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:: Articolo n. 4138 postato il 12-jul-2004 19:43 ECT
Saddam può chiamare la CIA in sua difesa
Sanjay Suri, Nuovi Mondi Media
Uno dei capi d'accusa del processo contro Saddam Hussein è l'uso di agenti chimici nel massacro di Halabja in cui morirono migliaia di curdi. Saddam assicura di essere venuto a conoscenza del massacro dai giornali. Nessuno gli ha creduto. Ora, però, c'è una testimonianza a suo favore che potrebbe cambiare il corso del processo: viene addirittura da un ufficiale della CIA.
Le prove fornite da un importante uomo della CIA possono confermare la testimonianza fornita da Saddam Hussein all’apertura del processo svoltosi giovedì a Baghdad, nella quale egli ha assicurato di essere venuto a conoscenza del massacro di Halabja soltanto dai giornali.
A quanto riferito, sono migliaia i curdi iracheni morti nel massacro chimico avvenuto nel marzo 1988 ad Halabja, nel nord dell’Iraq, e nella guerra durata otto anni tra Iraq e Iran. L'uso di armi chimiche nel massacro dei curdi è stato per lungo tempo attribuito ad Ali Hassan al-Majid, soprannominato in occidente 'Ali il chimicò per il suo coinvolgimento nella faccenda. Saddam Hussein è fortemente sospettato di aver ordinato ad Ali di compiere il "massacro chimico".
Il massacro di Halabja è uno dei più forti capi d’accusa mossi contro Saddam dal tribunale di Baghdad. Quando l’accusa è stata formulata, Saddam ha replicato dicendo di aver letto del massacro su un giornale. Saddam ha smentito fin da subito le accuse in questione. Ma ora, con il processo in corso, può chiamare in causa un testimone in sua difesa e far cadere l’accusa, creando uno dei maggiori disastri diplomatici che gli Stati Uniti abbiano mai conosciuto.
Un rapporto preparato dai vertici ufficiali della CIA afferma che Saddam Hussein non è responsabile del massacro, indicandolo piuttosto come un gesto a opera degli Iraniani. Inoltre, l’indagine Scott sul ruolo del governo Britannico ha raccolto le prove secondo le quali, dopo il massacro, gli Stati Uniti avrebbero di fatto dotato Saddam Hussein di armi chimiche per combattere gli iraniani.
In pochi credono che realmente un uomo della CIA possa presenziare a un’udienza al tribunale di Baghdad in difesa di Saddam. Ma in questo caso il pezzo grosso della CIA ha reso pubbliche le prove di cui è in possesso e che sono state diffuse per più di un anno.
L’ufficiale della CIA Stephen C. Pelletiere era il senior analista in Iraq durante la guerra Iran-Iraq. Come docente all’ Army War College dal 1988 al 2000, ha detto di essere al corrente di gran parte del materiale segreto che circolava verso il Golfo Persico passando per Washington .
Inoltre, ha dichiarato di aver capeggiato, nel 1991, un’indagine militare nell’ambito della quale gli Iracheni avrebbero combattuto una guerra contro gli Stati Uniti, e la versione segreta della relazione avrebbe spiegato nel dettaglio il caso di Halabja.
Pelletiere ha reso nota l’informazione il 31 Gennaio scorso in un lungo editoriale sul New York Times dal titolo 'Un crimine di guerra o un atto di guerra?' L’articolo, che metteva in discussione una delle principali accuse di questa guerra, riportava una citazione del presidente George W. Bush che diceva: "Il dittatore che ha radunato le più pericolose armi del mondo le ha anche utilizzate su interi villaggi, uccidendo migliaia di suoi stessi cittadini morti o lasciandoli ciechi o sfigurati".
Pelletiere ha dichiarato che la Defence Intelligence Agency statunitense svolse delle indagini e elaborò un rapporto segreto sul massacro chimico di Halabja, che circolò all’interno dell’intelligence community. "Quello studio affermava che era stato il gas iraniano ad aver ucciso i Curdi, non quello iracheno", ha scritto sul New York Times.
"L’agenzia ha scoperto che entrambe le fazioni in guerra avevano fatto uso di armi chimiche le une contro le altre durante la battaglia di Halabja", ha dichiarato Pelletiere. "Le condizioni dei cadaveri dei Curdi presentavano però caratteristiche tali da far supporre che il gas letale fosse un coagulante del sangue – cioè un gas a base di cianuro – che l’Iran era solito utilizzare. "Gli Iracheni, sospettati di aver utilizzato gas nervino durante la battaglia, non erano in possesso di gas coagulanti all’epoca".
Pelletiere ha scritto che questi fatti "sono stati a lungo di dominio pubblico ma, in modo del tutto straordinario, come spesso ricordato nell’ambito del caso Halabja, raramente menzionati."
Pelletiere ha anche scritto che Saddam Hussein ha molto da rispondere in tema di violazione dei diritti umani. "Ma accusarlo di aver gasato i suoi stessi concittadini ad Halabja compiendo un vero e proprio genocidio non è corretto, perché a mano a mano che si ottengono nuove informazioni si scopre che tutti i casi in cui sono stati utilizzati gas letali c’era di mezzo una battaglia. E queste sono tragedie di guerra. Possono esistere delle giustificazioni per l’invasione dell’Iraq, ma Halabja non è una di queste."
Pelletiere ha mantenuto la propria posizione. Tutto ciò che Saddam deve fare ora è citare l’articolo del New York Times anche nel caso in cui il Tribunale non chiami in causa Pelletiere. I problemi esposti nell’articolo potrebbero essere sufficienti per sollevare seri quesiti circa le accuse mosse a Saddam – e di conseguenza circa le giustificazioni date lo scorso anno per l’invasione dell’ Iraq.
Lo sterminio di Halabja è stato citato non soltanto da Bush ma anche dal Primo Ministro Britannico Tony Blair per giustificare il suo appoggio agli Stati Uniti nell’invasione dell’ Iraq. Un dossier del governo Britannico reso pubblico per giustificare la guerra in Iraq dice che "Saddam ha fatto uso di armi chimiche non solo contro un nemico dello Stato, ma anche contro la sua stessa gente."
Il rapporto di un’indagine del 1996 compiuta da Lord Justice Scott ha reso noto come l’affare delle armi in Iraq abbia inciso negativamente su quanto avvenuto dopo Halabja. In seguito all’utilizzo di gas chimici nel 1988, sia gli Stati Uniti che la Gran Bretagna hanno iniziato a rifornire Saddam Hussein con quantitativi ancora maggiori di armi chimiche.
L’indagine Scott ha preso il via nel 1992 in seguito al crollo del processo sul caso Matrix Churchill, un’azienda britannica che avrebbe consegnato materiale militare all’Iraq.
Tre dei principali dirigenti della Matrix Churchill hanno affermato che il governo era al corrente di cosa stava facendo l’azienda e che il direttore Paul Henderson aveva regolarmente fornito informazioni sull’Iraq alle agenzie dell’intelligence britannica.
L’indagine ha rivelato i dettagli della decisione segreta del governo britannico di continuare a rifornire Saddam di materiali militari anche dopo il massacro di Halabja.
Il segretario degli Esteri Geoffrey ha scritto che la fine della guerra Iraq-Iran avrebbe significato "maggiori opportunità per l’industria britannica" nelle esportazioni militari, ma era intenzionato a mantenere celata la questione.
"Potrebbe sembrare davvero cinico se subito dopo aver mostrato un sentimento di offesa relativamente al trattamento riservato ai Curdi adottassimo un approccio più flessibile alla vendita delle armi," è stato ufficialmente dichiarato nel corso dell’indagine Scott. Lord Scott ha condannato la decisione del governo di cambiare la propria politica, mantenendo allo stesso tempo all’oscuro i deputati e il pubblico.
Subito dopo l’attacco, gli Stati Uniti hanno approvato l’esportazione in Iraq di colture virali e un contratto da un miliardo di dollari per la progettazione e la costruzione di un impianto petrolchimico che gli iracheni hanno programmato di utilizzare per la produzione di gas nervino.
Fino a questo momento Saddam Hussein si è sempre presentato senza un avvocato difensore. Un’azienda giordana si occuperà di fargli da portavoce. Ma la sua vera difesa potrebbe venirgli da Washington e da Londra.
Tradotto da Laura Franchini per Nuovi Mondi Media
For Fair Use Only
Articolo originale: http://www.uruknet.info/?p=3973
FLASHBACK: A War Crime or an Act of War?
Stephen C. Pelletiere The New York Times
MECHANICSBURG, Pa., Jan. 31, 2003 - It was no surprise that President Bush, lacking smoking-gun evidence of Iraq's weapons programs, used his State of the Union address to re-emphasize the moral case for an invasion: "The dictator who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages, leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind or disfigured."
The accusation that Iraq has used chemical weapons against its citizens is a familiar part of the debate. The piece of hard evidence most frequently brought up concerns the gassing of Iraqi Kurds at the town of Halabja in March 1988, near the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. President Bush himself has cited Iraq's "gassing its own people," specifically at Halabja, as a reason to topple Saddam Hussein.
But the truth is, all we know for certain is that Kurds were bombarded with poison gas that day at Halabja. We cannot say with any certainty that Iraqi chemical weapons killed the Kurds. This is not the only distortion in the Halabja story.
I am in a position to know because, as the Central Intelligence Agency's senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and as a professor at the Army War College from 1988 to 2000, I was privy to much of the classified material that flowed through Washington having to do with the Persian Gulf. In addition, I headed a 1991 Army investigation into how the Iraqis would fight a war against the United States; the classified version of the report went into great detail on the Halabja affair.
This much about the gassing at Halabja we undoubtedly know: it came about in the course of a battle between Iraqis and Iranians. Iraq used chemical weapons to try to kill Iranians who had seized the town, which is in northern Iraq not far from the Iranian border. The Kurdish civilians who died had the misfortune to be caught up in that exchange. But they were not Iraq's main target.
And the story gets murkier: immediately after the battle the United States Defense Intelligence Agency investigated and produced a classified report, which it circulated within the intelligence community on a need-to-know basis. That study asserted that it was Iranian gas that killed the Kurds, not Iraqi gas.
The agency did find that each side used gas against the other in the battle around Halabja. The condition of the dead Kurds' bodies, however, indicated they had been killed with a blood agent - that is, a cyanide-based gas - which Iran was known to use. The Iraqis, who are thought to have used mustard gas in the battle, are not known to have possessed blood agents at the time.
These facts have long been in the public domain but, extraordinarily, as often as the Halabja affair is cited, they are rarely mentioned. A much-discussed article in The New Yorker last March did not make reference to the Defense Intelligence Agency report or consider that Iranian gas might have killed the Kurds. On the rare occasions the report is brought up, there is usually speculation, with no proof, that it was skewed out of American political favoritism toward Iraq in its war against Iran.
I am not trying to rehabilitate the character of Saddam Hussein. He has much to answer for in the area of human rights abuses. But accusing him of gassing his own people at Halabja as an act of genocide is not correct, because as far as the information we have goes, all of the cases where gas was used involved battles. These were tragedies of war. There may be justifications for invading Iraq, but Halabja is not one of them.
In fact, those who really feel that the disaster at Halabja has bearing on today might want to consider a different question: Why was Iran so keen on taking the town? A closer look may shed light on America's impetus to invade Iraq.
We are constantly reminded that Iraq has perhaps the world's largest reserves of oil. But in a regional and perhaps even geopolitical sense, it may be more important that Iraq has the most extensive river system in the Middle East. In addition to the Tigris and Euphrates, there are the Greater Zab and Lesser Zab rivers in the north of the country. Iraq was covered with irrigation works by the sixth century A.D., and was a granary for the region.
Before the Persian Gulf war, Iraq had built an impressive system of dams and river control projects, the largest being the Darbandikhan dam in the Kurdish area. And it was this dam the Iranians were aiming to take control of when they seized Halabja. In the 1990's there was much discussion over the construction of a so-called Peace Pipeline that would bring the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates south to the parched Gulf states and, by extension, Israel. No progress has been made on this, largely because of Iraqi intransigence. With Iraq in American hands, of course, all that could change.
Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in a way that probably could not be challenged for decades - not solely by controlling Iraq's oil, but by controlling its water. Even if America didn't occupy the country, once Mr. Hussein's Baath Party is driven from power, many lucrative opportunities would open up for American companies.
All that is needed to get us into war is one clear reason for acting, one that would be generally persuasive. But efforts to link the Iraqis directly to Osama bin Laden have proved inconclusive. Assertions that Iraq threatens its neighbors have also failed to create much resolve; in its present debilitated condition - thanks to United Nations sanctions - Iraq's conventional forces threaten no one.
Perhaps the strongest argument left for taking us to war quickly is that Saddam Hussein has committed human rights atrocities against his people. And the most dramatic case are the accusations about Halabja.
Before we go to war over Halabja, the administration owes the American people the full facts. And if it has other examples of Saddam Hussein gassing Kurds, it must show that they were not pro-Iranian Kurdish guerrillas who died fighting alongside Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Until Washington gives us proof of Saddam Hussein's supposed atrocities, why are we picking on Iraq on human rights grounds, particularly when there are so many other repressive regimes Washington supports?
Stephen C. Pelletiere is author of "Iraq and the International Oil System: Why America Went to War in the Persian Gulf."
FLASHBACK: In Defense of Saddam Hussein
December 14, 2000
To: Barbara Crossette, New York Times
From: Jude Wanniski
Re: The Gassing of Iraq’s Kurds
We may have had this discussion before, Barbara, but perhaps not, so I’ll do it now. You report in your article ( "Iraq Is Forcing Kurds From Their Homes, the U.N. Reports", 12-11-00) that "[i]n 1987 and 1988, 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds were gassed to death with chemical agent by Mr. [Saddam] Hussein’s government." You attribute the claim to "American officials" but provide no further details. I’m fairly certain the claim that Saddam Hussein used chemical warfare against Iraqi Kurds was part of the demonization campaign against Iraq in preparation for the war against that country by the U.S. and its allies. What a monster! If he would slaughter his own people, he must be some kind of bad guy.
Let’s go back to 1988, when the patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Democratic Party had united and had joined in Iran’s war efforts against Iraq. Iraq was accused by Teheran of using mustard gas and cyanide against the Kurds in the Halabjeh region, but even the Iranians put the number of casualties at 3,000 to 5,000 -- never at the figures you cite. Although both Iran and Iraq had engaged in chemical warfare during their conflict, the deaths of civilians in Halabjeh provoked condemnation from throughout the world. Iraq denied the charges, but the campaign to attribute the atrocities to Iraq was already in full swing. Consequently, the disclosure by U.S. officials that Iran also had used chemical weapons at Halabjeh received little circulation in the media. This, despite the fact that the case against Iran, in fact, was very strong. For example, in reviewing classified information, U.S. analysts determined that the Kurds had been killed by cyanide, and that only the Iranians possessed cyanide gas at the time.
Not only was the evidence weak against Iraq and strong that Iran had carried out the chemical warfare attacks in Halabjeh, but subsequent charges that Iraq was carrying out further gas attacks on the Kurds were found to be without evidence. Turkish doctors treating ailing Kurds could not verify the use of poison gas on them, and the U.S. Army War College study in early 1990 also found it impossible to determine if gas had been used by the Iraqis in further attacks.
In the Spring of 1988, an anti-Iraq campaign was heating up, with various officials resurrecting the allegation that Saddam Hussein had gassed his own people. I am concerned such a campaign may be underway again, now that the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Iraq are beginning to break down. As a respected journalist, I think you have an obligation to provide the evidence to back up allegations such as the claim that 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds were gassed by Saddam Hussein. Check as much as you wish, but you will find no evidence for that charge. I enclose here memos I sent to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms in which I pointed out how recklessly U.S. policy toward Baghdad was being manipulated by the circulation of such charges. Please do some digging, lest you become a mere instrument of those in pursuit of a new offensive against Iraq.
* * * * *
November 18, 1998
Did Saddam Hussein Gas His Own People?
Memo To: Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor
From: Jude Wanniski
Re: Iraqi use of Poison Gas
On the Jim Lehrer News Hour Monday night, you repeated the assertion that Saddam Hussein "gassed his own people." As the President’s National Security Advisor, I had assumed you of all people would not make such assertions without having supporting evidence. Early this year, on the supposition that the Iraqi situation would blow up again, I made serious inquiries about this charge. On April 7, I sent the following memo to Chairman Jesse Helms of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If you have better information, Mr. Berger, I hope you can supply it, as this is the most serious of all charges made against Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis readily acknowledge using chemical weapons against Iran a few times late in the war, but using such weapons in wartime is not nearly as serious as "gassing his own people."
* * * * *
To Senator Helms:
I continue to make inquiry into the situation in Iraq, as it is likely to brew up into another crisis one of these days when the United Nations has no choice but to conclude that Iraq is not hiding any weapons of mass destruction -- or if they are, they are so well hidden that nobody is going to find them. As you know, I’m sure, the warhawks in the United States will continue to insist that the embargo remain in place no matter what, and there will be assertions from around the world that we have not been acting in good faith. As you also know, I believe there are serious questions regarding our behavior toward Iraq that go back further. You would agree, I think, that at the very least our State Department gave a "green light" to Saddam Hussein to go into Kuwait in August 1990. The more I read of the events of the period, the more I believe history will record that the Gulf War was unnecessary, perhaps even that Saddam Hussein was willing to retreat back to his borders, but our government decided we preferred the war to the status quo ante.
In my previous correspondence with you on this matter, I had been in a quandary about the state of our relations with Baghdad during that critical period. In the months immediately preceding the "green light" given by our Ambassador, April Glaspie, a number of your Senate colleagues including Bob Dole had traveled to Baghdad, met with Saddam, and found him to be a head of state worthy of support. Even Sen. Howard Metzenbaum [D-OH], a Jewish liberal and staunch supporter of Israel, gave him a seal of approval. What disturbs me even now, Jesse, is that these meetings occurred after the Senate Foreign Relations committee had accused Iraq of using poison gas against its own people, i.e., the Kurds. Like all other Americans, in recent years I had assumed that what I read in the papers was true about Iraq gassing its own people. Once the war drums again began beating last November, I decided to read up on the history, and found Iraq denied having used gas against its own people. Furthermore, I heard that a Pentagon investigation at the time had also turned up no hard evidence of Saddam gassing his own people.
This is serious stuff, because the United Nations tells us that 1.4 million Iraqi civilians have died as a result of the sanctions, which is three thousand times more than the number of Kurds who supposedly died of gassing at the hands of Saddam. Many of my old Cold Warrior friends practically DEMAND that we not lift the sanctions because if Saddam would gas his own people, he would gas anyone. Now I have come across the 1990 Pentagon report, published just prior to the invasion of Kuwait. Its authors are Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger, of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The report is 93 pages, but I append here only the passages having to do with the aforementioned issue:
Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East
Excerpt, Chapter 5
U.S. SECURITY AND IRAQI POWER
Introduction. Throughout the war the United States practiced a fairly benign policy toward Iraq. Although initially disapproving of the invasion, Washington came slowly over to the side of Baghdad. Both wanted to restore the status quo ante to the Gulf and to reestablish the relative harmony that prevailed there before Khomeini began threatening the regional balance of power. Khomenini’s revolutionary appeal was anathema to both Baghdad and Washington; hence they wanted to get rid of him.
United by a common interest, Iraq and the United States restored diplomatic relations in 1984, and the United States began to actively assist Iraq in ending the fighting. It mounted Operation Staunch, an attempt to stem the flow of arms to Iran. It also increased its purchases of Iraqi oil while cutting back on Iranian oil purchases, and it urged its allies to do likewise. All this had the effect of repairing relations between the two countries, which had been at a very low ebb.
In September 1988, however -- a month after the war had ended -- the State Department abruptly, and in what many viewed as a sensational manner, condemned Iraq for allegedly using chemicals against its Kurdish population. The incident cannot be understood without some background of Iraq’s relations with the Kurds. It is beyond the scope of this study to go deeply into this matter; suffice it to say that throughout the war Iraq effectively faced two enemies -- Iran and the elements of its own Kurdish minority. Significant numbers of the Kurds had launched a revolt against Baghdad and in the process teamed up with Tehran. As soon as the war with Iran ended, Iraq announced its determination to crush the Kurdish insurrection. It sent Republican Guards to the Kurdish area, and in the course of this operation -- according to the U.S. State Department -- gas was used, with the result that numerous Kurdish civilians were killed. The Iraqi government denied that any such gassing had occurred. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Schultz stood by U.S. accusations, and the U.S. Congress, acting on its own, sought to impose economic sanctions on Baghdad as a violator of the Kurds’ human rights.
Having looked at all of the evidence that was available to us, we find it impossible to confirm the State Department’s claim that gas was used in this instance. To begin with there were never any victims produced. International relief organizations who examined the Kurds -- in Turkey where they had gone for asylum -- failed to discover any. Nor were there ever any found inside Iraq. The claim rests solely on testimony of the Kurds who had crossed the border into Turkey, where they were interviewed by staffers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We would have expected, in a matter as serious as this, that the Congress would have exercised some care. However, passage of the sanctions measure through the Congress was unusually swift -- at least in the Senate where a unanimous vote was secured within 24 hours. Further, the proposed sanctions were quite draconian (and will be discussed in detail below). Fortunately for the future of Iraqi-U.S. ties, the sanctions measure failed to pass on a bureaucratic technicality (it was attached as a rider to a bill that died before adjournment).
It appears that in seeking to punish Iraq, the Congress was influenced by another incident that occurred five months earlier in another Iraqi-Kurdish city, Halabjah. In March 1988, the Kurds at Halabjah were bombarded with chemical weapons, producing a great many deaths. Photographs of the Kurdish victims were widely disseminated in the international media. Iraq was blamed for the Halabjah attack, even though it was subsequently brought out that Iran too had used chemicals in this operation, and it seemed likely that it was the Iranian bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds.
Thus, in our view, the Congress acted more on the basis of emotionalism than factual information, and without sufficient thought for the adverse diplomatic effects of its action. As a result of the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq is now the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf, an area in which we have vital interests. To maintain an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf to the West, we need to develop good working relations with all of the Gulf states, and particularly with Iraq, the strongest.
* * * * *
I wonder, Senator, had you ever read this material? The entire report is worth reading, as a matter of fact, because of its credibility on the threshold of the Iraqi invasion. The authors are quite emphatic, by the way, in stating that Iraq was struggling for its financial survival at this point -- because of its debts from the Iranian war, and the decline of the world oil price. That is, they did not believe Iraq would have expansionist designs in the Middle East for years to come, given how financially flattened they had been.
It does seem to me that if Congress did act more on the basis of emotionalism than factual information, it may have contributed substantially to the economic distress of our ally in the war with Iran. That is, by squeezing Saddam with sanctions that included a cutoff of IMF assistance, it thrust Saddam into the confrontation he had with the Emir of Kuwait over oil fields and better port access to the Gulf that the Iraqis claimed going back to World War I.
The more I pull on this piece of string, the more I believe you should commit resources of the Foreign Relations Committee to a review of this history. In this period, the Democrats did have control of Congress and another senator chaired Foreign Relations. It could be that a different viewpoint at a distance of time would enable even slight adjustments of policy. It is now a season where everyone is asking for apologies of events that occurred generations ago, even hundreds of years ago. We should deal today with those issues which could grow tomorrow into embarrassments for which our grandchildren will have to apologize. Meanwhile, I’ll continue to keep you informed as I collect this Iraqi ball of string.
What Happened at Halabja?
Memo To: David Remnick, editor, The New Yorker
From: Jude Wanniski
Re: Did Saddam Hussein Gas the Kurds at Halabja?
Yes, David, I know you are ticked at me for saying the article you ran last month about Saddam Hussein gassing the Kurds at Halabja, back in 1988, was pure propaganda by your new writer Jeffrey Goldberg. You also seem most distressed that I said you should have told your readers that Jeffrey has dual citizenship with Israel and served in the Israeli defence forces a few years back. I'm not pursuing this to rub it in, but because I am really worried that President George W. Bush read Goldberg's story and that it helped persuade him that it would be a good thing for him to do to eliminate Saddam. He did cite the story at a press conference, practically inviting the world to read it. Good for circulation, but in the long run a bad deal for civilization, if the story is bogus, as I believe it is. I'm not saying Goldberg "made it up," David. I'm only saying he was waltzed down a garden path toward false conclusions. It does not help to run several photographs of people whose skin seems to be coming off in chunks, I'm afraid. There is general agreement that several hundred people died by gassing at Halabja, a Kurdish town of 30,000 or so inside Iraq near the Iranian border, five months before the end of the eight-year Iran/Iraq war. Because your magazine said these ugly photos were of Iraqi Kurds inflicted harm by the Iraqi armed forces, your readers believed you, including Mr. Bush. Here are some thoughts I have on what happened at Halabja, based on all the work I've done over several years in trying to figure it out. I'll append a letter I got from an Iraqi expatriate, a doctor who lives in the UK, whose brother was at Halabja as an army colonel and is now retired. The doctor, Mohammed Obeidi, is not a fan of Saddam, but is not happy with the thought that his people could be falsely accused of genocide, killing their own citizens for some evil purpose.
* * * * *
First of all, remember the Iran/Iraq war began at the end of 1980. By March 16, 1988, several hundred thousand soldiers had died in the conflict. Iran, with 60 million people, was supposed to be able to defeat Iraq, with 20 million. But Saddam Hussein proved to be superior to the Ayatollah Khomeni in organizing resources. Historians now agree that by the end of 1987, the advantage had shifted to Iraq. The Iranians had in desperation thrown "human waves" of soldiers against Iraq, and Iraq had used mustard gas to turn that tide. They have acknowledged this use. In early 1988, Iraq was using Scud missiles to hit Teheran, and the Iranian government was reeling.
It was at this point that Halabja broke into the news. A relatively small unit of the Iranian army broke into the town from a point only a few miles from the border. They overwhelmed the Iraqi garrison. Two days later they were driven out as Iraqi reinforcements arrived from other points in the vicinity. At issue, David, is what happened between the rock and the hard place. As far as Jeffrey Goldberg is concerned, having interviewed citizens 14 years later, the Iraqis bombed this Iraqi town with poison gas in order to drive out these few Iranians. Now I might believe this, because I can believe almost anything that occurs in wartime, but in order for Goldberg to make the story hang together, he has to say the Iraqi Air Force dropped chemical bombs on Halabja in order to conduct medical experiments on their own citizens, as there were no reports from the Iranians that they had suffered casualties by poison gas. More on this later.
From day one, the Iraqi government insisted it had nothing to do with any poison gas being used on its own nationals, not even accidentally in attacks on the Iranian adversaries. The defense ministry said it would be ridiculous for them to use poison gas in the town when their forces were going in the direction of the Iranian retreat. The Army War College did conduct an inquiry soon thereafter and in April 1990 concluded that both Iran and Iraq had used gas in their warring exchanges, but that the horrible deaths at Halabja were almost certainly the result of gas in the Iranian inventory, gas not available to the Iraqis. You must admit, David, that Jeffrey Goldberg never even mentioned this report. The War College report had been widely reported in April 1990 and the principal author, Dr. Stephen Pelletiere, to this day insists that if there were citizens killed by Iraqi gas at Halabja, it was collateral in the Iraqi engagement with the Iranian army. His report says Iraq used gas, but he says he got this from the Defense Intelligence Administration and it may or may not be true.
I was contacted last month by an Iraqi expatriate, a doctor who lives in the UK. He informed me his brother, who had just retired as a general in the Iraqi army, was a colonel in 1988 when his regiment was sent to Halabja on the news that it had been occupied by the Iranians. I asked him for his brothers recollections and here is what Dr. Mohammed Obaidi e-mailed me last week:
* * * * *
Let me start this report by telling a little bit about the attitude and behaviour of the Ba'ath regime when it comes to defending themselves against a mistake they have committed or were about to commit. They initially prepare all their media by injecting them with false information regarding any particular act they did or were about to do, and once they committed that action, they release their media to defend the regime. In addition, all party members will be served with strict information of how to deny the action that took place and how to convince the people that the Iraqi regime DID NOT committed that mistake or error or anything else. In other words, the party members plus the media are ready.
What surprised the Iraqi people after gassing the Kurds in Halabja was that the Iraqi regime was not prepared at all to defend itself against the allegations that they were behind these gassings at a time when they were able to do so. It seems that they were taken by a surprise as the only thing they could do was to show on the national TV the result of that failed offence by the Iranians in Halabja. This was also confirmed to me by lot of people who were in Iraq at that time. However, the opposition to the Iraqi regime in Iraq, and particularly the Shiite (supported and supplied by Iran) turned the story to be as an act by the Iraqi regime against the Kurds.
As you will see from the map that I sent you, my brother was in Mosul, which is more than 100 kilometers from Halabja, when he received an order to move to Halabja a day before the attack by the Iranians. Although the distance was relatively short, but preparing a full regiment to move to a different area, it took them about two days to arrive to Halabja. The reason for the order to my brother's regiment to move to that area was based on military information that the Iranians were preparing to launch an attack from that particular region possibly with the help of fighters from one of the Kurd parties.
In that area, Iraq had two infantry regiments and one artillery battalion scattered on the hills surrounding Halabja. They were over 3000 soldiers.
On the other hand, however, it was well known even to the simple Iraqi's that during each attack by the Iranians, they usually send first the "revolutionary guards" to open the way for the military units by detonating the mines (if any) and also to absorb the first reaction from the Iraqi Army. For this reason, innocent Iranian civilians were killed in hundreds if not in thousands during each attack by the Iranian Army. My brother could not confirm the number of Iranians entered into the Iraqi territory at Halabja. But he thinks that after they bombarded Halabja with that kind of "gas" and entered the town, they were shocked to see what happened to the Kurds, and because of the heavy resistance by the Iraqi Army in the area who was in control (by being on the hillsides of the town), the Iranian and the Kurds (if any) were defeated within a few hours.
My brother could not add any more to what I have told you before. But what he told me today is that when his regiment arrived to the area, everything had finished and the Iraqis were back in control. By briefing from other Iraqi commanders who were already there, he learnt that no Iraqi aircraft or any other Iraqi military machines or units had started the fire before the Iranians attacked them. He also mentioned that the day his regiment arrived to Halabja, General Nezar Al-Khazraji, who then was deputy chief of staff, was in the area and had a meeting with all the commanders, where he was also very shocked and surprised of what happened to the Kurds.
My brother also mentioned to me that the allegation against Iraq must be untrue, as he believes if Iraq had used any sort of gas against the Kurds, they should have used it first against the invading Iranians, particularly when Iraq knew that they are about to launch an attack on that area, and second, Iraq should have used these "gases" against the Iranians when they occupied Um Kasr, the Iraqi harbour. (Legitimate questions with no answers!!!!!!)
My brother told me that one has to ask TWO VERY BIG questions, that is (A) since Iraq always knew from where the Iranians are about to launch an attack, why did the Iraqi Army not use its chemical weapons to stop the Iranians before they launch their attack? He thinks that the answer to this question is: (1) Either Iraq did not possess this kind of weapon at that time to use it against the Iranians, or (2) Iraq had these weapons but could not use them fearing a retaliation by the Iranians of using their own chemical weapons against the Iraqis. In all cases this means that Iran had definitely the chemical weapons before Iraq, which they have used in Halabja; and (B) Iraq lost during the war hundreds of thousands of soldiers, a large percent of them were University graduates, the brains of the country, and since Saddam's aim was to bring Iran to its knees, therefore, he could have used his chemical weapons to achieve his goal, similar to what the U.S. did to Japan when they used the atomic bombs. So, why did he not use it against the Iranians, but instead, if it was true, he used it against the Kurds?
It seems to me that the above questions are very logical ones; however, the answers to them will be left to those who think that Iraq had used chemical weapons against the Kurds.
* * * * *
If you would take the trouble to read Pelletiere's 2001 report on why oil played such an important role in the Gulf War, you would find he covers other specious information that Goldberg had spoon fed to him by the Kurd rebels, who have a vested interest in keeping alive the story that Saddam had slaughtered as many as 100,000 Kurds at the end of the war with Iran. It was our Secretary of State, George Shultz, who leveled this charge at Iraq as soon as the Iran/Iraq war was over, as it was convenient for our government to join Israel in making Iraq an enemy. In his book, Pelletiere says this was a "hoax, a non-event," as no bodies were ever discovered. In his March 25 report, David, Goldberg does go with the updated version of this hoax, peddled by Human Rights Watch, which is that Iraq actually used conventional weapons, i.e., bullets, to kill 100,000 Kurds, men and boys, and then bury them "in mass graves." Goldberg also notes the graves have never been found. Surely you must have raised an eyebrow in editing this material. There are only 4 million Iraqi Kurds, half of them women, another quarter youngsters or seniors. To wipe out 10% of the remainder in a few days with weapons and burials in mass graves should at least have produced some witnesses who escaped, or soldiers with remorse at slaughtering their fellow Iraqis in this fashion. Here is an account of Milton Viorst, a Washington Post reporter, who went to Kurdistan a few days after Shultz made his charge:
From what I saw, I would conclude that if lethal gas was used, it was not used genocidally -- that is, for mass killing. The Kurds compose a fifth of the Iraqi population, and they are a tightly knit community. If there had been large-scale killing, it is likely they would know and tell the world. But neither I nor any Westerner I encountered heard such allegations.
Nor did Kurdish society show discernible signs of tension. The northern cities, where the men wear Kurdish turbans and baggy pants, were as bustling as I had ever seen them. I talked to armed Kurds near the border, members of Iraqi military unites mobilized against the rebels.
On the other hand, Iraq probably used gas of some kind in air attacks on rebel positions. Journalists visiting the Turkish camps saw refugees with blistered skin and irritated eyes, symptoms of gassing. But doctors sent by France, the United Nations and the Red Cross have said these symptoms could have been produced by a powerful, but non-lethal tear gas.
Citing national security, Mr. Shultz has declined to submit the U.S. data to scrutiny, even by America's NATO allies, though State Department sources say it is the sort of information that the United States routinely shares with them. American officials acknowledge that Mr. Shultz's evidence, chiefly radio intercepts, may be subject to conflicting interpretations.
I hope you begin to see why you should not be ticked off at me for questioning the accuracy of the Goldberg piece. I actually could write several other pages of criticism of the piece, where it seems obvious he allowed himself to be managed by those in our government and in Israel who are eager to have a "regime change" in Baghdad as soon as possible. If I were you, I would conduct an independent inquiry, and if necessary alert your audience that they were misled. They were.
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