April 1, 2006
"Anti-War"
-- -- History repeats itself, but always with new
twists. We are back to the good old days when a
Declaration of War preceded the start of a war.
Such declaration
occurred on March 16th, 2006. Reversing the old
order, we are now in the
"Sitzkrieg", to be followed shortly by an aerial
"Blitzkrieg" in the coming days.
In the old days, Congress declared war, and
directed the Executive to take action. In the
new millenium,
the Executive declared war last March 16th, then
Congress will pass
H.R. 282, "To hold the current regime in Iran
accountable for its threatening behavior and to
support a transition to democracy in Iran." This
bill and
previous ones like it are in direct violation of
the legally binding
Algiers Accords[pdf] signed by the United States
and Iran on January 19, 1981, that states "The
United States pledges that it is and from now on
will be the policy of the United States not to
intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or
militarily, in Iran's internal affairs";
however, this is clearly of
no interest to the
353 policymakers sponsoring the bill.
The US promised Russia and China that
the UN Security Council statement just approved
will not be a trigger for military action after 30
days; true to its promise, the US will attack
before the 30-day deadline imposed by the UNSC
for Iran to stop its nuclear enrichment activity,
i.e. before the end of April. The "justification" is
likely to be an alleged threat of
imminent biological attack with Iran's involvement.
The Declaration of War against Iran
I n the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the
Congressional Declaration of December 8, 1941
stated: " Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan
has committed unprovoked acts of war against the
Government and the people of the United States of
America: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the state of war
between the United States and the Imperial
Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon
the United States is hereby formally declared; and
the president is hereby authorized and directed to
employ the entire naval and military forces of the
United States and the resources of the Government to
carry on war against the Imperial Government of
Japan."
Similarly, the formal war declaration against
Iran, the
National Security Strategy of March 16, 2006,
stated:
- "We may face no greater challenge from a
single country than from Iran."
- "The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism;
threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East
peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies
the aspirations of its people for freedom."
- "[T]he first duty of the United States
Government remains what it always has been: to
protect the American people and American
interests. It is an enduring American principle
that this duty obligates the government to
anticipate and counter threats, using all
elements of national power, before the threats
can do grave damage."
- "The greater the threat, the greater is the
risk of inaction – and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy's attack. There are
few greater threats than a terrorist attack with
WMD."
- "To forestall or prevent such hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively."
- "When the consequences of an attack with WMD
are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford
to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize."
- "[T]here will always be some uncertainty
about the status of hidden programs."
- "Advances in biotechnology provide greater
opportunities for state and non-state actors to
obtain dangerous pathogens and equipment."
- "Biological weapons also pose a grave WMD
threat because of the risks of contagion that
would spread disease across large populations
and around the globe."
- "Countering the spread of biological weapons
.... will also enhance our Nation's ability to
respond to pandemic public health threats, such
as avian influenza."
This has to be combined with the 2005 U.S. State
Department
"FINDING. The United States judges that, based on
all available information, Iran has an offensive
biological weapons program in violation of the BWC."
In addition, the March 16 declaration makes it clear
that the US
will use nuclear weapons in the war against
Iran:
- ."..using all elements of national power..."
- "Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces
continue to play a critical role. We are
strengthening deterrence by developing a New
Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both
nuclear and improved conventional
capabilities)."
and this is further reinforced by the
just released
"National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction"[pdf] that states "Offensive
operations may include kinetic (both conventional
and nuclear) and/or non-kinetic options (e.g.
information operations) to deter or defeat a WMD
threat or subsequent use of WMD."
There is of course also the
claim that Iran is a threat because it intends to
develop nuclear weapons. The sole purpose of
that claim, which
flies in the face of all available evidence, is
to
generate a diplomatic stalemate at the UN that
will allow Bush to state that
other nations share the US concern but not the
resolve to act. However the actual trigger for
the bombing to begin will not be the
long-term and
by now discredited nuclear threat, rather it is
likely to be
the threat of an imminent biological attack.
Casus Belli
There is no casus belli against Iran based
on its nuclear program. The
IAEA has found no evidence that in the 20 years
of its development there has been any diversion of
nuclear material to military applications. The Bush
administration now
officially acknowledges that the issue with Iran
arises from a
"loophole" in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
that allows non-nuclear countries to pursue uranium
enrichment.
However it is not a loophole, the right to a full
civilian nuclear program is an integral part of the
compromise, that made non-nuclear countries
agree to it. For the US to call it a loophole means
to abrogate the treaty unilaterally and propose a
different treaty that non-nuclear countries will
have no motivation to agree to.
The Bush administration declares that a civilian
nuclear program that gives Iran
"knowledge" or
"capability" to build a nuclear weapon is
unacceptable. It could apply exactly the same logic
to biotechnology.
The State Department says that "Iran is
expanding its biotechnology and biomedical
industries by building large, state-of-the-art
research and pharmaceutical production facilities.
These industries could easily hide pilot to
industrial-scale production capabilities for a
potential BW program, and could mask procurement of
BW-related process equipment." Why isn't the US
demanding that Iran stops its biotechnology research
and development, and that
it transfers all biotech related activities to
Russia?
The key lies in
Executive Order 13292, which made information on
"weapons of mass destruction" and on "defense
against transnational terrorism" classified. If
concrete details about
Iran's alleged biological weapons programs were
made public, they would be subject to public
scrutiny and they would be discredited, as the
allegations on Iran's "nuclear weapons program"
have been. The US is likely to have "assembled"
classified information on Iran's biological weapons
programs and shared it with selected individuals,
including members of Congress, under the constraint
that classified information cannot be made public.
For example, at the
June 25, 2004 House subcommittee "MEMBERS ONLY
CLASSIFIED BRIEFING on Iran, Middle East
Proliferation and Terrorist Capabilities." The
unclassified portion of that
briefing states "It is time for Iran to declare
its biological weapons program and make arrangements
for its dismantlement."
There is likely to be a
team of "experts" lined up by the administration
that will support its
claims that Iran had a biological weapons program
representing an imminent threat. There is always
room in science for differing opinions, and if an
open scientific debate is not possible because
information is classified, any outlandish claim can
find some supporters in the scientific community.
The
most likely biological threat to be invoked,
because it has a
natural time element associated with it, is the
threat of a bird flu pandemic caused by a
deliberately mutated H5N1 virus carried
by migrating wild
birds.
The Biological Threat
Consider for example
Dr. Ward Casscells, a renowned cardiologist that
has of late
become an "expert" in bioterrorism. Even more
recently, Dr. Casscells
joined the Army as a colonel . According to the
US Defense Department,
"his years of research on now-spreading avian flu
are now deemed cutting edge." However, I know of
no independent credible scientific body that makes
the same assessment: Dr. Casscells has written a
total of four papers on the effect of influenza on
cardiac disease which have been cited by no other
scientists. His paper "Influenza as a bioweapon" has
a grand total of 5 citations, meaning a mere 5 other
papers refer to it; "cutting edge" scientific papers
have hundreds or thousands of citations. His only
other paper on the subject, "Influenza as a
bioterror threat: the need for global vaccination"
has zero citations.
Nonetheless,
Dr. Casscells' outstanding credentials as a
scientist will be invoked by the administration if
he vouches for the credibility of "intelligence"
indicating that a dangerous mutated bird flu virus
has been developed in an Iranian underground
bioweapons laboratory. Dr. Casscells has been
surveilling the Middle East to
"scope out the possibility for a widespread
outbreak" of bird flu. Because he has been
advocating the view that
"Bird flu is poised to be an explosive problem"
and has
predicted the use of influenza as a bioweapon,
he is likely to be inclined to believe such claims.
Similarly his scientific colleagues at the
"Defense of Houston" committee, that work on
anticipating bioterrorism threats and
are highly lauded by the administration and very
well
funded by Army grants.
The
Bush administration has spent
vast sums of money in combating bioterrorism
threats, reportedly
over $7 billion per year, without any evidence
or precedent for bioterrorism attacks. Nevertheless
there will always be plenty of scientists that
will flock to
where the grant money is and devote efforts to
validate conclusions that are valued by the
organizations giving the grants,
and news media duly publicize the
hyped threat of bioterrorism. Still, last year
over
700 scientists including 2 Nobel laureates
signed a petition objecting to the diversion of
funds from projects of high public-health importance
to biodefense, calling it a "misdirection" of
priorities. Dr. Richard H. Ebright, a renowned
molecular biologist,
states that "A majority of the nation's top
microbiologists – the very group that the Bush
administration is counting on to carry out its
biodefense research agenda – dispute the premises
and implementation of the biodefense spending."
On the supposed threat of bird flu, while it is
continuously being hyped by the administration
[1],
[2],
[3],
[4],
[5], expert opinion is that it is not a serious
threat
[1],
[2],
[3],
[4],
[5],
[6]
and is politically motivated. The blaming of
bird flu spread on wild birds is also highly
questionable
[1],
[2].
On March 15th, right before the disclosure of the
new National Security Strategy, I suggested
the bird flu casus belli against Iran, that
would "necessitate" bombing of Iranian facilities
before the bird migration season begins in the
Spring. Several elements emphasized in the March 16
NSS appear to support that scenario,
as discussed above. In a
March 20 press conference concerning federal
preparedness for avian flu, Secretary Michael
Leavitt (who also
warned a few weeks ago to store tuna and milk under
the bed to prepare for bird flu ) stated "Think
of the world if you will as a vast forest that is
susceptible to fire. A spark if allowed to burn will
emerge as an uncontainable fire. That's a pandemic.
If we are there when the spark happens, it can be
squelched. But if allowed to burn for a time it
begins to spread uncontrollably." An aerial attack
on Iranian installations may be touted as the
"squelching" of the bird flu pandemic spark.
Does Bush need congressional authorization to
bomb Iran?
The answer is contained in the
Statement by the president of October 16, 2002,
in signing into law the congressional authorization
to use force against Iraq. It states
"...I sought an additional resolution of
support from the Congress to use force against Iraq,
should force become necessary. While I appreciate
receiving that support, my request for it did not,
and my signing this resolution does not, constitute
any change in the long-standing positions of the
executive branch on either the president's
constitutional authority to use force to deter,
prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats
to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution."
In other words: "I appreciate Congress'
authorization but didn't need it and will not need
it next time with Iran."
The
War Powers Resolution encourages the president
to consult with Congress "in every possible
instance",
yet allows the president to introduce Armed Forces
into hostilities without Congressional
authorization; it simply compels him to terminate
hostilities within 60 to 90 days unless Congress
authorizes an extension. Plenty time enough.
The Attack
I t is unlikely that there will be a
public announcement of the impending attack before
it starts, since it would generate opposition.
Allies
do not want to be implicated and will deny any
knowledge. Who will be officially notified that an
attack is about to take place? Most likely, Iran
itself.
Direct conversations between the US and Iran are
about to start, nominally on the subject of Iraq
only. They will also provide the only direct conduit
for the US to communicate with Iran without
intermediaries. An "ultimatum" unacceptable to Iran,
as was delivered publicly
to Iraq on March 17th, 2003, could be delivered
privately to Iran through that route.
The reasons for our actions will be clear, the
force measured, and the cause just.
The initial US attack on Iranian facilities is
likely to be "measured": a highly accurate strike on
selected facilities "suspected" of bioweapons work,
with
cruise missiles launched
from submarines or ships in the Persian Gulf.
That is a component of the
CONPLAN 8022 Global Strike mission, which
recently became operational and also includes
nuclear preemptive strikes.
The "clear" reasons and "just" cause for the
administration to attack can be stated as follows:
if
a bird flu pandemic can cause 150 million deaths
and there is even a one percent probability that the
"intelligence" is right, i.e. even if there is a
99%
"uncertainty about the status of hidden programs",
the
expected number of deaths that would be
prevented by bombing the Iranian facilities is the
product of those two numbers, i.e. 1.5 million,
vastly larger than the few thousand Iranian
casualties due to "collateral damage."
Any
military reaction by Iran to the attack, perhaps
even a verbal reaction, will be construed as
"aggression" by Iran towards the US and Israel,
and result in large scale bombing of Iranian
missile, nuclear and other facilities. Does that
sound absurd? Recall that
the US and
Britain bombed
Iraq's no-fly zones well before the Iraq invasion,
and Iraqi response was labeled
"aggression toward planes of the coalition forces."
Nuclear
earth penetrating weapons may be used in the
initial attack, and
certainly will be used in the large scale attack
that will follow.
Why will this happen? Because it was
"pencilled in" a long time ago. The
actions of the US against Iran in
recent years have been clearly directed towards
a confrontation, to
suppress the rise of Iran as a strong regional power
that does not conform to US interests.
Can it be Prevented?
A
small group of thugs is about to lead America
across
a line of no return. On the other side of this
line there is no nuclear taboo, no restraint on
preemptive nuclear attacks on non-nuclear nations,
and no incentive for non-nuclear nations to remain
non-nuclear. A global nuclear war and the
destruction of humanity will be a distinct
possibility.
Americans are largely unaware of what is about
to happen.
Half a million people go to the streets on
immigration law, yet nobody is demonstrating
against the Iran war that will radically change the
life of Americans for generations to come. The more
informed sectors of society, scientists, arms
control organizations, the media, the political
establishment, the military, are not taking a strong
stand against the impending war.
Congress is silent.
Only people in the know can stop this. Resigning
from the job is not good enough
[1],
[2],
[3]. People in the know
have to come forward with information that
brings the impending attack to the forefront of
attention of Congress and the American public and
thwarts it. Not doing so is being complicit in a
plan that will bring tragic consequences to America
and the world.
Else, all that will be left is to
bring the perpetrators to justice. Danton,
Robespierre, Mussolini, Petain, Ribbentrop, Goering,
Ceausescu also occupied positions of power and
prominence at some point in their careers.
Jorge
Hirsch is a professor of physics at the
University of California San Diego.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/eoamend.html
MS Word Version
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 25, 2003
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13292
- - - - - - -
FURTHER AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, AS AMENDED,
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States of America, and in order to further amend Executive Order
12958, as amended, it is hereby ordered that Executive Order 12958 is amended to
read as follows:
Classified National Security Information
This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information, including information relating to
defense against transnational terrorism. Our democratic principles require that
the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also,
our Nations progress depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless,
throughout our history, the national defense has required that certain
information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our
democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with
foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our Nations security
remains a priority.
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered
as follows:
PART 1--ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION
Sec. 1.1. Classification Standards. (a) Information may be originally
classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions
are met:
(1) an original classification authority is classifying the
information;
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the
control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of
information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and
(4) the original classification authority determines that the
unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be
expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes
defense against transnational terrorism, and the original
classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
(b) Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a
result of any unauthorized disclosure of identical or similar information.
(c) The unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is
presumed to cause damage to the national security.
Sec. 1.2. Classification Levels. (a) Information may be classified at
one of the following three levels:
(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original
classification authority is able to identify or describe.
(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security that the original classification
authority is able to identify or describe.
(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security that the original classification authority is
able to identify or describe.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used
to identify United States classified information.
Sec. 1.3. Classification Authority. (a) The authority to classify
information originally may be exercised only by:
(1) the President and, in the performance of executive duties, the
Vice President;
(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in the
Federal Register; and
(3) United States Government officials delegated this authority
pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) Officials authorized to classify information at a specified level are
also authorized to classify information at a lower level.
(c) Delegation of original classification authority.
(1) Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited
to the minimum required to administer this order. Agency heads are
responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a
demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.
(2) "Top Secret" original classification authority may be delegated
only by the President; in the performance of executive duties, the
Vice President; or an agency head or official designated pursuant to
paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original classification authority may
be delegated only by the President; in the performance of executive
duties, the Vice President; or an agency head or official designated
pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this section; or the senior agency
official described in section 5.4(d) of this order, provided that
official has been delegated "Top Secret" original classification
authority by the agency head.
(4) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in
writing and the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided
in this order. Each delegation shall identify the official by name or
position title.
(d) Original classification authorities must receive training in original
classification as provided in this order and its implementing directives. Such
training must include instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified
information and of the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that may be
brought against an individual who fails to protect classified information from
unauthorized disclosure.
(e) Exceptional cases. When an employee, government contractor, licensee,
certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have original
classification authority originates information believed by that person to
require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner
consistent with this order and its implementing directives. The information
shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this order or its implementing
directives to the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and
classification authority with respect to this information. That agency shall
decide within 30 days whether to classify this information. If it is not clear
which agency has classification responsibility for this information, it shall be
sent to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office. The Director
shall determine the agency having primary subject matter interest and forward
the information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a
classification determination.
Sec. 1.4. Classification Categories. Information shall not be considered
for classification unless it concerns:
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence
sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States,
including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the
national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials
or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the
national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 1.5. Duration of Classification. (a) At the time of original
classification, the original classification authority shall attempt to establish
a specific date or event for declassification based upon the duration of the
national security sensitivity of the information. Upon reaching the date or
event, the information shall be automatically declassified. The date or event
shall not exceed the time frame established in paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) If the original classification authority cannot determine an earlier
specific date or event for declassification, information shall be marked for
declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision, unless the
original classification authority otherwise determines that the sensitivity of
the information requires that it shall be marked for declassification for up to
25 years from the date of the original decision. All information classified
under this section shall be subject to section 3.3 of this order if it is
contained in records of permanent historical value under title 44, United States
Code.
(c) An original classification authority may extend the duration of
classification, change the level of classification, or reclassify specific
information only when the standards and procedures for classifying information
under this order are followed.
(d) Information marked for an indefinite duration of classification under
predecessor orders, for example, marked as "Originating Agencys Determination
Required," or information
classified under predecessor orders that contains no declassification
instructions shall be declassified in accordance with part 3 of this order.
Sec. 1.6. Identification and Markings. (a) At the time of original
classification, the following shall appear on the face of each classified
document, or shall be applied to other classified media in an appropriate
manner:
(1) one of the three classification levels defined in section 1.2 of
this order;
(2) the identity, by name or personal identifier and position, of the
original classification authority;
(3) the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise evident;
(4) declassification instructions, which shall indicate one of the
following:
(A) the date or event for declassification, as prescribed in
section 1.5(a) or section 1.5(c);
(B) the date that is 10 years from the date of original
classification, as prescribed in section 1.5(b); or
(C) the date that is up to 25 years from the date of original
classification, as prescribed in section 1.5 (b); and
(5) a concise reason for classification that, at a minimum, cites the
applicable classification categories in section 1.4 of this order.
(b) Specific information described in paragraph (a) of this section may be
excluded if it would reveal additional classified information.
(c) With respect to each classified document, the agency originating the
document shall, by marking or other means, indicate which portions are
classified, with the applicable classification level, and which portions are
unclassified. In accordance with standards prescribed in directives issued
under
this order, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office may grant
waivers of this requirement. The Director shall revoke any waiver upon a
finding of abuse.
(d) Markings implementing the provisions of this order, including
abbreviations and requirements to safeguard classified working papers, shall
conform to the standards prescribed in implementing directives issued pursuant
to this order.
(e) Foreign government information shall retain its original
classification markings or shall be assigned a U.S. classification that provides
a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that
furnished the information. Foreign government information retaining its
original classification markings need not be assigned a U.S. classification
marking provided that the responsible agency determines that the foreign
government markings are adequate to meet the purposes served by U.S.
classification markings.
(f) Information assigned a level of classification under this or
predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of
classification despite the omission of other required markings. Whenever such
information is used in the derivative classification process or is reviewed for
possible declassification, holders of such information shall coordinate with an
appropriate classification authority for the application of omitted markings.
(g) The classification authority shall, whenever practicable, use a
classified addendum whenever classified information constitutes a small portion
of an otherwise unclassified document.
(h) Prior to public release, all declassified records shall be
appropriately marked to reflect their declassification.
Sec. 1.7. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations. (a) In no case
shall information be classified in order to:
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error;
(2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency;
(3) restrain competition; or
(4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require
protection in the interest of the national security.
(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the
national security shall not be classified.
(c) Information may be reclassified after declassification and release to
the public under proper authority only in accordance with the following
conditions:
(1) the reclassification action is taken under the personal authority
of the agency head or deputy agency head, who determines in writing
that the reclassification of the information is necessary in the
interest of the national security;
(2) the information may be reasonably recovered; and
(3) the reclassification action is reported promptly to the Director
of the Information Security Oversight Office.
(d) Information that has not previously been disclosed to the public under
proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received
a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of
section 3.5 of this order only if such classification meets the requirements of
this order and is accomplished on a document-by-document basis with the personal
participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head,
or the senior agency official designated under section 5.4 of this order.
(e) Compilations of items of information that are individually
unclassified may be classified if the compiled information reveals an additional
association or relationship that: (1) meets the standards for classification
under this order; and (2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items of
information. As used in this order, "compilation" means an aggregation of
pre-existing unclassified items of information.
Sec. 1.8. Classification Challenges. (a) Authorized holders of
information who, in good faith, believe that its classification status is
improper are encouraged and expected to challenge the classification status of
the information in accordance with agency procedures established under paragraph
(b) of this section.
(b) In accordance with implementing directives issued pursuant to this
order, an agency head or senior agency official shall establish procedures under
which authorized holders of information are encouraged and expected to challenge
the classification of information that they believe is improperly classified or
unclassified. These procedures shall ensure that:
(1) individuals are not subject to retribution for bringing such
actions;
(2) an opportunity is provided for review by an impartial official or
panel; and
(3) individuals are advised of their right to appeal agency decisions
to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (Panel)
established by section 5.3 of this order.
PART 2--DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION
Sec. 2.1. Use of Derivative Classification. (a) Persons who only
reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply
classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a
classification guide, need not possess original classification authority.
(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings shall:
(1) observe and respect original classification decisions; and
(2) carry forward to any newly created documents the pertinent
classification markings. For information derivatively classified
based on multiple sources, the derivative classifier shall carry
forward:
Sec. 2.2. Classification Guides. (a) Agencies with original
classification authority shall prepare classification guides to facilitate the
proper and uniform derivative classification of information. These guides shall
conform to standards contained in directives issued under this order.
(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official
who:
(1) has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or
is the senior agency official; and
(2) is authorized to classify information originally at the highest
level of classification prescribed in the guide.
(c) Agencies shall establish procedures to ensure that classification
guides are reviewed and updated as provided in directives issued under this
order.
PART 3--DECLASSIFICATION AND DOWNGRADING
Sec. 3.1. Authority for Declassification. (a) Information shall be
declassified as soon as it no longer meets the standards for classification
under this order.
(b) It is presumed that information that continues to meet the
classification requirements under this order requires continued protection. In
some exceptional cases, however, the need to protect such information may be
outweighed by the public
interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases the information
should be declassified. When such questions arise, they shall be referred to
the agency head or the senior agency official. That official will determine, as
an exercise of discretion, whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs
the damage to the national security that might reasonably be expected from
disclosure. This provision does not:
(c) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office
determines that information is classified in violation of this order, the
Director may require the information to be declassified by the agency that
originated the classification. Any such decision by the Director may be
appealed to the President through the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. The information shall remain classified pending a prompt
decision on the appeal.
(d) The provisions of this section shall also apply to agencies that,
under the terms of this order, do not have original classification authority,
but had such authority under predecessor orders.
Sec. 3.2. Transferred Records. (a) In the case of classified records
transferred in conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for
storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the originating
agency for purposes of this order.
(b) In the case of classified records that are not officially transferred
as described in paragraph (a) of this section, but that originated in an agency
that has ceased to exist and for which there is no successor agency, each agency
in possession of such records shall be deemed to be the
originating agency for purposes of this order. Such records may be declassified
or downgraded by the agency in possession after consultation with any other
agency that has an interest in the subject matter of the records.
(c) Classified records accessioned into the National Archives and Records
Administration (National Archives) as of the effective date of this order shall
be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist of the United States (Archivist)
in accordance with this order, the directives issued pursuant to this order,
agency declassification guides, and any existing procedural agreement between
the Archivist and the relevant agency head.
(d) The originating agency shall take all reasonable steps to declassify
classified information contained in records determined to have permanent
historical value before they are accessioned into the National Archives.
However, the Archivist may require that classified records be accessioned into
the National Archives when necessary to comply with the provisions of the
Federal Records Act. This provision does not apply to records being transferred
to the Archivist pursuant to section 2203 of title 44, United States Code, or
records for which the National Archives serves as the custodian of the records
of an agency or organization that has gone out of existence.
(e) To the extent practicable, agencies shall adopt a system of records
management that will facilitate the public release of documents at the time such
documents are declassified pursuant to the provisions for automatic
declassification in section 3.3 of this order.
Sec. 3.3. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject to paragraphs (b)-(e)
of this section, on December 31, 2006, all classified records that (1) are more
than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical
value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified
whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently,
all classified records shall be automatically declassified on December 31 of the
year that is 25 years from the date of its original classification, except as
provided in paragraphs (b)-(e) of this section.
(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under
paragraph (a) of this section specific information, the release of which could
be expected to:
(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or a human
intelligence source, or reveal information about the application of an
intelligence source or method;
(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of
weapons of mass destruction;
(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or
activities;
(4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of
the art technology within a U.S. weapon system;
(5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;
(6) reveal information, including foreign government information,
that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the
United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably
undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
(7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the
current ability of United States Government officials to protect the
President, Vice President, and other protectees for whom protection
services, in the interest of the national security, are authorized;
(8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair
current national security emergency preparedness plans or reveal
current vulnerabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, or
projects relating to the national security; or
(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.
(c) An agency head shall notify the President through the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs of any specific file series of records
for which a review or assessment has determined that the information within that
file series almost invariably falls within one or more of the exemption
categories listed in paragraph (b) of this section and which the agency proposes
to exempt from automatic declassification. The notification shall include:
(1) a description of the file series;
(2) an explanation of why the information within the file series is
almost invariably exempt from automatic declassification and why the
information must remain classified for a longer period of time; and
(3) except for the identity of a confidential human source or a human
intelligence source, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a
specific date or event for declassification of the information.
The President may direct the agency head not to exempt the file series or to
declassify the information within that series at an earlier date than
recommended. File series exemptions previously approved by the President shall
remain valid without any additional agency action.
(d) At least 180 days before information is automatically declassified
under this section, an agency head or senior agency official shall notify the
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, serving as Executive
Secretary of the Panel, of any specific information beyond that included in a
notification to the President under paragraph (c) of this section that the
agency proposes to exempt from automatic declassification. The notification
shall include:
(1) a description of the information, either by reference to
information in specific records or in the form of a declassification
guide;
(2) an explanation of why the information is exempt from automatic
declassification and must remain classified for a longer period of
time; and
(3) except for the identity of a confidential human source or a human
intelligence source, as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, a
specific date or event for declassification of the information. The
Panel may direct the agency not to exempt the information or to
declassify it at an earlier date than recommended. The agency head
may appeal such a decision to the President through the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. The information will
remain classified while such an appeal is pending.
(e) The following provisions shall apply to the onset of automatic
declassification:
(1) Classified records within an integral file block, as defined in
this order, that are otherwise subject to automatic declassification
under this section shall not be automatically declassified until
December 31 of the year that is 25 years from the date of the most
recent record within the file block.
(2) By notification to the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office, before the records are subject to automatic
declassification, a
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