August 15, 2006
Iran's interventionist policy in Iraq has a long history. Tehran's objective to influence developments in Iraq has been motivated by a number of strategic factors, as well as cultural and religious interests. The most important is that the history of the two nations has been characterized by a near permanent state of rivalry and political-military conflict.
With regard to its cultural, religious and ethnic dimensions, Iraq is a perfect setting for Arab-Persian confrontation. Iraq also represents a key point where Sunni and Shiite interests meet, and clash, therefore the Iraq-Iran rivalry has always had wider Arab national and historical dimensions. Iraq has always represented a counterbalancing force to Iran. A Sunni-led Iraq was the main instrument of the containment of Shiite influence beyond the community's heartland in Iraq and Iran.
In the Gulf and the wider Middle East, the balance of power between Iraq and Iran is the key to regional stability. Each of the two states has tried to alter this delicate balance and take advantage of the other's weaknesses at one point or other. As a result, the neighbors have been governed by deep mistrust and antagonism, sometimes leading to war.
Iran's present plan to intervene in Iraq has its roots in the Iranian government's decision to lend full support - overt and covert - to Iraqi Shiite opposition groups shortly after the Iranian revolution in 1979. This was followed by help for pro-Iranian Shiite religious and political groups operating in Iraq, from Iranian territory, from Syria, Iran's strategic ally in the region, or even from certain European capitals. The goal was to topple Iraq's Baathist regime.
Yet despite over 20 years of effort, and despite unlimited Iranian and Syrian political, financial and military support and propaganda, none of these Iraqi Shiite groups proved capable of posing a serious threat to the Iraqi regime. During the course of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the Iranian leadership mobilized the pro-Iranian, mainly Shiite Iraqi parties - the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and Al-Daawa - to support Iran's military efforts in the hope of achieving victory. These two parties helped Iran with vital intelligence from Iraq, and their cadres participated in Iranian military operations along the border. This failed, and until the US-led invasion of Iraq in April 2003, Iranian strategy to intervene in Iraq had proved to be a complete failure.
By mid-2002, the balance began to tip in Iran's favor with the escalation of the Iraqi-US confrontation. The Iranian leadership accurately judged the seriousness of this looming confrontation. Thus, while the Bush administration was engaged in plotting the removal of the Iraqi regime, the Iranian leadership was busy planning how Tehran could strategically gain from any US adventure in Iraq.
This approach became evident in several high-level decisions taken by Tehran in 2002-2003. First, against all declared ideological and political principles of the Iranian revolution, the Iranian leadership encouraged the main Iraq Shiite opposition parties to move closer to the US, especially during the crucial months preceding the invasion when Washington was preparing the post-invasion political arrangements. Iraqi ayatollahs and prominent Shiite political and religious figures frequently visited Washington or met high-ranking US officials. This unusual alliance was approved by the Iranian leadership.
Second, in August 2002 Iran's supreme guide Ali Khamenei ordered the formation of a special committee on Iraq to monitor the development of the crisis, formulate Iranian strategy and mobilize the state's resources to promote Iranian interests in post-Baath Iraq. The committee consisted of representatives from defense, intelligence, political, diplomatic, and religious institutions. The intelligence arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, responsible for promoting "external jihad," was in charge of most, if not all, Iranian activities related to Iraq, including sponsorship and control of the pro-Iran Shiite opposition groups and direct and crucial control of these groups' intelligence and armed wings, as well as militias. Thus, at the time of the US-led invasion of Iraq, Iranian institutions were well placed to advance Tehran's strategic objectives.
Among the chief aims of these institutions were: first, to prevent an American success in Iraq that might undermine the stability and security of Iran, as well as threaten the survival of the Islamic regime at a later stage; second, to establish sustainable Iranian influence in the new Iraq that could serve Iran's long-term strategic regional interests; and third, to prevent the emergence of a strong Iraq that could balance or contain Iran. The Iranian formula was simple: A failed US plus a weak and fragmented Iraq equalled a strong and influential Iran.
By virtue of its past associations, Iran also has links with all the important power centers in Iraq. First, the Iranian intelligence apparatus has ties to and influence over militias and intelligence services of Iraqi Shiite parties now in power. Iranian intelligence also has an overt and covert direct presence in Iraq, particularly in the Shiite heartland in southern Iraq, the Shiite holy cities, and parts of Baghdad. Second, the Iranian leadership also had strong and longtime links with the new Iraqi Shiite political leadership, dating back to the early 1980s.
And third, the Iranian religious leadership maintains strong links with its Iraqi Shiite counterparts because the two centers of Shiite spiritual authority - Najaf and Qom - are now closer than ever before. Both religious centers perceive the situation with common interest. This requires a high degree of coordination, and both have huge moral and practical leverage over Iraq's political and security leaderships.
Iranian interventionist policy in Iraq has already attained a significant part of its objectives. In fact, despite US forces occupying the country, Iran has more influence over developments in post-Baath Iraq.
Mustafa Alani is senior adviser and director of the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with the center.
|