With the US congress' insisting to divide Iraq, there is no more room today for discussion or debate, the decisive hour has come and every one should choose his real trench. For what happened since the invasion and specially transforming Iraq internal setup by both occupations, US and Iranian, ascertains and without the slightest doubt what our Party has warned about many a times before and after the invasion : that the ultimate objective is to dismember every Arab country one after the other or at the same time...
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Baath Party Statement
Let's foil, with the unity of the armed Resistance, the conspiracy to divide Iraq
The Arab Baath Socialist Party
In the name of God the Most Beneficent the Most Merciful
The Arab Baath Socialist Party
One Arab Nation, with an eternal mission
Unity, Freedom, Socialism
Let's foil, with the unity of the armed Resistance, the conspiracy to divide Iraq.
With the US congress' insisting to divide Iraq, there is no more room today for discussion or debate, the decisive hour has come and every one should choose his real trench. For what happened since the invasion and specially transforming Iraq internal setup by both occupations, US and Iranian, ascertains and without the slightest doubt what our Party has warned about many a times before and after the invasion : that the ultimate objective is to dismember every Arab country one after the other or at the same time.
The US and Iran insistence to fuel and heighten the sectarian (fitna) ill feeling in Iraq and the systematic destruction of every normal human life in our homeland, were interconnected steps designed to pave the way for the right environment to divide Iraq.
Now all the masks have fallen and all the US and Iranian lies have been uncovered concerning the unity of Iraq that they have no intention to divide it! In the meanwhile, the official division is ready thanks to the complete US - Iranian entente: first organize a temporary confederation, then, declare independent states on the ruins of the patriotic Iraqi entity.
Therefore, the time for talks is over! What is requested from all the Iraqi Resistance factions and all the Iraqi patriotic forces should be the following:
1- The immediate unity of all the Resistance factions. The non existence of the unity of all the Iraqi Resistance factions and the relying on ideological understanding, is a dangerous lacuna which might divide the Resistance instead of unifying it.
Our Party warns from the dangers of some known Islamic currents which consider many of the fundamental combating factions in the Iraqi Resistance and in the Iraqi patriotic forces, as infidels or Takfiris..and fight them either by arms or through Takfiri Fatwas.. This is the most dangerous situation, facing Iraq' liberation. The US exploited this breach in al Anbar to strike all the Resistance factions under the pretext of fighting al Qaeda.
In the past, every one including those who spread the Islamic faith, used to strike deals with the non Muslims to accelerate victory. In modern times, peoples didn't get rid of colonialism unless through a global alliance which included all the anti colonialists forces be clerics or atheists as it happened in Vietnam. So will those who use now infidelity and faith as a criteria to divide the Resistance and the Iraqi patriotic movement, ever comprehend that this is exactly what serves the Occupation and helps it stay instead of forcing it to withdraw? Our Party, therefore, sincerely calls upon all the combating organizations to let aside their division and to hold on to a real unity of all the combatants and transform the groups newly formed into a global combating unity which includes all the factions without exception. This is the most important request to achieve victory, foil and wreck the US Occupation and Iran' tactics to divide the Resistance.
2- Get rid of any ideological rows in between the Resistance factions for the time being for any disagreement now, can turn into a real ill feeling (fitna)! That is why all should avoid mutual suspicion or criticizing each other.
3- The Iraqi patriotic forces which back the Resistance should unite too in a global Front which includes every body. Indeed! Any delay is a sign of lack of awareness on what is going on in Iraq and on how to confront dangers.
4- All the educated Iraqi and Arab circles should act immediately, actively and globally to expose this US' new move and exercise complete and multilateral pressure to convey a message to the US' congress, the US' administration and the US' public opinion.. and tell them that dividing Iraq is a crime, surpassing with its gravity and its devastating consequences, all the US administration' crimes in Iraq so far and which lets the door wide open to extremely dangerous events, the US will never be exempted of or be able to escape.
5- The United Nation bears directly the responsibility to protect Iraq's regional unity. Iraq is a founder member state of the UN whose pact insists on equal sovereignty for every nation and the protection of its national independence. True! The United Nations are weak and influenced by the reigning superpowers, but its stand even officially or in theory can help in some ways, control the US rampaging buffalo behavior.
Last, Baathists, be combatants or militants, must prepare themselves to a new phase for liberation and to protect the Iraqi national unity, based above all on intensifying the armed struggle as the fundamental mean to guarantee the complete liberation and the defeat of the Occupation.. They bear too the fundamental responsibility to create the global national Front, in Iraq or in the Arab homeland.
Long live Iraq, united, free, and Arab where all its components are respected!
Long live the Armed Iraqi National Resistance, the sole and unique representative of the Iraqi people!
Long live the unity of the Armed Resistance, the key to the liberation of Iraq!
Iraq Leadership
Iraq Culture and Information Bureau
The Arab Baath Socialist Party
Baghdad, Iraq on the 30th September 2007
Baghdad, Martyr Saddam Hussein's Capital City
The Iraqi glorious Resistance has made out of the US, a pariah country, loathed and hated, every where, from the rising sun to the setting sun on this planet.
*Translated by Abu Assur. http://www.al-moharer.net
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:: Article nr. 36819 sent on 01-oct-2007 17:15 ECT
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| Comment pos ted: by eric lindblad on 02 Oct 2007 - 00:30 |
a² + b² = c²
F.W. Lanchester - World War II.
If 'a' the United States and 'b' the Soviet Union are initially - technologicall y and in terms of manpower - weaker than 'c' fascist Germany, then if 'a' and 'b ' can be built up they can eventually become the equavalent of 'c', which increa ses the chances of combined 'a' + 'b' victory over 'c'.
Thus if public demonstrations of the Arab states' cities, not necessarily in tec hnical or manpower support of the Iraqi resistance, but in sympathy with, would be accepted by the Arab governments, the Arab (...specifically Iraqi) resistance would achieve the equivalent of the occupying or colonial powers. |
| Comment pos ted: by eric lindblad on 02 Oct 2007 - 00:31 |
Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer
By: C. A. "Bert" Fowler
Englishman Frederick W. Lanchester (1868-1946) was a major contributor to the fo undation of automotive and aeronautical engineering. He also published works on radio, acoustics, warfare, and even relativity. His equations of combat form the basis of the science of operations research. (These equations have been used to formulate business strategy in recent times.) He was the first to describe the aeronautics of lift and drag. His automobile inventions include the gas engine starter, rack-and-pinion steering, disk brakes, four-wheel drive, and fuel injection.
In his historic 1916 paper "Mathematics in Warfare," Lanchester presents two sim ple differential equations relating force attrition to the number of forces or w eapons in opposition and to their effectiveness (see sidebar "Lanchester's Equat ions"). The equations' solutions show that the effectiveness of a force is direc tly proportional to the effectiveness of its weapons and to the square of its numbers. The following table illustrates how Lanchester's equations would apply in a classic artillery duel:
The Lanchester Exchange: Artillery Duel
Pk per round = 0.1
No. of Orange weapons / Start 200, 1st volley 200, 2nd 190, 3rd 176, 4th 172, 5 th 169, 6th 168. No. of Blue weapons / Start 100, 1st volley 80, 3rd 43, 4th 25, 5th 8, 6th 0.
The table shows 200 weapons arrayed against 100 weapons with equal kill probabil ities (Pk) of 10 percent. In the first round, Orange kills 20 Blues, and Blue ki lls 10 Oranges - leaving 190 Oranges to kill 19 of the remaining 80 Blues, while the Blues kill 8 Oranges in the second round. At the end of the sixth round, al l the Blues are gone and 168 Oranges (84 percent) remain.
Note that each side engages only the remaining live targets. If neither side can tell when it has killed a target, as in some artillery duels, both sides must c ontinue to shoot at all the targets, thereby wasting part of their efforts. Lanc hester analyzed this problem also and showed that the impact of numbers is a lin ear not square law.
Bob Everett, former president of The MITRE Corp., noted that that was reasonable , because in the square-law example, "you get one power from the number of weapo ns shooting at the other side and the other power from the reduced number of tar gets you have to shoot at."
The advantage of telling dead from live targets is one of the reasons that artil lery forces use spotters and counter-battery radar and that air forces use bomb- damage assessment after air attacks.
Of course, wars aren't fought in accordance with mathematical equations, and the re are many other important factors, including leadership, discipline, morale, t raining, and health. Nevertheless, analysis of battles between conventional forc es over the years has supported the thrust of Lanchester's Law: numbers do make a huge difference.
In the 1985 book Race to the Swift, British military analyst Richard E. Simpkin notes that "for a conflict between two large, sophisticated mechanized forces, o ne did not go far wrong with a '1.5 law' - a halfway house between Lanchester's two cases."
Lanchester's paper appears in Volume 4 of mathematician James Newman's delightfu l The World of Mathematics collection. (Incidentally, to give you some feeling o f what Newman thinks of our profession, he writes in his commentary on Lancheste r, "His writings on these matters, apart from high professional competence, exhi bit such striking independence of judgment and boldness of conception that it is surprising to learn he was an engineer." Oh, well.)
Lanchester and the Cold War
During the Cold War, in the strategic nuclear area, the United States wisely opt ed for parity in numbers and, generally, some superiority in weapons capability. However, in the tactical arena, the United States took a different approach. Th e Warsaw Pact nations had overwhelming numerical superiority in almost all categ ories of conventional forces - infantry, tanks, artillery, tactical aircraft, and so on - ranging from 2:1 to 5:1. NATO based its counter to such numbers on a substantial conventional force plus tactical nuclear weapons. The plan called for 15 000 nuclear weapons: artillery shells, warheads for surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (SSMs and SAMs), and nuclear bombs for tactical aircraft. Although most of the weapons were fabricated - deployment to Europe was limited to about 7000 - the threat of their use effectively countered any Warsaw Pact offensive capability for more than two decades.
Overall, one ruefully concludes that it is unlikely there is a military or a mil itary-technical solution to the low-tech asymmetric warfare in Iraq.
However, over time, similar advances by the Soviets overtook that "solution," an d there were concerns about crossing the nuclear threshold and triggering strate gic exchanges. Therefore, NATO began considering a conventional solution to the numerical disparity.
In the mid-1970s, as the United States started to rebound from the Vietnam War, key analyses by BDM International (a defense consulting and research firm) and M artin Marietta prompted the U.S. Department of Defense to readdress the conventi onal-force imbalance. One effort was a Defense Science Board (DSB) study in 1976 titled "Conventional Counters to a Pact Attack." The charge was to see what technology could do to help counter the numerical discrepancy.
Early in the study, one of the board members, MITRE's Ed Key, pointed out the re levance of Lanchester's Law, and it became a major theme of the study. The first conclusion of the DSB study noted the importance of a surveillance system that could provide NATO forces an accurate and timely picture of enemy force distribu tion with an appropriate command, control, and communications (C3) structure, which together would allow commanders to achieve, in some cases, local numerical superiority and, in others, to avoid local numerical inferiority.
A second thrust was to seek systems for asymmetrical engagements whose effective ness would be sufficiently great to overcome numerical square-law advantages. Be cause, for example, it would be nearly impossible to make NATO tanks nine times as good as Warsaw Pact tanks to overcome the 3:1 numerical advantage, other mean s of effectively attacking tanks, whereby the tank had essentially zero capability against the attacker, were sought. Several promising approaches were identified and many more were conceived by the Defense Department and vigorously pursued.
The thrust of asymmetrical engagements is to avoid force against a numerically s uperior similar force until the enemy force has been substantially weakened. The combination of those capabilities led to the term "force multiplier," which rap idly became a buzzword in the military community.
The third finding of the DSB study was: if good surveillance and C3 were good fo r NATO, then countering or disrupting Warsaw Pact surveillance and C3 would be b ad for the enemy. The Defense Department launched a substantial C3 countermeasur es (C3CM) effort, and the term "force divider" was born. C3CM is yet another for m of asymmetric engagement.
By the late 1970s, Defense Department speeches were awash with Lanchester. To re phrase an old maxim: You couldn't throw an empty beer bottle through a window wi thout hitting some major giving a talk on Lanchester's equations.
Lanchester and the Gulf War
Meanwhile, throughout the last half of the 1970s and through the 1980s, Bill Per ry, then Defense Department undersecretary for research and engineering, and his successors concentrated on developing a set of capabilities that would reduce t he Warsaw Pact's numerical advantages. Developments included better platforms (s uch as the M-1 tank), systems for vastly reducing the effectiveness of some enemy systems (such as stealth aircraft and C3CM approaches), and systems for greatly improved surveillance, C3, and asymmetric engagements.
Although, happily, war with the Warsaw Pact alliance was avoided, the success an d broad applicability of U.S. efforts were demonstrated by the rapidity and comp leteness of the 1991 Persian Gulf War victory.
Here are two interesting examples:
1. Opening attacks by Tomahawk cruise missiles and stealth aircraft crippled the Iraqi C3 system. Those attacks were followed by air-launched anti-radiation mis siles to finish off the high-altitude SAMs, which allowed U.S. tactical aircraft to operate with relative impunity above the coverage of short-range infrared mi ssiles and "plink" enemy tanks and artillery with laser-guided bombs.
2. Before completing its encirclement, the famous deceptive "left hook" was appa rently discovered, and an Iraqi force attempted to move into a blocking position . This movement was detected by the JointSTARS aircraft, which uses a special ra dar to detect and track moving ground vehicles.
In discussing the lopsided outcome of the Gulf War, Perry compared it to a baske tball game that ended 100-1. Could the winning team have shot that much better o r rebounded, defended, and passed that much better? No, the team that lost was b lindfolded, and the team that won had perfect vision.
The war's Desert Storm operation was unquestionably one of the most studied of a ll time. Many groups and nations analyzed it. India, for example, produced a fiv e-volume report.
The principal conclusion was that U.S. capabilities in conventional tactical war s were so great and represented such a sizable investment that no sensible natio n would challenge the United States in a direct conventional war, provided it re tained such capabilities. Suggested countermeasures were generally in two catego ries: high tech and low tech.
High Tech: Nearly all studies noted that the overwhelming U.S. capabilities depe nded on large air bases and logistic supply centers near the war zone. The high- tech counter would be to make such facilities dangerous to use. Such a counter w ould provide, much as the newer U.S. capabilities have, huge leverage and repres ent a significant asymmetric engagement capability.
Low Tech: It was also noted that, whereas in past battles between conventional f orces the relative size and capabilities of the forces played a dominant role, t here have been many cases where one side with grossly inadequate conventional fo rces, or none at all, adopted tactics that offset conventional capabilities. The difficulties the U.S. military had in the Vietnam War were especially noted and, thus, the low-tech counters suggested were forms of guerrilla warfare, including urban and jungle operations. Such low-tech counters largely avoid traditional battles and, therefore, thwart the effectiveness of most modern military capabilities. In addition, without conventional engagements, neither Lanchester nor its counters apply.
In the 1990s, the United States continued developing advanced asymmetric engagem ent capabilities, including greatly improved surveillance, situation awareness, and Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided weapons. Meanwhile, several nations, drawing on the lessons learned from Desert Storm, pursued the high-tech counter. Iran, North Korea, Syria, India, and Pakistan developed longer range, more accurate ballistic missiles that would allow them to put any nearby bases at risk and, thus, attenuate or deny U.S. capabilities.
For example, the Iranian Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), w ith a 1-ton warhead and a range of 1200 miles, can cover the entire Arabian Peni nsula and more. Such a weapon, even with a conventional warhead, could create se rious problems for the United States. With a WMD warhead, the situation probably would be untenable. The Shahab-3 is a derivative of the North Korean Nodong missile. Clearly, the deterrent value of IRBMs is greatly increased if they have nuclear warheads—which probably accounts for the priority efforts by Iran and North Korea to develop such missiles.
The military value of the further enhanced U.S. capabilities was demonstrated du ring the rapid defeat in 2002 and 2003 of Afghan and Iraqi forces using conventi onal combat.
After rapidly defeating the Iraqi military and toppling its dictator, the United States set about rebuilding the country and creating a democratic form of gover nment. However, the U.S.-organized coalition has faced a serious insurgency prob lem in Iraq (and, to some extent, in Afghanistan). By adopting the low-tech less ons learned from the first Iraq war, the insurgents have resorted to an extreme form of asymmetry, the tactics of terrorism.
(Note: The use of terrorism by Islamic extremists is now frequently referred to as "asymmetric warfare.")
Lanchester and the Iraq War
The United States finds itself, once again, in a situation where its superb mili tary capabilities are largely ineffective. The U.S. military is, in a sense, now on the other side of the Lanchester equation. As in Vietnam, it has great numer ical superiority over its enemy but has yet to find effective ways to deal with low-tech counters.
Lanchester's Law deals with the forces engaged. By choosing the time, place, and type of action, the insurgents can achieve a huge asymmetric advantage and even , in some cases, local numerical superiority. An improvised explosive device (IE D) can be covertly planted by a few people and later remotely detonated by a sin gle, hidden individual. The insurgents can organize an attack or ambush on a small number of our troops where they have numerical advantage.
At this point, we've stretched Lanchester well beyond its applicability. A colle ague has noted that Lanchester applies to armies fighting according to Marquis o f Queensberry rules, something guerrillas and terrorists don't do.
The problem for the conventional force is finding and identifying someone to fig ht. The only way greater numbers help is that more troops can search more areas and monitor more streets, buildings, and borders. The problem is made even more difficult because the insurgents are not necessarily trying to win a battle. (Af ter all, in Vietnam, U.S. forces decisively won nearly all the military battles.)
There's an old saying, "To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail." H istory suggests this additional version: "To the leaders of a nation with an ove rwhelmingly powerful military, every problem looks like it has a military soluti on."
Clearly, though, current U.S. military capabilities, overwhelming as they are, h ave not allowed the United States to squelch the insurgency.
Here's another "hammer-nail" observation: "To a nation with a superb technology base, every problem, including military ones, looks like it has a technology sol ution." The United States, as it has frequently done, has turned to technology t o provide solutions. The record is mixed.
Technology and Asymmetry
World War II was the first time the United States organized the national scienti fic community to aid in the war effort. President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved establishment of the National Defense Research Committee and the Office of Scie ntific Research and Development (OSRD). Directed by Vannevar Bush of the Massach usetts Institute of Technology, the OSRD created scientific centers to address major military issues. Each had civilian leadership and near total freedom from federal government interference. The largest were the MIT Radiation Lab, which developed nearly all the U.S. microwave radars; the Harvard Radio Research Lab, which developed intercept and jamming systems; and the Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic bomb.
Each of those organizations had a close, constructive working relationship with the uniformed military, and the use of technology to address military problems w orked magnificently. After World War II, a strong coupling continued between the Defense Department and the scientific community at the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore labs. With strong emphasis on the strategic area, including continental air defense, conventional forces had about zero technical attention until the Vietnam War.
During the Vietnam War, in spite of overwhelming superiority in conventional mil itary capability, the United States was unable to figure out how to deal with th e enemy's guerrilla warfare other than using nuclear weapons or invading North V ietnam. (In retrospect, it seems clear that neither approach would have achieved a favorable long-term outcome for the United States.)
The U.S. military fielded many new systems in Vietnam, including "people sniffer s," quiet airplanes, portable combat surveillance radars, infrared imaging detec tors, and a system designed to interdict the flow of supplies down the Ho Chi Mi n Trail from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong in the south, the so-called McNamara Line. (The McNamara Line is worth further comment, because the approach, as implemented, made the common error of ignoring "feedback" - that is the reaction of those affected to changed circumstances.)
The basic idea for the interdiction system came from JASON, a group of largely a cademic scientists who address various difficult Defense Department problems - u sually during a lengthy summer study. The system consisted of many acoustic and seismic sensing devices planted along the trail to detect people and vehicles; a comprehensive communications network tying everything together; and a large, computer-based control station in Thailand to analyze the sensor inputs and to control air strikes against the movers.
After the United States created and deployed the large, creative system and devo ted thousands of air sorties as part of the operation, sufficient supplies conti nued to flow to the Viet Cong. In spite of its massive technology effort, the Un ited States continued to suffer casualties and made little, if any, progress in winning the war. (It should be noted, though, that those technology efforts resulted in a number of significant additions to U.S. conventional capabilities, such as infrared detectors for night operations, laser-guided bombs, unattended ground sensors, and gunships.)
One can't help but be struck by the disturbing similarity to the U.S. drug inter diction program, where in spite of massive expenditures of resources, the street price has remained relatively constant.
Lanchester and Low Technology
In the case of the Ho Chi Min Trail supply system, the enemy mustered enough red undancy and slack to meet demand in spite of the Americans' best efforts to coun ter it.
Both the Ho Chi Min Trail and the illegal drug supply system designs include eno ugh redundancy and slack to meet demand in spite of the best efforts to counter them. Moreover, neither technology nor major military or similar efforts have pr ovided a satisfactory solution to the problem. In many ways, dealing with insurg ents in Iraq is similar. There are many different situations, circumstances, and times where terrorism can be employed. The place, time, and type of action are decided by the insurgents, who are not trying to win battles, just the "war," and their timescale is very long.
When IEDs and suicide bombers began showing up, the United States brought its va st technological and intelligence resources to bear. There is a major effort by industry, not-for-profits, government labs, and the entire intelligence apparatu s to counter the threats and to track down the insurgents and their leaders.
Many clever devices, techniques, and systems have been developed and fielded, an d a number of isolated successes have been achieved. Although the efforts have h elped and other devices and systems are likely to be deployed and to help, the U nited States remains a long way from solving the problem. As with the Viet Cong, the insurgents have an almost endless variety of options.
It turns out that having a great technological capability and relying on it may be a disadvantage. I recently ran across T.E. Lawrence's Principles of Insurgenc y. Each is pungent and seemingly applicable to Iraq, especially the second and f ourth ones:
1. A successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base.
2. The guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy.
3. The enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy
the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.
4. The guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement.
5. The irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence, and logistical independence.
6. The irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enem y's logistics and signals vulnerabilities.
On reading the rules, one can't help but wish someone in authority had studied t hem prior to the invasion decision.
Summary
Let's recap. Starting in the mid-1970s, the United States turned its attention t o countering the Warsaw Pact's substantial numerical superiority in conventional weapons, principally through the use of advanced technology. The U.S. effort, w hich continued throughout the 1990s, resulted in the creation of many important military capabilities.
By the end of the century, those capabilities - supplemented by an emphasis on e xcellent training facilities and programs involving many exercises - produced th e most capable military force ever assembled. It was a force that rapidly defeat ed a major Iraqi force and a scattered Taliban force with minimal U.S. losses. H owever, it is designed to fight against other military forces; it is neither designed for nor capable of countering a determined insurgency.
Overall, one ruefully concludes that it is unlikely there is a military or a mil itary-technical solution to the low-tech asymmetric warfare in Iraq.
That is not to say that technology won't play a part in homeland defense. It wil l and should play an important role.
And then there is the broader issue of worldwide Islamic violence, which some ha ve also called asymmetric warfare or, as a British analyst said after the London subway tragedies, a "revolution in the nature of conflict." Here, also, it woul d seem that the eventual solutions will lie outside the military and military-te chnical realms.
About the Author.
IEEE Fellow Charles A. "Bert" Fowler of C.A. Fowler Associates has been a consul tant to industry and government since 1986. His major field is electronics, with specialties in radar; command, control, and communications (C3); counter-C3; in telligence; and military systems. He has held a wide range of industrial positio ns, most recently as senior vice president of MITRE Corp. He was a member of the Defense Science Board (Chair 1984-1988) and the Defense Intelligence Agency, Science and Technology Advisory Board (Chair 1976-1982); and is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Sidebar 1
Lanchester's Equations
Lanchester argued that the effectiveness of a force is directly proportional to the effectiveness of its weapons and to the square of its numbers.
dO/dt = - cB
dB/dt = - kO
O = Orange force size (number) k = Effectiveness of Orange weapons B = Blue forc e size (number) c = Effectiveness of Blue weapons
This is the solution for these equations, giving the relationship between Blue a nd Orange.
(O/Oo)2 = 1 - 1/(kO0 2/cB0 2) + (B/B0)2/(kO02/cB02)
Oo = initial or starting number of Orange force
Bo = initial or starting number of Blue force
Designating the parameter, kOo)2/cBo)2, as _,
O/Oo = √[1 - 1/_ + (B/Bo)2/_]
This is the famous Lanchester Square Law of numerical superiority.
The basic equations must be modified to reduce the attrition by the ratio of the numbers of remaining live targets to the total initial targets as shown here.
dO/dt = - cBxO/Oo
dB/dt = - kOxB/Bo
The relation between surviving forces becomes:
O/Oo = 1 - 1/ _ + (B/Bo)/_
It's a linear relationship. |
| Comment pos ted: by eric lindblad on 02 Oct 2007 - 00:32 |
Bibliography of F. W. Lanchester's Writings
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"British aeroplane policy," 10.2.16, and 17.2.16.
"Aircraft policy," 23.3.16, and 30.2.16.
"Air defence problems," 20.3.16, 27.4.16 and 4.5.16.
"The rise and fall of the French air ministry," 11.5.16.
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"The air board," 15.6.16.
"The sea and air," 29.6.16.
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Articles in Flying, London -
"The air raid of July 7th," 18.7.17.
"Formation flying," 25.7.17, 1.8.17 and 8.8.17.
"A campaign of slander," 15.8.17.
"Flying as affected by the wind," 29.8.17, 12.9.17 and 26.9.17.
"Reprisals," 10.10.17 and 17.10.17.
"Vertical climb and the chaser of the future," 14.11.17 and 21.11.17.
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| Comment pos ted: by eric lindblad on 02 Oct 2007 - 01:25 |
From uruknet.info :: Article nr. 36819 sent on 01-oct-2007 17:15 ECT.
1 ..."The immediate unity of all the Resistance factions. The non existence of t he unity of all the Iraqi Resistance factions and the relying on ideological und erstanding, is a dangerous lacuna which might divide the Resistance instead of u nifying it."
"Our Party warns from the dangers of some known Islamic currents which consider many of the fundamental combating factions in the Iraqi Resistance and in the Ir aqi patriotic forces, as infidels or Takfiris..and fight them either by arms or through Takfiri Fatwas.."
- - -
The Jihadi Salafis are used by the occupiers whether such members are informed o r not of such Western intentions. They are used with the intention to weaken the support of the 'Iraqi' populace for the resistance. Another example of 'terrori sm' used to manipulate public sentiment, against a political platform, was the i nfiltration of the Red Brigades in Italy, wherein an imprisoned member of Brigate Rosse has admitted that they were used by the right-wing. It was intended that public sentiment would shift away from the support of left-wing political parties and/or agendas, thereby. |
| Comment pos ted: by eric lindblad on 02 Oct 2007 - 01:47 |
It was inevitable after the dismantling of the Soviet Union that the West would make a play for the Middle Eastern oil. It was the final prize of the Cold War, the engagement for which military units fought in the mother of all battles, whi ch ...President Saddam Hussein so diligently prepared for, and which now likely will result in the dismantling of the “four great pillars” of international finance capital, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States, in terms of capital accumulation, finance control, nationalization of energy and transportation sectors, substitution of the militia for the standing army, and adoption of pacifist constitutions. The premise of the Postdam Conference may be respected, with liberal democratic (Rechtsstaat) constitutions remaining in effect in Western states, minus the right to make war and to maintain standing armies.
Eric Lindblad |
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