossible now that the power in their hands had passed to others. It therefore had no other option than to agree to a peaceful coexistence, both socially and politically, with the different regimes. The fate of the world then became precariously balanced on the nuclear scales. With acute polarization, the third world crisis increased in severity as it alone was crushed between the stones of the mill. The non-aligned movement, which had appeared on the international stage with its positive neutrality, had in practice given it no more than a spiritual cover for its hopes, which in view of the balances in the world at the time, could not be achieved.

The third world itself began experiencing blows aimed at its very core. The respective leaders of Ghana, Mali, the Congo, Indonesia and India all fell victim. Egypt was confronted with imperialism and Zionism, and in many parts of the world America behaved with reckless abandon.

Notes

1 - See Amir Iskander, Tanaqudhat fil-Fikr al-Mu'asir (Contradictions in Contemporary Thought), Baghdad, Ministry of Information, 1974, p. 61.

Translated by Hassan Selim